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Yliopistopaino 
Helsinki 2009 
ABSTRACT 
Strategy seems to have penetrated almost every organization nowadays, from global corpora-
tions to small businesses and public organizations. As a result, managers are obligated to fol-
low and submit themselves to the principles of strategic management, a discourse which has 
become an industry. This empirical research is part of a growing interest in understanding 
how strategy is practiced in organizations. Particularly, this work studies how managers, as 
central strategy practitioners, consume strategy.  
By drawing on the work of the late Michel de Certeau, the term consumption is adopted as a 
theoretical framework to explain and describe managers’ strategy usage. Consumption is an 
everyday activity that uses and applies strategy subtly, quietly and opportunistically for the 
users’ own purposes and ends, which may not comply with the original purpose of strategy. 
This is the art of using strategy.  
The research data were produced in three case organizations during 2003-2008. The first case 
organization is a global industrial organization (Industrial), the second a Finnish polytechnic 
(Polytechnic), and the third a Finnish insurance company (Insurance). Discourse analytic 
methods were used to analyze the data.  
The results show that the strategy consumption process consists of three overlapping and si-
multaneous elements. Firstly, five macro-discourses of strategy, militarism, mechanism, hu-
manism, pragmatism and spirituality are used as resources in strategy consumption. Secondly, 
managers (re)produce strategy by bringing it into being at the societal and organizational 
level. Here, strategy appears to managers rather unanimously as a way or means to reach the 
intended vision. Thirdly, managers make something out of strategy by using it originally and 
creatively for their own purposes through three different usage tactics.  
The instrumental tactic applies strategy as an instrument to legitimize and justify managers’ 
activities, solve problems, and lead their subordinates, among others. The playful tactic uses 
strategy through irony and humor. Here managers use strategy playfully to cope and entertain 
themselves, as a manifestation of cynicism and resistance. The intimate tactic takes strategy 
personally by constructing managers’ identity and subjectivity in relation to it. Managers may 
use strategy to glorify themselves as strategic leaders, submit themselves to it, or dis-identify 
themselves from it.  
The results capture the reciprocal dynamics between the micro and macro-levels of strategy 
practice. They shed light on the practice-oriented strategy research by showing how managers 
use and poach strategy – being unable to escape it – for their own intentions, with ways that 
depart from the conventional ideals of strategy. The findings also show how strategy con-
sumption is an artful discursive activity.  
As a practical contribution, the work discusses a number of ways in which individual manag-
ers can use and apply strategy in their work. The study also brings out factors that should be 
taken into account when constructing strategy processes and managing strategy work at or-
ganizations.  
Key words: Strategy, consumption, discourse, manager 
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Strategia näyttää tunkeutuneen nykyään lähes jokaiseen organisaatioon kansainvälisistä suur-
yrityksistä pienyrityksiin sekä julkisorganisaatioihin. Tämän seurauksena johtajat ovat velvoi-
tettuja seuraamaan ja alistumaan strategiseksi johtamiseksi kutsutun diskurssin periaatteisiin, 
josta on muodostunut lähes oma toimialansa. Tutkimus pyrkii ymmärtämään, miten strategiaa 
harjoitetaan organisaatioissa. Työssä keskitytään erityisesti siihen, miten johtajat kuluttavat 
strategiaa. 
Työssä nojaudutaan edesmenneen Michel de Certeaun kuluttamisen käsitteeseen, jota käyte-
tään teoreettisena viitekehyksenä selittämään ja kuvaamaan sitä, miten johtajat käyttävät stra-
tegiaa. Kuluttaminen on jokapäiväistä toimintaa, joka käyttää ja soveltaa strategiaa hienova-
raisesti, vähäeleisesti ja opportunistisesti kuluttajan omiin päämääriin ja pyrkimyksiin, jotka 
eivät aina käy yhteen strategian alkuperäisen tarkoituksen kanssa. Kyse on eräänlaisesta stra-
tegian käyttämisen taidosta.  
Tutkimusaineisto tuotettiin kolmessa case-organisaatiossa vuosina 2003-2008. Ensimmäinen 
organisaatio on kansainvälisesti toimiva teollisuusyritys (Industrial), toinen suomalainen 
ammattikorkeakoulu (Polytechnic) ja kolmas suomalainen vakuutusyhtiö (Insurance). Aineis-
to analysoitiin käyttämällä diskurssianalyyttisiä tutkimusmenetelmiä.  
Tulosten mukaan strategian kuluttamisen prosessi koostuu kolmesta päällekkäisestä ja saman-
aikaisesta osasta. Ensinnäkin viittä strategian makrodiskurssia, jotka ovat militarismi, meka-
nisti, humanismi, pragmatismi ja hengellisyys, käytetään resursseina strategian kuluttamises-
sa. Toiseksi johtajat toisintavat ja tuottavat strategian olemassaoloon yhteiskunnallisella ja 
organisaatiotasolla, jolloin strategia näyttäytyy heille suhteellisen yksimieleisesti matkana tai 
keinoina kohti haluttua visiota. Kolmanneksi johtajat hyödyntävät strategiaa käyttämällä sitä 
omaperäisesti ja luovasti omiin tarkoituksiinsa kolmen taktiikan kautta.  
Instrumentaalinen taktiikka käyttää strategiaa muun muassa instrumenttina legitimoidakseen 
ja perustellakseen johtajan toimintaa, ratkaistakseen ongelmia tai johtaakseen alaisiaan. Leik-
kimielinen taktiikka käyttää strategiaa ironian ja huumorin keinoin. Tällöin johtajat käyttävät 
strategiaa selviytyäkseen sekä viihdyttääkseen itseään osoituksena kyynisyydestä ja vastarin-
nasta. Intiimi taktiikka ottaa strategian henkilökohtaisesti rakentaen johtajien identiteettiä ja 
minuutta suhteessa strategiaan. Johtajat voivat käyttää strategiaa glorifioidakseen itsensä stra-
tegisina johtajina tai erottautuakseen siitä.  
Tulokset paljastavat vastavuoroisen dynamiikan, joka vallitsee mikro- ja makrotason strate-
giakäytäntöjen välillä. Ne valaisevat käytäntölähtöistä strategiatutkimusta osoittamalla, miten 
johtajat käyttävät ja kuluttavat strategiaa omiin tarkoituksiinsa tavoilla, jotka poikkeavat stra-
tegian perinteisistä ihanteista. Tulokset niin ikään osoittavat, että strategian kuluttaminen on 
taidokasta kielellistä toimintaa.  
Käytännön suosituksena tutkimus esittää joukon keinoja, joiden avulla yksittäinen esimies voi 
käyttää ja soveltaa strategiaa omassa jokapäiväisessä työssään. Tutkimus tuo myös esille teki-
jöitä, jotka tulisi ottaa huomioon organisaatiotasolla strategiaprosesseja suunnitellessa ja stra-
tegiatyötä johdettaessa.  
Avainsanat: Strategia, kuluttaminen, diskurssi, johtaja 
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PERSONAL PROLOGUE 
I became familiar with the concept of strategy by joining the STRADA project in 
2001 at the Helsinki University of Technology. STRADA is a research and develop-
ment program concentrating on studying and developing strategy practices and meth-
ods. From that moment on, I have been on a continuous journey of learning and ex-
periencing strategy work in different organizational settings. On that excursion, I have 
been engaged in strategy both as a researcher, consultant, and user. The motivation for 
studying strategy in this dissertation stems from these rich experiences.  
While working as a researcher and consultant with companies and public organiza-
tions, I have noted how strategy has conquered the world of organizing and become 
the most popular management discipline of our times. Indeed, strategy seems to pro-
vide managers and leaders with the ultimate means to manage and lead their organiza-
tions and people in a legitimized and justified manner. Although strategy has different 
emphases in different contexts, almost every organization seems to expect much from 
it. As a result, many things and practices are nowadays labeled as “strategic” in or-
ganizations, which is why the original meaning of the strategy concept has become 
vague. 
I have also had the privilege to discuss strategy with many managers and leaders and I 
have observed how they have discussed and communicated strategy in their organiza-
tions. Many of them have shown extraordinary skills in addressing strategy when 
seeking to influence their subordinates and other stakeholders. Here, they have used 
strategy artfully for their own purposes, which has been fascinating to observe and 
study. Also many other managers have explained to me how they have used strategy 
for different purposes in their work. These practical experiences and accounts have 
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confirmed my theoretical view of strategy as a social construction that is being con-
structed discursively. 
I am also a keen strategy user myself. Having worked as a Project Manager since 
2005, I have formulated various strategies together with my team. Some objectives 
included in them were realized with the desired way, others were not. Some of our 
realized strategies have been totally unexpected and emergent. However, on many oc-
casions, the process of formulating and creating a strategy itself has been the most 
fruitful part of strategizing in terms of mutual learning, knowledge sharing and collec-
tive sensemaking. Here strategy has provided us with a platform for analyzing the past 
and planning for the future. During the past few years, I have even created a personal 
strategy plan for myself, which includes the targets and goals that I want to achieve in 
my life. (Finishing a PhD thesis has been one of my personal strategic goals.) For me, 
such strategy has provided consistency and clarity in the course of life.  
However, all this has left me with many open questions concerning the practice of 
strategy. What is strategy all about, at the end of the day? What do we do when we are 
using strategy? Why do we use strategy? How do we use it? And for what purposes 
do we use it? These questions have driven me forward during the research process. 
My former senior colleagues at STRADA have each studied strategy practice from 
different angles in their dissertations, for instance, with regard to the social positions 
of individuals (Mantere 2003), middle managers (Ikävalko 2005), strategy implemen-
tation activities (Aaltonen 2007), and organizational identity (Hämäläinen 2007). 
With this work, I hope to contribute to this academic track by investigating the discur-
sive construction of strategy and, particularly, by showing how managers consume 
strategy.  
 
INTRODUCTION   
3 
1 INTRODUCTION 
“How do I see strategy? Well, that’s a good question, since I’ve been fussing 
with it for 20 years.” – Manager, Polytechnic 
Strategy has clearly become an institutional must for organizations. It has colonized 
the world of organizing and has become a popular, powerful and legitimized man-
agement discipline in our time. It is exceptional to come across an organization that 
does not have any plans or objectives labeled as strategic whether it is operating in the 
private, public or third sector. Indeed, strategy seems to have penetrated almost every 
organization obligating managers to follow and submit themselves to the principles of 
strategic management, a discourse (Knights & Morgan 1991) which has almost be-
come “an industry,” and whose members, like consultants, academics and managers, 
construct and produce strategies and strategic practices that are further applied in dif-
ferent organizational settings (Whittington 2006).  
Strategy discourse has power over us. It subjugates us, while we are repetitively par-
ticipating and performing its ceremonies and practices. It dominates the way we man-
age others and are managed ourselves. We take many aspects of it for granted, while 
we threat it as “a natural” feature of organizational life. (Knights & Morgan ibid.) As 
a consequence, organizations or managers that do not swear by the principles of stra-
tegic management are easily regarded as odd, unusual or un-legitimized.  
However, although strategy discourse seems to be a prevailing “management fash-
ion” (Clark 2004) and it is imposed on us by the zeitgeist, the spirit of the times, we 
are not prisoners of it, not totally. As the quote in the beginning of this chapter re-
veals, strategy is something you “fuss with.” This work investigates what this fuss, 
called strategy, is about. To do this, I apply the late French theorist Michel de 
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Certeau’s1 (1988) idea of “consumption” as a theoretical lens in this work to explain 
and understand how managers practice strategy. Consumption, as de Certeau calls it, 
is a collective activity that makes “transformations of and within the dominant cul-
tural economy in order to adapt it to its own interest and rules” (ibid., xiv). He de-
fines the nature of the consumption as the following:  
“’consumption’ […] characterized by its ruses, its fragmentation (the results of 
the circumstances), its poaching, its clandestine nature, its tireless but quiet ac-
tivity, in short by its quasi-invisibility, since its shows itself not in its own prod-
ucts but in an art of using those imposed on it.” (De Certeau 1988, 31) 
Although strategy is a dominant cultural must for managers, they are not completely 
subordinate to it. Instead, they can use this institutionalized discourse, which is not 
their own product and which they neither can establish nor create, in novel and crea-
tive ways. In this work, managers, as central practitioners of strategy, are regarded as 
users of strategy, consuming it creatively for their own purposes through their ways of 
talking. Managers make something of it. They poach it, they use it as an instrument 
for their own purposes, they play with it, they joke about it, and they use it to con-
struct their subjectivity. By doing this, they engage in a discursive activity called 
strategy and produce outcomes that are beneficial to them within a larger discursive 
context. They operate within the discourse of strategy by creating space for them-
selves to maneuver and cope. They draw on the discursive recourses with particular 
intentions in mind that may secure some outcomes and mitigate others. (Hardy, 
Palmer & Phillips 2000.)  
The consumption of strategy manifests itself in the form of tactics. Consumption tac-
tics describe the use of strategy imposed on managers by the dominant strategy ortho-
dox. According to de Certeau, language or rhetoric, as he calls it, is a means of ana-
lyzing and understanding the consumption process: 
                                                 
1
 Michel de Certeau lived from 1925 to 1986. His book The Practice of Every Day Life, which is used 
widely as a reference and source of inspiration in this work, was published in English firstly in 1984. In 
French, the book was published originally in 1980. 
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“[…] rhetoric offers models for differentiating among the types of tactics. […] it 
describes the ’turns‘ or tropes of which language can be both the site and the ob-
ject […] rhetoric, the science of ’ways of speaking,’ offers an array of figure-
types for the analysis of everyday ways of acting […]” (De Certeau 1988, xx) 
The everyday practices of managers, tactics and ways of talking, show how they are 
creatively using, resisting, and appropriating the strategy discourse imposed on them 
by the orthodox of the strategic management. This strategy consumption represents 
the art and practice of everyday strategy usage. Through analyzing the talk of manag-
ers, we can better understand the social construction process of strategy. It also gives 
us an understanding of how strategy discourse is used in the everyday life of strategy 
practitioners.  
1.1 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In terms of academic research, strategy is a vague and complex concept that has been 
used and studied from multiple viewpoints (cf. Mintzberg, Lampel & Ahlstrand 
1998). In this research, I identify four different streams of strategy research2. These 
streams of thought are rational, processual, practice and discursive approaches. Ra-
tional strategy thinking is the most normative approach by its nature. It views strategy 
making as a rational process driven by top management with the aim of positioning an 
organization, most often a firm, into markets in the most profitable way. It views 
strategies as long-term plans. (Cf. Chandler 1962.) The processual view takes a more 
descriptive view of strategy and investigates the ways and complex processes through 
which strategies are formulated and implemented (Pettigrew 1992). It does not con-
sider organizations and their people as rational actors, but more likely, views their life 
as indefinite and unpredictable. (Mintzberg & Waters 1985.) 
The third approach, the practice orientation, regards strategy as something that people 
actually do in organizations. Thus, strategy is a practice, a recurrent, habitual, and/or 
                                                 
2
 These approaches have also been identified and acknowledged in prior strategy literature. For similar kinds 
of strategy classifications, see for instance Chaffee 1985, Mintzberg et al. 1998, Whittington 2001 and Juuti 
& Luoma 2009. 
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routinized accomplishment, repetitive performance, that is done in organizations by 
practitioners such as managers. (Whittington 2003, 2006; Jarzabkowski 2004.) Within 
the practice-oriented research stream, there are also researchers with discursive inter-
ests, that is, their interest is to track and analyze the discursive construction and prac-
tice of strategy (cf. Vaara, Kleymann & Seristö 2004; Laine & Vaara 2007; Mantere 
& Vaara 2008). It is these latter two partly overlapping research traditions, practice 
and discourse, that this study stems from.  
In this work, I adopt a view that language is a central feature and precondition of the 
practice of strategy. Strategies are discursive constructions produced in talk through a 
plethora of different discursive practices (cf. Vaara et al. 2004), which we need to un-
derstand in order to comprehend the practice of strategy. Also, practitioners, who 
want to participate in strategy, have to be able to use these practices properly. Thus, I 
am following Barry and Elmes’ (1997) notion that strategy is a dominant narrative, 
discourse, which has taken different storylines in the past decades. Again, I agree 
mostly with Knights and Morgan (1991), who define strategy as: 
“set of discourses and practices which transform managers and employees alike into 
subjects who secure their sense of purpose and reality by formulating, evaluating, 
and conducting strategy” (Knights & Morgan 1991, 252) 
Within the sociological discussion, there is an ongoing debate about the relation be-
tween individual and structure. On one hand, there are views that consider structures 
(such as discourses) to have ultimate power over individuals, and on the other hand, 
there are others who claim that structures are constructed by individuals, and not vice 
versa. Applied to this study, we could ask whether strategy, as a popular and legiti-
mized management discipline, dominates us, or whether we, as practitioners, have 
power over it? De Certeau (1988) contributes to this discussion by introducing the 
concept of consumption, which describes how dominant cultural and economic prod-
ucts are used by ordinary people. In this work, I adopt his view to explain and study 
the role of managers as consumers of strategy.  
To sum up, the theoretical background of this study stems from the following ideas: 
- Strategy is a social practice that is done in organizations just like any other 
work (accounting, marketing, etc.).  
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- Language is a crucial part of any social practice, including strategy, making it 
a discursive phenomenon.  
- In order to understand the social practice of strategy, we need to understand 
the discourse of strategy.  
- The strategy discourse has power over us, but on the other hand, we can use it 
creatively for our own purposes discursively as a resource. This activity is 
called strategy consumption.  
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As highlighted above, this work uses the term consumption (de Certeau 1988) to un-
derstand and explain the ways in which managers use and apply strategy discourse in 
their everyday work. Consumption is something that takes place between the struc-
ture, here the discipline of the strategic management, and the subject, here individual 
managers (Fiske 1989, 36). In other words, it attempts to bridge the gap between the 
macro- and micro-level analysis by pointing out how these two levels, intra-
organizational and extra-organizational, are related to each other (Whittington 2006). 
This integrative approach (ibid.) aims to show how the societal level strategy dis-
course (Knights & Morgan 1991) is consumed in the everyday talk of the managers in 
different contexts. Thus, the primary research question of the study is the following: 
- How do managers consume strategy in their talk? 
However, to be able to fully describe the strategy consumption process, we need to 
dig deeply into the discursive components of strategy consumption and to be able to 
outline what discursive practices and resources are used in it (Fairclough 1992, 73). 
The study also adopts a holistic view on strategy discourse by analyzing both its lin-
guistic and societal aspects (cf. Fairclough ibid.; Phillips, Sewell & Jaynes 2008). 
Hence, the two other secondary research questions are as follows: 
- What kinds of discursive resources do managers use in strategy consumption? 
- What kinds of discursive practices do managers use in strategy consumption?  
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Discursive resources are structures that are drawn upon to produce and consume strat-
egy. They are larger discursive entities, such as macro and mega discourses (cf. 
Alvesson & Kärreman 2000a), that are present in the extra-organizational macro-level 
and that may (and often does) incorporate elements of ideology and hegemony. (Fair-
clough ibid., 85.) The discursive practices are, on the other hand, contextual processes 
through which texts are produced, distributed and consumed (ibid., 78). These, either 
individual or collective activities of talk, construct, maintain and consume the dis-
course and practice of strategy at the intra-organizational micro-level.  
Along with paying attention to the general elements of strategy consumption, I want 
to understand how contextual factors influence and relate to the consumption process. 
That is why strategy consumption is studied in three different case organizations in 
this work. The first case organization is a global industrial enterprise (Industrial); the 
second a Finnish multi-sector polytechnic (Polytechnic); and the third a Finnish insur-
ance company (Insurance). These organizations provide a context of strategy con-
sumption for this study. Thus, the first secondary research questions is: 
- How do managers consume strategy in the different case organizations? 
This study seeks to contribute to strategy research in two ways. Firstly, by studying 
the consumption of strategy, it presents a novel way of looking into strategy practice 
by drawing on the thinking of de Certeau. Although he is a familiar name in the prac-
tice-oriented strategy literature, the empirical works based on his thinking are few in 
the field of strategy (cf. De La Ville & Mounoud 2003). While we know that strategy 
is consumed differently, little is known about the actual consumption tactics, i.e. how 
strategy is consumed. In this work those tactics are analyzed in detail in case-specific 
contexts.  
Secondly, the results of this study show what kinds of discursive practices are used in 
the strategy consumption process and how the macro-level strategy discourses are 
used in micro-level consumption in different contexts. This is a viewpoint that prac-
tice-oriented strategy research seeks to take into account (Whittington 2006).  
The managers, who are studied in this work, are mostly line and middle managers, but 
they also include some top managers. All in all, they are a very heterogeneous group 
consisting of different kinds individuals in terms of their background and experience. 
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They are at the core of this research, since they are often key users of strategy. In 
practice, managers spend plenty of their time communicating and interacting about 
strategy with others. Strategy language is their resource for shaping issues and events 
and for gaining influence over people. The way strategy is consumed by them influ-
ences and shapes the way others perceive strategy and their role in it. (Johnson, Scho-
les & Whittington 2008, 17-22.) From this viewpoint, the results will also give some 
practical advice to managers and other strategy practitioners.  
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is divided into eleven main chapters. The following, second chapter, dis-
cusses the relevant literature related to this study. Firstly, I discuss the history and 
background of the strategy concept in more detail and provide four alternative ap-
proaches to it. By doing this, I outline how strategy has been “consumed” in the pre-
vious literature and show how these approaches are still largely relevant in today’s 
strategy practice. Besides that, I shed light on the concept of discourse and highlight 
how strategy is a discursive phenomenon. After that, the concept of consumption is 
brought into play and the thinking of Michel de Certeau is discussed.  
After the literature review, I will present the research process of this study. I will be-
gin the third chapter by describing the constructivism and poststructuralism, on 
which the discursive research tradition is built. Then, I will discuss discourse analysis 
as a research method in more detail, present some different approaches within it, and 
position my approach into this field. I will also describe the contextual reasoning 
strategy, which this work draws on. After that, I will discuss the research data and 
present how they were produced and analyzed.  
The results of this study are presented in the three following chapters. The fourth 
chapter will shed light on different elements of the strategy consumption process. 
Chapters five (Industrial), six (Polytechnic) and seven (Insurance) will each present 
case-specific results illustrating the ways how managers consume strategy in case or-
ganizations.  
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In Chapter eight, the results and key findings of this work and their contribution is 
discussed and evaluated. In Chapter nine, I will discuss the practical recommenda-
tions and lessons that could be drawn from the results. I will also review the credibil-
ity of the findings and discuss some possible shortcomings and weaknesses of them. 
At the end, some further research questions are proposed. Following Chapter nine are 
the literature (Chapter ten) and the appendixes (Chapter eleven).  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW   
11 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, the theoretical background of the study is discussed. Firstly, I will dis-
cuss the concept of strategy by discussing the first three approaches to it, rational, 
processual and practice. With regard to each approach, I will elucidate how they con-
struct strategy and strategizing in order to gain an understanding of the historical un-
derpinnings and developments of strategy practice. Then, I will move on to the con-
cept of discourse and outline how language has become a central feature of the study 
of management, and especially, I will discuss how strategy is a discursive construc-
tion. At the end of the chapter, the concept of consumption adopted from de Certeau is 
discussed in more detail.  
2.1 STRATEGY 
Strategy is anything but a clear-cut phenomenon. On one hand, it is a management 
discipline that has influenced and touched various managers and organizations in dif-
ferent fields and industries. There is a myriad of strategy books and gurus giving ad-
vice on how to lead strategically. On the other hand, strategy is a research field that 
has captured a lot of attention from scholars and academics. And as Bracker (1980) 
points out, strategy concept has a long and vivid history: 
“Our word strategy comes from the Greek strategos, ’a general,’ which in turn 
comes from roots meaning ’army‘ and ’lead.’ The Greek verb stratego means to 
’plan the destruction of one's enemies through effective use of resources.’ The 
concept of strategy in a military or political context has remained prominent 
throughout history, and has been discussed by such major writers as Shake-
speare, Montesquieu, Kant, Mill, Hegel, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and Tolstoy. 
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The strategic concepts developed by these writers have been used by numerous 
militarists and political theorists, such as Machiavelli, Napoleon, Bismarck, Ya-
mamoto, and Hitler.” (Bracker 1980, 219) 
As can be seen, strategy has its roots in the military field. It was elaborated as the 
means for planning wars and regulating combats involving a plan on how to outwit 
the enemy. (Knights & Morgan 1990.) The unstable, changing, and competitive busi-
ness environment following the Second World War set the scene for strategy to in-
vade corporate life. Large American corporations were the first in line to adopt its 
principles and practices.  
Nowadays, there is a certain orthodoxy that forces almost every organization to follow 
the principles of strategic management. Organizations without explicated strategies 
and strategic objectives are regarded as being without direction or control. Thus, 
“strategy has become part of the institutional landscape of business education and 
practice” (Grandy & Mills 2004, 1156). According to this doctrine, strategy is typi-
cally considered a set of rational practices for managing business in the turbulent 
business environment. (Knights & Morgan 1991.) Thus, it has been said that strategies 
have become “the most prominent, influential, and costly stories told in organiza-
tions” (Barry & Elmes 1997, 430).  
Why then has strategy become such an institutionalized practice and disciple for to-
day’s organizing and managing? The primary reason for the popularity of the strategy 
concept may lie in organizations’ obsession to succeed. According to Mintzberg 
(1987), strategy provides means for determining a firm’s direction, to outsmart com-
petitors, and to maneuver through threatening environments. Or as Ansoff (1965, 94) 
put it: “a firm needs a well-defined scope and growth direction, that objectives alone 
do not meet this need, and that additional decision rules are required if the firm is to 
have orderly and profitable growth.” Strategy can also be a means for focusing and 
coordinating a firm’s activities. Strategy may also define an organization and create 
meaning and identity for its members. Strategy might even provide a feeling of con-
sistency and belonging, a psychological emotion that things are under control al-
though the surrounding world is turbulent and unpredictable. (Mintzberg ibid.) Hence, 
a more appropriate question would be the following: who would not want to apply a 
practice like this?  
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Knights and Morgan (1990, 1991) outline how three societal phenomena - each of 
which took place shortly after the Second World War - have influenced the develop-
ment of strategy in the business context. Firstly, the separation of ownership and di-
rect managerial control opened up a discursive space that strategy colonized effec-
tively. Corporations had to explain what they were doing and why they were doing it. 
Secondly, the war led to changes in market conditions. American companies ex-
panded their operations around the globe, which led to problems in both controlling 
the production and managing culturally diverse markets. Strategy provided an answer 
to these challenges. Also, the increased competition between American, European and 
Japanese companies created complexity and tensions between them. This tension 
turned out to be a fertile soil for the discipline of strategic management. (Ibid.) 
In the following, I will discuss the concept of strategy in terms of three theoretical 
discussions, each of which provides a unique angle on strategy and strategy research. 
Discussing these approaches helps us to understand the practice of strategic manage-
ment better and enables us to get the full picture of it. The approaches are rational, 
processual and practice. I will discuss the basic premises of each approach and de-
scribe how it views the role of the managers, who are considered the strategy users in 
this study. Also, the contribution of each approach is evaluated in terms of this work.  
2.1.1 RATIONAL APPROACH 
When strategy invaded large American corporations in the middle of the 20th century, 
strategy-making was a rational design and/or planning process typical for a modern 
project. The origins of the rational approach can be traced to the writings of authors 
such as Chandler and Andrews. The former defined strategy as follows:  
“The determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, 
and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary 
for carrying out these goals” (Chandler 1962, 13)  
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The latter described corporate strategy as follows:  
“The pattern of decisions in company that produces its objectives, purposes or 
goals, produces the principal policies and plans for achieving those goals” (An-
drews 1980, 18-19) 
As another pioneer of the strategic management, Ansoff (1984, xv), points out, the 
process in which rational strategies are formulated is called “strategic planning.” 
Later, when studying the premises of the rational strategy approach, Ocasio and Jo-
seph (2008, 250) described strategic planning as “a formalized procedure to produce 
an articulated result in the form of an integrated system of decisions.” They also 
stress the formalization related to strategic planning and describe it with three attrib-
utes: 1) “the articulation of goals and objectives for planning,” 2) “establishment of a 
division of authority and responsibility for planning, implementation and control,” 
and 3) “the development of standardized planning procedures” (ibid.). These attrib-
utes are characteristic of the rational strategy approach.  
BASIC PREMISES 
The rational strategy approach stems from empirical realism, wherein environments 
are seen as independent, external, and tangible elements (Ezzamel & Willmot 2008) 
and wherein organizations are distinguished from these surrounding environments. 
The organization’s environment is “out there” and it is composed of elements like 
competitors, legislators, partners, trends, threats, and challenges that the organization 
should both be fitted to and be able to compete with. (Whittington 2001, 11-16.) To 
some extent, the rational approach of strategy may even consist of an idea that the 
market forces can be controlled through strategic planning mechanisms by the manag-
ers (Knights & Morgan 1991). Rational strategy thinking originates from the profit-
seeking businesses, wherein the success of strategy is measured and evaluated by 
profits and productivity (Whittington ibid.). 
The rational view considers strategy a result of an analytical, rational, and “linear” 
planning process. Strategy is typically a long-term plan of an organization that posi-
tions the organization to its environment, allocating its resources, and guiding its ac-
tions with regard to its environment and competitors. Such a strategy plan describes 
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the long-terms goals and the short-term objectives derived from it as well as the re-
sources necessary for carrying out these goals. (Chaffee 1985; Whittington ibid.) The 
rational strategy approach tends to view organizations as rational and mechanistic en-
tities. They are instruments - means of gaining strategic objectives. Once these ma-
chine-like apparatuses are given strategic goals and objectives and their structure is 
fitted to the strategy, people are hired to operate this machine in a predetermined 
manner. The approach emphasizes command and control and arises from military and 
classical management theory. (Cf. Morgan 1997, 11-31.) 
ROLE OF MANAGERS 
The rational strategy view is rather managerialistic by nature. It portrays top managers 
as having considerable capacity to lead their organizations strategically. When doing 
so, they go through a prototypical rational decision-making process. In it, they set 
goals, generate alternative methods of achieving them, and weigh the likelihood of 
alternative methods to succeed. In the course of this process, they capitalize on the 
future trends and events that are favorable and avoid or counteract those that are not. 
(Chaffee 1985.) Hence, the rational approach places great confidence in the readiness 
and capacity of the top managers to adopt profit-maximizing strategies through ra-
tional long-term planning and to implement them successfully.  
Along with emphasizing (top) managers’ role in strategy-making, the rational ap-
proach maintains a dichotomy between planners and implementers of strategy remi-
niscent of the principles of Taylor’s scientific management. It constructs top managers 
as “commanders,” capable of planning sound strategies for others to implement. It 
portrays them as providers of direction for the organizational members, the “soldiers” 
who implement strategy by obeying their orders (Bourgeois & Brodwin 1984; Hart 
1992). Top managers can also be “bosses” determining direction through formal and 
analytical processes and mechanisms. Organizational members are regarded as “sub-
ordinates” following these systems (Hart ibid.). Managers can also be viewed as “ar-
chitects” whose role is to design and manipulate administrative systems and structures 
that support the particular strategy (Volberda 2003).  
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CONTRIBUTION AND CRITIQUE 
Today, the rational, planning-oriented3 view of strategy is still relevant and widely 
applied and accepted in many organizations. Maybe the most prominent reason for the 
rational strategy view to be so prevailing is the fact that it equips managers with a 
straightforward model on how to formulate and implement strategy. By reducing the 
complexity related to strategic management, it sounds simple and clear and it gives 
executives a sense of being in control. It is also a generalized way of teaching strategy 
in business schools and MBA programs wherein strategists are socialized to the prac-
tice of strategy. Without understanding it and the premises of it, we cannot suffi-
ciently understand the practice of strategy. Again, without being aware of its nature, 
we are unable to analyze strategy discourse, which is still dominated by the rational 
ethos of strategy.  
In some cases, the rational approach to organizing seems to work fairly well. It has 
been noted that strategy implementation emphasizing goal setting and control may be 
helpful in some occasions. Carroll (2000) presents several reasons why MBO (man-
agement by objectives) programs lead to improved results when executing strategy. 
Firstly, they can clarify performance expectations and thus lead to more efficient use 
of time and effort. Secondly, the feedback system associated with these kinds of ap-
proaches makes it possible to identify problems and difficulties that may be resolved 
more easily in the early stages. Thirdly, from the psychological and motivational per-
spective, the goals, when accepted, impose a burden in the form of a promise and 
commitment whose tension is released when the goal is achieved. Fourthly, it is indi-
cated that that effort and performance tend to be higher when organizational members 
know what and how they are to be evaluated for. Also, goals can serve as the means 
through which individuals satisfy their needs for achievement and validation of a self-
concept of competence. (Ibid.) 
                                                 
3
 However, one must be careful when using the word planning. As Mintzberg (1981) points out, the term can 
be used in many different ways meaning different things. In this context, planning means future-oriented 
“thinking” and it is done with a more or less “formalized procedure” likely to produce an “articulated re-
sult” (ibid).  
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However, while concentrating mainly on how firms should develop and formulate 
sound strategies by means of systematic forecasting, planning, and control mecha-
nisms, the rational approach to strategy has been criticized for ignoring “flexibility.” 
In unstable environments, many situations involve surprises and irregularity that do 
not give sufficient warning to permit rigid planning processes. In many cases the stra-
tegic planning procedures live a life of their own in relation to actual strategic events 
and situations, and instead of fueling creativity, they can limit or even ruin the strate-
gic potential of organizations. (Volberda 2003.) This is one of the Achilles heals of 
the rational strategy approach. However, as Whittington and Cailluet (2008) point out, 
strategic planning has not been abandoned by organizations, although its fall has been 
predicted for a long time. Instead, it seems that the practice of strategic planning does 
well in the organizations and has acquired some new manifestations and forms along 
the way that are more adaptive to changes and adjustments.  
The rational strategy approach has also been criticized for creating and maintaining 
artificial and false dichotomies of strategy, such as “content and process,” “formula-
tion and implementation,” “thinking and acting,” “intent and emergence,” and “stra-
tegic and operational” (Jarzabkowski 2005, 180). For instance, in his Strategic Man-
agement Journal article Mintzberg (1990) points out various reasons why the formu-
lation-implementation dichotomy is false (and even harmful for the organization) in 
many cases. Firstly, the dichotomy detaching thinking from acting refers to a basic 
rationality typical of Western thinking: think before you act. It separates muscle from 
brain corresponding to the classical hierarchy, a mechanical bureaucracy typical of 
mass production and military. It assumes that data can be aggregated and transmitted 
up to the hierarchy without significant loss or distortion. However, as Mintzberg 
points out, the “officers in the rear,” who have the power to formulate plans, may not 
always have the best information or experience of what is happening in the “front 
row.” (Ibid.) 
Mintzberg also criticizes the rational view on strategy for not acknowledging the pos-
sible resistance related to the intended strategy. The resistance towards the intended 
strategy may come from the environment, so that although the implementers are will-
ing to implement the strategy, the environment may have changed dramatically, mak-
ing it impossible to implement it. The environment may also be so unstable that no 
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specific strategy can be useful. In other cases it might be the implementers themselves 
that resist the implementation, based on a lack of willingness, understanding, compe-
tence, or motivation. Sometimes the implementers may resist implementation because 
they sincerely believe and sense that the strategy at hand would do harm for the or-
ganization by being unsuitable to the environment or harmful for the organization. 
Mintzberg criticizes the rational approach to strategy of being too pessimistic and re-
stricted about strategic learning, the collective trial and error process of organization 
members. (Ibid.) 
Mintzberg also points out how the implementers are not robots that can be pro-
grammed, but more likely individuals with their own values and interpretations. They 
make strategy something their own through improvisation and creativity, causing 
some “slipping” and “drifting” from the intended goal. (Ibid.) This is a particularly 
interesting notion from the perspective of this study, because it shows how the ra-
tional strategy approach has neglected strategy consumption, the improvisatory side of 
the strategy use and practice, which this work seeks to study. Thus, we need to know 
how strategy discourse that is still influenced by the ideals of the rational strategy ap-
proach is used and consumed by the practitioners of the strategy. Besides that, in or-
der to understand the practice of strategy more thoroughly, a more adaptive and proc-
ess-oriented reading of strategy is needed.  
2.1.2 PROCESSUAL APPROACH  
As the level of environmental change was increasing and as the rational approach to 
strategy was considered as too rigid and slow to react into these changes, the need for 
a more adaptive and flexible approach to strategy became obvious. It was also noted 
that many realized strategies were “emergent” by nature. They were neither planned 
nor intended (by top managers and/or strategists), but more likely developed and 
grown over time through the actions and learning of organizational members. In line 
with this, it was emphasized that instead of focusing purely on planning and control, 
organizations should develop their capabilities of strategic learning and thinking. 
(Mintzberg & Waters 1985.)  
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According to this processual view4, strategy is a process rather than a state. The re-
search interest has thus been put on the renewal and growth of organizations and in 
the entrepreneurial work within them that emphasizes dynamism, action and move-
ment. Processual strategy research is interested in processes in which strategies are 
formulated and implemented. (Pettigrew 1992.) Unlike the rational strategy approach, 
the processual view is not as normative by nature, but is more likely to study strategy 
with descriptive interest, with the aim of understanding how strategies emerge and are 
realized in organizations, both issues that are neglected by the rational approach.  
BASIC PREMISES 
Already in the 1950s and 60s, some highly influential ideas for the processual ap-
proach began to emerge. Lindblom’s (1959) notion of “the science of muddling 
through” described public sector policy-maker proceeding with small steps as the ob-
jectives given to him are unclear and the environment surrounding him is unstable. On 
the other hand, Cyert and March’s (1963) remarks on the strategy-maker in the busi-
ness environment remind the latter in various ways. Since the organization is gov-
erned by the dominant coalition of disparate interest, the strategy-maker they portray 
seeks to avoid uncertainty by solving present problems and negotiating with the envi-
ronment instead of formulating long-run strategies. Mintzberg (1973) has considered 
these notions as the basic behavioral modes of what he calls the “adaptive” strategy-
making mode. 
The processual strategy approach views organizations and their environments as more 
open to each other than the rational approach. The environment is dynamic and un-
predictable by nature, and the organization is expected to continually assess its exter-
nal and internal conditions in order to match them successfully. This calls for adapta-
tion. While in the rational view, organizations deal with and control the environment, 
the processual view assumes that firms need to change with the environment. (Chaffee 
1985.) Thus, the processual thinking, views organizations as “brains” or “organisms” 
                                                 
4
 However, it has to be noted here that the processual strategy approach is not a unanimous school, but in-
cludes various kinds of stands. For instance, Jarzabkowski (2005, 3-5) divides it into three veins of research: 
1) Bower-Burgelman, 2) action (influenced by Mintzberg) and 3) change process (influenced by Pettigrew).  
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that are constantly learning when processing information and seeking to adapt and 
survive in changing environments (Morgan 1997, 33-118). 
The processual view sees strategies as results of learning and adaptation, a process of 
detection and correction of error (Argyris 1989). Strategies can also be seen as prod-
ucts of internal processes of mutual adjustment. It has been noted that strategic redi-
rection has not originated from formal planning efforts nor has it been planned by sen-
ior executives or strategic planners. Instead, there are examples wherein the actual 
realized strategy can be something totally different that the indented (planned) strat-
egy. With this respect, the processual approach concludes that the actual realized 
strategy of an organization can be often perceived only afterwards, from the historical 
perspective. (Mintzberg & Waters 1985.) 
The processual approach is in many ways different than the rational approach. While 
the rational approach relies on planning and control, the processual view emphasizes 
the organization’s capabilities for strategic thinking and learning, being open and re-
sponsible to new situations and ways of working. As according to the rational strategy 
approach, strategy cascades downward in the organization, the processual view turns 
it upside down. In it “strategy comes upward from the firing line, rather than down-
ward from the top” (Bourgeois & Brodwin 1984, 254). Whereas the rational idea of 
strategy focuses on direction and control, the processual strategy mode stems from the 
strategic learning that occurs through continuous action. However, processual strategy 
does not mean chaos, neither that the management would be out of control. Instead, it 
is open, flexible, and responsive, willing to learn and adapt. As the rational approach 
to strategy emphasizes central direction and hierarchy, the emergent strategy mode 
opens the way for collective action. (Mintzberg & Waters ibid.) 
According to the processual approach, strategy can be traced to small actions and de-
cisions made and carried out by all sorts of people at every level of organization. 
Small changes can produce major shifts at organizational level and individuals at 
every level of the organization can contribute to this process. Strategies emerge as 
people learn to cope and handle situations and soon their actions often converge on 
patterns of behavior that work. (Mintzberg & Waters ibid.; Mintzberg 1990; Mintz-
berg et al. 1998, 176-231.) 
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Burgelman (1983) explains the reciprocal relationship of structure and strategy by in-
troducing two types of activity related to strategy. Strategic activities can be either 
“induced” or “autonomous” in relation to the firm’s strategy. Induced activity stems 
from the firm’s strategy and is shaped by its structural content. It literally follows cor-
porate strategy causing no departure from its predefined strategic direction. This kind 
of activity is desirable for the rational strategy mode, and according to Burgelman, it 
constitutes the firm’s “bulk of strategic activity.” Autonomous activity, on the other 
hand, is behavior that falls outside the current scope of strategy and it is daring and 
entrepreneurial by nature. This internal corporate venturing, as Burgelman calls it, 
does not follow strategy, but escapes the current structural arrangements. Although 
this kind of activity might be occasionally problematical for the current strategy, it 
usually fuels strategic renewal and precedes changes in corporate strategy. (Ibid.) 
Crossan and Berdrow (2003) explain the strategic renewal of an organization from the 
learning perspective through the 4I framework. According to the framework, organ-
izational learning proceeds through “intuiting,” “interpreting,” “integrating,” and 
“institutionalizing.” Intuiting refers to the preconscious recognition of the pattern 
and/or possibilities inherent in a personal stream of experience. Interpreting means the 
explaining of an insight or idea to oneself and to others. Integrating is the process 
wherein shared understanding is developed among individuals and coordinated action 
is taken. Institutionalizing is the process of ensuring that routinized actions occur. 
(Ibid.) 
INTERPRETIVE EMPHASIS 
The process approach to strategy is a broad church that includes many views and 
ideas. Within the approach, there is also a view that emphasizes the interpretative 
elements of strategy – and organizational life in general. The view has been influ-
enced by the writings and findings of sociology and cognitive psychology, such as the 
work of Berger and Luckmann (1967) highlighting the nature of our reality as socially 
constructed. The view helps us to understand how people in the midst of strategy 
processes interpret and construct their thoughts and ideas.  
Weick (1995, 30-31) describes the process in which our reality is constructed with the 
term “enactment.” In organizational life, people actually do not merely perceive the 
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environment they face, but produce it. There is no monolithic environment that exists 
detached from and external to those people, since people are a part of their own envi-
ronments. People create their own environments and these environments, on retro-
spect, constrain their actions. Organizations and people perceive their environment 
(and organizations as well) through action, so that sensemaking is not just interpreta-
tion but also ongoing activity. (Ibid.) The environment does not hold for threats or 
challenges for the organizations as such, but it is the strategist who constructs these in 
his/her mind. Although he/she can see material things (such as plants, machines, and 
microchips), he/she constructs their meaning and relationship in his/her mind. (Chaf-
fee 1985; Smircich & Stubbart 1985.) 
The interpretative emphasis views organizations as social constructions, “cultures.” 
They are mini-societies with their own values, rituals, ideologies, and beliefs. Culture 
is not something that can be changed or touched: it is instead embedded in social in-
teraction and influenced by many factors such as professional groups, subcultures, and 
ethnic backgrounds. By applying this view, we see that organizations and their envi-
ronments are enacted domains. We are constantly making sense of our world and 
these interpretations influence the way we perceive our world and ourselves. (Weick 
ibid.) This helps us to overcome the false impression that organizations only adapt or 
react to a world that is given to them. For instance, we learn that “strategy making is a 
process of enactment that produces a large element of the future with which the or-
ganization will have to deal” (Morgan 1997, 149).  
The interpretative view considers strategies as social constructions; they are meta-
phors, interpretative models, schemas, and/or frames of reference through which the 
organization and its environment is understood and made sense of by its members. 
Again, stakeholders are motivated to believe and to act in ways that are expected to 
produce favorable results for the organization. (Chaffee ibid.; Volberda 2003) 
Strategy process, according to the interpretative emphasis, is an ongoing sensemaking 
and sensegiving process. Sensemaking is activity that has to do with “the meaning 
construction and reconceptualization” of different actors while they are trying to 
make-sense of strategy and its underlying elements. Sensegiving, on the other hand, is 
activity that attempts to “influence the sensemaking and meaning making of others.” 
This twofold process of sensegiving and sensemaking is iterative, sequential, and re-
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ciprocal by nature and includes many different stakeholders of the organization. In 
practice, sensemaking is associated with actions that deal with the understanding 
processes such as envisioning and re-visioning. Sensegiving, on the other hand, deals 
with the processes associated with influencing others, like signaling and energizing. 
(Gioia & Chittipeddi 1991.) The practical manifestation of it, strategy communication, 
could be regarded as activity that includes procurement, production, synthesis, ma-
nipulation, and dissemination of information at every level of organization in such a 
way as to give meaning, purpose, and direction to an organization (Westley 1990).  
ROLE OF MANAGERS 
From the processual viewpoint, the rational “economic man,” portrayed by the ra-
tional strategy approach is fiction. People are boundedly rational actors, who have in-
dividual wants and motives, and who are limited in their knowledge and capabilities 
to make decisions and solve problems. (March & Simon 1958.) According to the 
processual approach, strategy is less centralized than in the rational approach. In it, 
managers are willing to act before everything is fully understood. The processual ap-
proach also delegates power over strategy from top managers to those who are capa-
ble of formulating strategies. (Mintzberg & Waters 1985.) As the rational approach 
saw managers as architects of organizational structures, the processual approach sees 
them as “facilitators” empowering and enabling these processes, as organizational 
members are “participants,” learning and improving while performing. While organ-
izational members are “entrepreneurs” experimenting and taking risks, top managers 
act as “sponsors” endorsing and supporting this activity. (Hart 1992.) As Bourgeois & 
Brodwin (1984) put it:  
“The role of the CEO has moved from designer to that of premise-setter and 
judge. Here, the strategic problem revolves around the CEO's ability to define 
organization purposes (i.e. set decision premises) broadly enough to encourage 
innovation, and to select judiciously from among those projects or strategy al-
ternatives that reach his attention.” (Bourgeois & Brodwin 1984, 254) 
Instead of seeing the middle managers purely as implementers of an existing strategy, 
the processual view stresses their role as a strategic asset of an organization. Accord-
ing to it, middle managers gather and apply new ideas and actively influence the deci-
sion-making process with their own experience. (Balogun 2000.) According to Ba-
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logun’s findings, the managers have a complex and challenging task that consists of 
four different roles. They are simultaneously expected to undertake personal change, 
help their staff through change, implement change in their part of the business, and 
keep the business running. (Ibid.) 
CONTRIBUTION AND CRITIQUE 
The processual view on strategy emerged as a critique of the rational strategy ap-
proach. It has revealed many shortcomings and weaknesses of the rational approach, 
and opened up some new horizons for strategy-making. It has challenged the hegem-
ony of the rational strategy approach, and provided many answers to the questions it 
ignored. As its main contribution, the approach has proven that many - if not all - 
strategies are a combination of intentions and emergent elements. Sticking only to the 
strategic plans, may be dangerous for any organization. The strength of the approach 
lies in the fact that most organizations need to pay close attention to their external en-
vironment in order to survive and evolve over time.  
Although being widely accepted and praised, the processual approach has still re-
mained marginal in strategy practice. This may be due to the fact that it does not pro-
vide managers with as tangible and concrete advice on how to execute strategy than 
the rational approach did. Instead of being a normative approach by nature, like the 
rational approach, it seeks to provide a descriptive account of strategy. It constructs 
strategy and strategy implementation as unpredictable and unclear, and it may even 
diminish managers’ feeling of omnipotence. In many cases it may challenge the 
dominant orthodoxy of organizing, thereby creating conflicts and tensions. The proc-
essual strategy approach has been criticized of being too opportunistic by nature. It 
has been noted that absent strategy in times of crisis might lead to strategic drift 
(Mintzberg et al. 1998, 224-226). The processual approach has also been criticized for 
being too modernist and functional by accepting and taking managerial preferences 
for granted (Grandy & Mills 2004). Also, it has to be noted that learning merely for 
the sake of learning can become just another ideology that can hinder our thinking and 
reasoning on strategy, as planning has done in the other direction.  
Although the processual strategy reading has constructed a totally different view of 
the practice of strategy, it still discusses strategy work on a rather general level. It fo-
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cuses on strategy processes at the organizational level, but says relatively little about 
the actual practice and practices of strategy. Little is known about the actual learning 
or adaptation process or the preconditions for them. Neither does it describe how the 
managers or other individuals consume and use strategy in their work.  
2.1.3 PRACTICE APPROACH 
In recent years, strategy has been given some new flavor from the practice perspec-
tive. While the traditional strategy research (most obviously the rational approach) 
regarded strategy as a property of organizations (an organization has a strategy), the 
practice approach to strategy regards it as something that people actually do in organi-
zations. Thus, strategy is a practice, repetitive performance that is done in organiza-
tions by practitioners such as managers and consultants. (Johnson et al. 2003; Jarzab-
kowski 2004; Whittington 1996, 2006.) 
BASIC PREMISES 
The practice approach to strategy could be seen as a part of a broader concern to hu-
manize organizational and management research. It attempts to understand human 
agency in the construction and enactment of strategy, focusing on the actions and ac-
tivities of a strategy practitioner in it. (Jarzabkowski, Balogun & Seidl 2007.) To 
some extent, the practice approach to strategy tries also to overcome the dualism be-
tween the rational and processual schools of strategy by concentrating on the phe-
nomenon of strategy itself. The approach takes a sociological eye and treats strategy 
like any other institutionalized activity in our lives. (Whittington 2007.) 
Although the practice view shares many assumptions of the processual approach to 
strategy, it goes deeper into the actual practices of strategy, referring to different tools 
and techniques that are used in strategy work. It studies how strategy work is done, 
who does it, and what tools are used in it (Whittington & Cailluet 2008). It also seeks 
to study and locate these actions in a wider context since they are not isolated, but 
draw upon the socially defined and accepted institutionalized modes of acting. Many 
tools, technologies and discourses of strategy that are used and applied in strategy 
work belong to the social infrastructure or industry of strategy having institutionalized 
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common properties. The practice approach to strategy tries to uncover this relation-
ship between the micro and macro-level of strategy. (Jarzabkowski et al. ibid.)  
The practice approach stems from the social theory and draws on the work of Gid-
dens, Bourdieu and de Certeau, whose attempts have been to overcome the ancient 
dualism between structuralism and individualism. Whittington (2006) highlights three 
concepts that should be taken into account when studying the relationship between the 
structure and individual. First, there is the concept of “society,” a field or system, 
such as shared understanding, cultural rule, language, or procedure, which is guiding, 
setting the scene, and enabling human activity. Second, there is the concept of “indi-
viduality” that refers to people’s creative and partly unexpected activity in practice. 
The third concept is the “actor,” which means strategy practitioners, individuals per-
forming and using strategy. The practice theory views these themes as interrelated 
parts of the whole. The actions of individuals cannot be separated from the society, 
but society itself is, on the other hand, produced by these actions. (Ibid.) 
Jarzabkowski (2004) makes a distinction between practice and practices: “Practice is 
the actual activity, events, or work of strategy, while practices are those traditions, 
norms, rules, and routines through which the work of strategy is constructed” (ibid., 
454). According to Whittington (2007), the recognition of strategy as practice has 
pointed in two directions with regard to research efforts. The first direction has led to 
studies of people’s strategy activity, praxis, at the micro-level. In these cases strategy 
is regarded as demanding work mastered by managers. For instance, Aaltonen’s 
(2007) study shows how organizations have five kinds of activity types relating to 
strategy implementation. Determining means calculating, devising plans and setting 
targets. Controlling is related to rewarding, monitoring performance and exerting in-
fluence. Communicating is top-down and bottom-up communication and sensemak-
ing. Organizing refers to developing competence and processes and procedures along 
with team working and modifying organization structure. And interacting with the 
environment means developing services and products, networking, choosing custom-
ers and acquiring information. By categorizing activities like this, the study shows, 
among others, that strategy implementation is a much more externally oriented phe-
nomenon than the previous research has recognized. (Ibid.) 
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According to Whittington (ibid.), the second research direction has led to a wider per-
spective, wherein strategy is regarded as an industry, whose members in business, 
consulting, and beyond, collectively produce the strategies and practices related to it. 
Previous research has proved that strategy processes get different kinds of emphasis in 
different organizations (Jarzabkowski 2004). Mantere (2005) showed how in a recur-
sively driven strategy process, strategy is formulated, organized and controlled 
through explicit, predefined, and predictable practices and mechanisms. To some, this 
kind of strategy work ensures a sense of ontological security, while some consider it 
to be restricting and limiting by nature. On the contrary, in an adaptively driven proc-
ess, the practices of strategy are more decentralized and unpredictable by nature, 
drawing on the mutual improvisation and adaptation of individuals. This kind of strat-
egy-making mode means more control for individuals over strategy. Although this 
might leave some insecure, it increases individual ownership of strategy. (Ibid.) 
Regnér (2003) showed how strategy work obtains different kinds of emphasis depend-
ing on whether it is done in the center or periphery of the organization. In the center, 
strategizing is more deductive by nature, following the spirit of the intended corporate 
strategy closely. In the periphery, strategizing tends to be more adaptive and creative. 
There people are more experimental and tentative with regard to strategy and strategy 
work. (Ibid.) 
By drawing on de Certeau, Jarzabkowski (2004) develops the concept of “manage-
ment practices-in-use,” in which she refers to management tools and techniques that 
are present in macro-institutional and competitive contexts, arising from communities 
such as industry, academia, consultancy, and the press, and which are diffused by 
business schools, consultants, and management fashions. These social structures set 
established practices and conventions for practitioners to use. Although being devel-
oped with a particular purpose or intent in mind, the intent or usage style of an actor 
may not however comply with the original purpose of the particular practice. Practices 
are open to interpretation and improvisation, depending on the use which they are put 
to. The recursive use follows the spirit and intent that is originally implied in the prac-
tice and is routinized and habitual by nature. The adaptive use, on the other hand, is 
more creative and appropriative by nature, thus leading more often to unanticipated 
outcomes. Jarzabkowski labels this activity as “artisan-like inventiveness” (bricolage) 
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in which actors produce their own purposeful activities and meanings for the socially 
legitimized practices that they use. (Ibid.) 
Whittington (2007, 1584) argues that “it needs the full vision of the sociological eye 
to grasp strategy’s connections, its embeddedness, its ironies, its problems and, fi-
nally, both its changes and its continuities.” Further on, he proposes guidelines for 
practice-oriented strategy research. Firstly, he outlines that the sociological eye should 
seek “structural connections” and “relationships” behind single events and individu-
als, since they seldom tend to be unique. Secondly, he encourages recognition of the 
“embeddedness” of strategic activity. Activities are not only affected by the organiza-
tional context, but also by the larger social context wherein they are performed. 
Thirdly, the practice-oriented researcher should pursue “irony;” transform strategy 
that was once considered a purely economical issue into merely another social prac-
tice that is done in organizations. Fourthly, Whittington urges problematization of the 
“performance” of strategic practice. And finally, he raises the issue of “continuity” in 
strategy work. Many practices of strategy are done on a regular basis; it seems like 
they follow certain pattern that has become a routine for the organization. (Ibid.) 
ROLE OF PRACTITIONERS 
Besides practices and practice, the practice approach to strategy also takes the practi-
tioners of strategy seriously. By practitioners it refers to those people, who are practic-
ing strategy, doing strategy work, like managers, consultants, and other strategists.  
The practice-oriented strategy research has for instance shown that strategic planning 
includes more creative, original and adoptive activity of individuals than the rational 
strategy approach has suggested. To describe this rich social process of strategizing at 
the level of individuals, Nordqvist and Melin (2008) introduced the role of the strate-
gic planning champion to explain and describe how strategy practitioners who intro-
duce, promote and guide strategic planning processes in organizations act. The cham-
pionship is manifested through three roles. “The social craftsperson” considers and 
balances expectations and tensions between different stakeholders in strategic plan-
ning. They also seek to establish positive and open dialogues and craft alignment and 
commitment around common strategic views and language. “The artful interpreter,” 
on the other hand, adjusts the general strategic planning practices to the local routines 
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and norms of the organization by showing an awareness of the specific ownership and 
business logic. They skillfully create a balance between the local context and the con-
fidence and legitimacy in personal background and the general planning practice. 
Thirdly, “the known stranger” balances distance and closeness in interaction with the 
managers, owners, and board members, by travelling between the various formal and 
informal arenas of strategy work. The stranger does not represent any internal or ex-
ternal interest although being experienced in the field. (Ibid.) 
Practice-oriented research has also shown how the role of middle managers is crucial 
in strategy work. Rouleau (2005) studied middle managers involved in implementing 
strategic change in a clothing company. She concluded that the managers’ sensemak-
ing and sensegiving practices consist of the micro-practices such as “translating” the 
orientation, “overcoding” the strategy, “disciplining” the client, and “justifying” the 
change. In her study, she adopted a viewpoint that strategic change depends on how 
managers interpret and enact the new orientation during their interactions and conver-
sations. (Ibid.) 
An earlier study (Mantere 2008) has also shown how middle managers need recipro-
cal and enabling conditions from top managers to be able to fulfill their strategic role 
of implementing, facilitating adaptability, synthesizing information, and championing 
alternatives, presented by Floyd and Wooldridge (1992). To be able to fulfill the role 
of implementation, top managers need to open the thought process behind the strategy 
to middle managers (narration) and make an effort to link strategy to relevant work 
contexts (contextualization). Middle managers should also be provided with sufficient 
resources to make changes in everyday work (resource allocation), and their work as 
implementers of strategy should be respected (respect). To fulfill the role of facilitat-
ing adaptability, top managers should encourage new ideas and be open to communi-
cation about success and failure (trust). To act in the role of synthesizing information, 
top managers need to be responsive to new information (responsiveness). To fulfill 
the role of championing alternatives, top managers need to invite middle managers to 
planning sessions and invite new ideas (inclusion) and referee between them (referee-
ing). (Mantere ibid.) 
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CONTRIBUTION AND CRITIQUE 
In this work, the contribution of the practice-oriented strategy view is obviously the 
strongest. As the approach has shown, the practitioners of strategy use strategy and 
practices related to it with multiple ways. This has targeted my research interests at 
both acknowledging the strategic practices that are being used and at the usage styles 
of these practices, i.e. what the practitioners make out of them.  
Since I personally find this approach to strategy to be the most suitable for my re-
search setting and thinking, I am relatively biased, what it comes to criticizing it. 
However, Carter, Glegg and Kornberger (2008) have criticized the practice approach 
to strategy for adopting too unclear and contradictory a definition of practice, which 
can mean almost anything, including events, routines and rules, or it may refer to a 
cry for more practical research approach. They also criticize the practice-oriented 
strategy view for showing too modest empirical findings as results. (Ibid.) In this 
work, I try to avoid this shortcoming by going deeply into the discursive practice of 
strategy. When studying strategy consumption, I also look for empirical evidence 
from three different case organizations and base my argumentation on those findings.  
The three approaches to strategy discussed in this chapter have each provided a differ-
ent angle on strategy and strategy research. These approaches are summarized in Ta-
ble 1. In the table, I summarize how each approach defines strategy and strategy work 
and discuss how it has been researched by the approach.  
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TABLE 1 SUMMARY OF THREE STRATEGY APPROACHES 
APPROACH DEFINITION, NATURE AND RESEARCH INTEREST 
RATIONAL Strategy is a plan or intent that consists of the long-term goals of an organization. It 
positions an organization in its environment, allocates its resources, and guides its ac-
tions. (Chandler 1962; Andrews 1980).  
Strategies are formulated in rational and linear planning processes (Ansoff 1984) 
wherein top managers play a crucial role. This is followed by strategy implementation 
where organization and its actions are aligned to the intended strategy.  
The research is mainly interested in the content of the strategy, studying which strategy 
is best for the organization in certain situation.  
PROCESSUAL Strategy is a process rather than a state. (Pettigrew 1992.) Strategy is less centralized 
than in the rational approach. Managers are willing to act before everything is fully 
understood.  
Many realized strategies are emergent by nature. Strategies consist of both intentional 
and emergent elements. (Mintzberg & Waters 1985.) 
The research interest is in the renewal, growth and entrepreneurial work of the organi-
zation, emphasizing dynamism, action and movement. Also, the political aspects of 
strategy-making are studied.  
PRACTICE Strategy is a social practice, something that people do in organizations. Strategy prac-
tice is not isolated but draws upon the socially defined modes of acting arising from 
social institutions. (Whittington 2003, 2006) 
Strategy work, strategizing, is done by practitioners of strategy, who draw on different 
tools and techniques in their work. Although strategy practices are often institutional-
ized by nature, practitioners may use them in novel and unpredictable ways for their 
own purposes. (Jarzabkowski 2004) 
The research seeks to uncover what is strategy work, how it is done, and by whom. It is 
also interested in relationship between the micro and macro-level of strategy. (Jarzab-
kowski et al. 2007) 
 
The practice approach to strategy has also stressed the role of language in strategy 
work. It sees it as a central feature in strategy practice. The following chapter presents 
the fourth approach, the discursive view of strategy. However, before proceeding to 
the discursive strategy view, the concept of discourse needs to be discussed.  
2.2 DISCOURSE 
Recent developments in social science have outlined the role of language. It has been 
noted that language, and language use particularly, is the most important phenomenon 
accessible to the empirical investigation in social and organizational research. Due to 
this “linguistic turn,” discourse has become a popular term that has been used widely 
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in social and organization research. (Alvesson & Kärreman 2000b.) The concept of 
discourse could be understood as a “set of ideas and practices which condition our 
ways of relating to and acting upon particular phenomena.” Discourses are also em-
bedded in social practice, which reproduce the way of seeing “the truth.” (Knights & 
Morgan 1991, 253.) Discourse brings objects into being. Although they are embodied 
in texts, they exist beyond the individual texts, which could be characterized as units 
or manifestations of discourse. (Hardy 2001.) Again, Grant, Hardy, Oswick & Putnam 
(2004) define the term organizational discourse as follows: 
“[…] structural collections of texts embodied in the practices of talking and 
writing (as well as a wide variety of visual representations and cultural arte-
facts) that bring organizationally related objects into being as these texts are 
produced, disseminated and consumed.” (Grant et al. 2004, 3) 
Organizations are created through the discourse of their members. Discourse is the 
primary means by which the members of the organization create a coherent social re-
ality that frames their sense of who they are and what they work for. (Grant, Keenoy 
& Oswick 2001.) This process, wherein the social reality is constructed, includes eve-
ryday activities such as “differentiating, fixing, naming, labeling, classifying and re-
lating” (Chia 2000, 513). Different types of discourses and discursive practices can be 
used to justify, legitimize and neutralize different events and decisions (Vaara & 
Tienari 2002) in organizations.  
The discursive view assumes that reality is socially constructed, which means that re-
ality cannot be perceived objectively. Rather, our social reality is constructed in the 
ongoing meaning making process of social interaction, wherein language plays a cru-
cial role.5 (Berger & Luckmann 1967.) Discourses create social reality through the 
production of concepts, objects, and subject positions. “Concepts” are categories, re-
lationships and theories through which we understand the world and relate to one an-
other. Concepts help constituting “objects” by making the material world meaningful. 
As subjects acquire a right to speak in different discourses, “subject positions” arise. 
(Oswick, Keenoy & Grant 2000.) Hardy and Phillips (2004, 302) define social posi-
                                                 
5
 A more thorough description of the constructivist epistemology is provided in Chapter 3.1.1. 
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tions as “locations in social space from which certain delimited agents can act.” 
They are produced socially as individuals take up positions within a discourse. Differ-
ent subject positions have different rights to speak; some may have a louder voice, 
due to their position in the discourse, while others may have no voice at all. Accord-
ing to the discursive perspective, discourses have power over individuals, but at the 
same time individuals can draw on different discourses as discursive resources for 
their own purposes (Hardy et al. 2000). 
So, to put it simply, discourse is a way of talking and writing about a certain issue, 
such as strategy, including the statements, concepts, terms, and expressions that are 
used when constructing it. In recent years, strategy discourse has attracted more and 
more interest in the strategy research community (cf. Barry & Elmes 1997; Hera-
cleous & Barret 2001; Eriksson & Lehtimäki 2001; Maitilis & Lawrence 2003; Vaara 
et al. 2004; Mantere & Vaara 2008). In the following, I will review the key premises 
of this discursive strategy view.  
2.2.1 DISCURSIVE APPROACH TO STRATEGY 
The process of strategizing involves usually lots of talk and text, such as memos, 
meetings, presentations, storytelling, and conversations, among others. Also the out-
comes of the strategizing are discursive, like strategy plans, vision statements, 
speeches and PowerPoint slides, just to mention a few. (Maitilis & Lawrence 2003.) 
Managers also spend a lot of time communicating strategy, trying to get others to 
“buy” strategy with means that are fundamentally discursive by nature. Discourse is 
their resource by which strategy is constructed, maintained and sustained. (Johnson et 
al. 2008, 42.) And in order to understand the dynamics of strategizing, we need to un-
derstand the discursive practices embedded in the strategy discourse. (Vaara et al. 
2004; Barry & Elmes 1997; Knights & Morgan 1991; Samra-Fredricks, 2003.) In 
other words, the research should cover the discursive process where strategy is con-
structed and made meaningful.  
As mentioned, the discursive viewpoint views strategies as social constructions “pro-
duced” and “consumed” as talk and text. Strategy is treated as a language used by or-
ganizational actors in order to determine, justify, and give meaning to organizational 
actions. Strategy is a frame or perspective that can be used to shape stakeholders’ un-
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derstanding of the environment and to act in ways that are favorable for the organiza-
tion. Strategy discourse does not simply mirror reality, it creates it. Strategy does not 
just react to problems existing in organizational environment; but also constitutes and 
defines those problems. It represents a sort of rhetoric embedded in social practices 
that makes sense of, legitimizes, and produces certain activities in organizations. 
(Hardy et al. 2000; Knights & Morgan 1991.)  
Strategy discourse is not a unanimous enterprise but more likely a polyphonic project 
that receives different kinds of emphasis in different contexts. Within the discursive 
strategy discussion, there has been a debate whether there is a certain macro-level of 
strategy discourse, which would influence how strategy is practiced at the micro-level, 
or whether different strategy concepts are more probably only translated from actor to 
actor, who operate in a network of actors. The latter view assumes that the meaning of 
strategy cannot be transferred from one context to another since “strategy concepts in 
different contexts are different concepts.” (Seidl 2007, 198-199.) In this work, I adopt 
the view that there are certain macro-level strategy discourses that can be located from 
the wider societal contexts, but that these same discourses can (and most likely will) 
be utilized and consumed with different ways at the micro-level. However, as de 
Certeau (1988) brings out, consumption is “an art of weak,” which means that it does 
not have a power to change the discourse it consumes, but it subverts and modifies it. 
Again, we can make a distinction between societal level strategy discourses that em-
body general elements of strategic management and organizational level strategy dis-
courses that include contextual and content specific strategies of organizations. That 
is, while the former discuss strategic management at a general level, the latter argue 
what an organization plans to do in certain situation. I argue that both of these are by 
nature strategy discourses.  
Strategy constructs subjectivity. Strategy discourse is by no means neutral by its na-
ture; it promotes, defines, and maintains the subjectivity of individuals and groups. 
Specific discourses produce subject positions for the actors involved, and actors may 
employ and use these discourses and resist others to protect and enhance their social 
agency or identity. Subjectivity means “a discursively constructed sense of identity 
and social agency in specific contexts.” (Laine & Vaara 2007, 30.) The discourse of 
strategy has become a part of the identity of managers and workers. This popular 
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management discipline “transforms them into subjects whose sense of meaning and 
reality becomes tied to their participation in the discourse and practice of strategy” 
(Knights & Morgan 1991, 252). The way strategy is talked positions individuals in 
relation to others constituting some actors as more powerful than others. It may em-
power others by giving them a clear mandate to speak and act and disable others by 
silencing them. Those actors, who have a central role and mandate in organizations’ 
strategy discourse and the ability to engage in it, can – and most likely will – use 
power over others. (Ibid.) 
Strategy has become a buzzword for all activities and disciplines that are trying to es-
tablish and maintain the importance of their work. Strategy is a powerful rhetorical 
device, which turns “normal” into significant and unique. Strategy is also a means to 
legitimize choices and activities, whereby strategists create a world in which problems 
defined by them can only be solved by them. (Grandy & Mills 2004.) Hendry (2000, 
969) brings out how the strategy appears to managers as an instrumental technology. 
This technology applies knowledge of economics and the social sciences, of specific 
industries and markets, and of the organization's resource capabilities to the creation 
of economic value and wealth (ibid.). The discursive approach to strategy is summa-
rized in Table 2.  
TABLE 2 DISCURSIVE APPROACH TO STRATEGY 
APPROACH DEFINITION AND NATURE  
DISCURSIVE Strategy is a discursive construction, language used by organizational actors in order to 
determine, justify, and give meaning to organizational actions. Strategy discourse does 
not simply mirror reality, it creates it. (Cf. Vaara et al. 2004) 
Strategy constructs subjectivity in organizations. Strategy discourse is by no means 
neutral by nature, but promotes and defines subjectivity of individuals and groups. 
(Knights & Morgan 1991.) Specific discourses produce and construct subject positions 
for the actors involved, and actors may employ and use these discourses and resist oth-
ers to protect and enhance their social agency or identity (Laine & Vaara 2007).  
 
So, strategy is a discursive accomplishment that is being produced in social interac-
tion. Next, I will provide an overview of how the previous research has described and 
discussed the process of constructing strategy.  
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2.2.2 PREVIOUS FINDINGS ON STRATEGY DISCOURSE 
In their seminal paper, Knights and Morgan (1991) outlined how the discourse of 
strategy transforms individuals into subjects, whose sense and meaning is closely tied 
to their participation in the discourse and practice of strategy. Thus, strategy is not a 
neutral phenomenon, but more likely a discourse produced in the specific sets of 
power relationships that define its truth effects both at the societal and organizational 
level. Strategy has some power effects that Knights and Morgan (ibid.) acknowledge: 
“a) It provides managers with a rationalization of their success and failures; b) 
It sustains and enhances the prerogatives of management and negates alternative 
perspectives on organizations, c) It generates a sense of personal and organiza-
tional security for managers; d) It reflects and sustains a strong sense of gen-
dered masculinity for male management; e) It demonstrates managerial rational-
ity to colleagues, customers, competitors; government and significant others in 
the environment; f) It facilitates and legitimizes the exercise of power; g) It con-
stitutes the subjectivity of organizational members as particular categories of 
persons who secure their sense of reality through engaging in strategic discourse 
and practice.“ (Knights & Morgan 1991, 262-263) 
The work of Knights and Morgan (ibid.) shows how the strategy discourse has power 
over us and that it is anything but a neutral way of describing the organization and its 
environment. The power effects of the strategy discourse show how strategy equips 
managers with certain means that they can capitalize on. Strategy can become a vehi-
cle for managers that they can use for many different purposes at the same time. With 
regard to this research, it is interesting to find out whether the power effects of strat-
egy are being used by the managers of this study and, especially, how they are used 
by them.  
However, the strategy discourse is by no means a monolithic and unitary entity. While 
studying the problem of participation in the context of strategy, Mantere and Vaara 
(2008) identified six different strategy discourses that either promote or prevent par-
ticipation in strategy work. “Mystification” discourse considers the strategy process as 
a vision and mission-driven process led by top management. Strategies are crafted in 
closed workshops and information is restricted. “Disciplining” is a discourse that 
links strategy to effective organizational discipline and command structures. Top 
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managers are also seen as the strategists and strategy work is closely linked to organ-
izational control mechanisms, while the access to information is limited and restricted. 
“Technologization” discourse promotes strategy that is driven by a specific system 
and usually the top management defines the systems to be used. Here, strategy work is 
linked to systems and technologies. “Self actualization” discourse seeks to impart 
meaning to organizational activities by means of strategy. In it, all actors can partici-
pate in strategizing, and strategy work is also done in micro-level. “Dialogization” 
sees strategy process as a dialogue between different organizational actors and func-
tions. “Concretization” sees strategy as part of the organizational decision making 
process. (Ibid.) 
For me, the strategy discourse classification provided by Mantere and Vaara is not 
interesting just from the perspective of the participation problem, but because it also 
shows how strategy is constructed discursively. It indicates how these strategy dis-
courses have an influence on us and our activities in strategy, and also how we can 
manipulate and use them intentionally for different purposes. It also makes out that 
strategy is a multifaceted phenomenon that can be constructed in multiple ways.  
Strategy creation, the production of strategy, is a top management’s effort to manage a 
company and to have power over people. Employees and middle managers, on the 
contrary, may show their power by consuming and maneuvering with the strategy in 
ways that may not meet top management’s expectations. Drawing on the critical Fou-
cauldian tradition, Ezzamel and Willmott (2008) analyzed and showed how a new 
strategy discourse, introduced in a global retailing and manufacturing company, be-
came a new regime of truth in the organization. The central feature of the new strat-
egy was a new accounting metrics, which was to ensure a more disciplined approach 
to business. However, the strategy was also resisted in the organization. The introduc-
tion of team work, a crucial implication and consequence of the new strategy at a shop 
floor, was resisted through slow-down tactics, by being less cooperative and being 
resentful. Also, Laine and Vaara (2007) showed how different groups struggled over 
subjectivity in an engineering firm. While the top management of the firm announced 
a new strategy for gaining control of the organization, the middle managers initiated 
unit-specific discourses in order to create room to maneuver in situations where their 
activities where not supported by the corporate management. Again, the project engi-
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neers at the employee level distanced themselves from the management-led strategy 
discourse to maintain their own identity.  
Strategy is practiced in organizations not only by means of the macro-level dis-
courses, but also by contextual micro-level discursive practices that seek to fulfill cer-
tain ends and needs. Vaara et al. (2004) studied airline alliances and found out certain 
practices that were used in strategizing. For instance, the traditional strategies were 
problematized, while the benefits of certain strategies were rationalized, objectified 
and factualized. Mantere and Sillince (2007) acknowledged the role of rhetoric as a 
discursive practice, especially in the case of the concept of strategic intent. They sug-
gest that the concept can be used as a rhetorical device when creating coherence be-
tween multiple intents. Further on, Jarzabkowski & Sillince (2007) showed empiri-
cally how top managers constructed a context for commitment to multiple strategic 
goals. They argue that managerial rhetoric is contextual and derives meaning from 
historical backgrounds. They also stress the importance of internal consistency within 
top management’s rhetoric, since it is related to their ability to influence their audi-
ence.  
Samra-Fredericks (2003) studied the everyday social interaction of strategist with the 
conversation analytic methods. Her analysis shows how a strategist rhetorically 
shaped a strategic direction of a firm. The rhetorical skills that were deployed in this 
interaction include strategist’s ability to speak forms of knowledge, mitigate and ob-
serve the protocols of human interaction, question and query, display appropriate 
emotion, deploy metaphors, and put history “to work.” Samra-Fredericks (2004) has 
also shown how strategy discourse, an area that has for a long time been regarded as 
an emotion-free field, actually consists of different rhetorical moves to create emo-
tional display.  
So far in this chapter, I have discussed my theoretical thinking on strategy. I started 
the chapter by discussing the two major approaches to strategy, rational and proces-
sual. The rational strategy approach is in a way the cradle of all corporate strategy 
thinking and research, since it addressed the phenomenon first. The processual view 
emerged as a critique of the rational approach, dominated by economics, by humaniz-
ing strategy research and generating more dynamic theories. The practice approach to 
strategy has been influenced by the processual view. However, it has gone deeper into 
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the practice of strategy by studying strategic activity and practices of the managers. 
To a large extent, these practices and activities are discursive by nature and strategy is 
mediated by the language that strategist use. (Jarzabkowski 2005, 2-3.) My own ap-
proach to strategy stems from a combination of the practice and discursive views on 
strategy (see Figure 16) and it is these two theoretical discussions that I mostly want to 
contribute. 
 
Rational 
approach
Processual 
approach
Critique
Influence
MY APPROACH TO STRATEGY
Practice 
approach
Discursive 
view
 
FIGURE 1 DIFFERENT VIEWS ON STRATEGY AND MY APPROACH TO IT 
The practice-oriented strategy research discussed earlier has been interested in study-
ing how strategy is practiced in organizations. To do this, it has pursued a sociological 
stance on strategy research (Whittington 2007). To explain and understand the prac-
tice of strategy, it has quoted theorists like Foucault, Bourdieu and Giddens. In this 
work, I apply the concept of consumption adopted from de Certeau (1988) to study 
the practice of strategy. Although de Certeau is a rather familiar name within practice-
oriented strategy research, there are not many empirical works that have applied his 
ideas (cf. De la Ville & Mounoud 2003). Next, I will discuss the concept of consump-
                                                 
6
 However, it has to be noted that the progress from one strategy approach to another has not been as 
straightforward and plain as this illustration might indicate. There have been, and there are, controversies 
and disagreements between different views on strategy. Strategy research is a heterogeneous field that em-
bodies many different strategy schools that have their own agendas and research approaches. 
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tion. Firstly, I will discuss the term at the general level, and then I will apply it in the 
context of strategy.  
2.3 CONSUMPTION 
Oxford English Dictionary7 gives a number of definitions and uses for the verb con-
sume. Firstly, it may relate to physical destruction when it might mean the following: 
”To cause to evaporate or disappear; to disperse. To destroy, corrode, wear 
away; (of fire) to burn up, reduce to ashes. To burn with fire, be reduced to 
ashes. To swallow up in destruction. To kill or destroy (a person). Of a person: 
to waste away, esp. from disease; (also) to pine. Also with away. Of a thing: to 
waste away, decay, rot. Also with away. To cause (organic matter) to decom-
pose.” 
Secondly, the verb may be used with respect to the exploitation of resources. Then it 
might mean the following: 
”To eat or drink; to ingest. To use up (esp. a commodity or resource), exhaust. 
To purchase or use (goods or services); to be a consumer of. To spend (money), 
esp. wastefully; to squander (goods). To ruin oneself through excessive spending. 
To spend or pass (a period of time), esp. wastefully. Also: to take up (time). To 
wear out (a thing) by use.” 
And thirdly, it may have some extended uses, when it means the following: 
”To engage the full attention or energy of (a person); (of a feeling or emotion) to 
overwhelm. To read (literature), watch (film or television), etc., esp. avidly or 
voraciously; to absorb (culture, art, etc.). To extinguish (a right of action).” 
These definitions do not give too good picture of consumption. Instead, they portray it 
as an activity that destroys, wastes or takes away something that has been produced by 
                                                 
7
 Oxford English Dictionary. Retrieved May 23, 2009, from dictionary.oed.com website: 
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50048269?query_type=word&queryword=consume&first=1&max_to_sh
ow=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=YaDB-oHrMaz-6697&hilite=50048269. 
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someone else. To some extent, these definitions fit also the purpose of this work. De 
Certeau used the term to describe how different cultural and societal mass-products 
are used by ordinary people in their everyday life. However, for him the term con-
sumption had a more positive connotation since he concluded that it belongs to our 
very human nature and has a sort of redemptive effect and meaning in our lives. (De 
Certeau 1988; cf. Mitchell 2007.) De Certeau investigated the ways in which users 
operate, not just being passive and guided by the established rules, but being users 
who are creatively consuming the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt it to 
their own interests and rules. He raised the consumers, the “unrecognized producers, 
poets of their own acts, silent discoverers of their own paths in the jungle of function-
alist rationality,” as the central actors of everyday life (de Certeau idib., xviii).  
De Certeau criticized Bourdieu and Foucault, academics who touched similar ques-
tions in their writings, of viewing subjectivity too narrowly as a reflex of broader 
structural process that defines subject positions and generates actions independently 
of the reflexive subject. For Bourdieu that structural process was habitus, for Foucault 
is was discourse. However, instead of addressing his own theory, de Certeau provided 
“a theology” that is rooted in the nature of human spirit. (Mitchell ibid.) The term 
consumption and the idea of individuals as creative and opportunistic users are in the 
core of this theology.  
In the following, de Certeau (ibid.) gives a practical example of consumption: 
”Thus the spectacular victory of Spanish colonization over the indigenous Indian 
cultures was diverted from its intended aims by the use made of it: even when 
they were subjected, indeed even when they accepted their subjection, the Indi-
ans often used the laws, practices, and representations that were imposed on 
them by force or by fascination to ends other than those of their conquerors; they 
made something else out of them; they subverted them from within – not by 
transforming them but many different ways of using them in the service of rules, 
customs, or convictions foreign to the colonization which they could not escape. 
They metaphorized the dominant order: they made it function in another register. 
[…] They diverted it without leaving it. Procedures of consumption maintained 
their difference in the very space that the occupier was organizing.” (De Certeau 
1988, 31-32) 
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Here, another modern example of consumption describes how an immigrant uses the 
systems and structures of his new country creatively: 
A North African living in Paris or Roubaix (France) insinuates into the system 
imposed on him by the construction of a low-income housing development or of 
the French language the ways of ‘dwelling’ (in a house or language) peculiar to 
his native Kabylia. He superimposes them and, by that combination, creates for 
himself a space in which he can find ways of using the constraining order of the 
place or of the language. Without leaving the place where he has no choice but 
to live and which lays down its law for him, he establishes within it a degree of 
plurality and creativity. By an art of being in between, he draws unexpected re-
sults from his situation. (De Certeau 1988, 30)  
To de Certeau, consumption is an activity that uses mass-produced and imposed 
goods, products and systems for one’s own purposes. The consumer cannot “own” the 
product or structure he/she is consuming; neither can he/she escape it in many cases. 
This leaves him/her in the situation of making something out of the system or product 
that is imposed on him/her, adopting and using it intentionally. The Indians consumed 
the sanctions imposed on them by their conquerors subtly and quietly in ways that 
were not intended by the Spanish. They made them “function in another register,” as 
Certeau describes it. Also, the North African living in Paris insinuates him into the 
system and laws, which are imposed on him, and manages to establish some space for 
him. He dwells peculiar to his native Kabylia. Consumption like this is characterized 
by its ruses and fragmentation. It poaches and shows itself not in its own products, but 
in an art of using those that are imposed on it, making it clandestine, invisible, tacit 
and tireless activity by nature. (ibid., 31.) The products of the tactical consumption are 
thus difficult to study, since they have no place - only the space of their moments of 
being (Fiske 1989, 35).  
Fiske (ibid., 1-47) discusses the idea of consumption from the perspective of popular 
culture. He concludes that the consumption of the popular culture is motivated by 
pleasure, the pleasure of producing one’s own meanings of social experience and the 
pleasure of avoiding the social discipline of the power-bloc. Also, the everyday act of 
consumption is always an act of production, since consumption is always production 
of meaning. Consumption is also “the art of being in between.” Using their products 
for our purposes is the art of being in between production and consumption. For in-
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stance cooking could be characterized as the art of being in between the supermarket 
and a unique meal. (Ibid.) 
Although de Certeau raises the everyday practices of individuals at podium, he does 
not, however, want to return to individuality. Moreover, de Certeau views subjects as 
mere vehicles or authors of the consumption. His investigation is concentrated on 
“modes of operation” or “schemata of action” rather than “the subjects who are their 
authors or vehicles” (De Certeau ibid., xi). His interest is not in individual subjects 
per se, but more likely in the modes or logics of operations, consumption tactics that 
the consumers use, which he considers to be socially shared by nature.  
2.3.1 STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
De Certeau uses the terms “strategy” and “tactics” to explain and illustrate the rela-
tionship between structure and human action. By strategy he refers to actions of the 
powerful that are derived and oriented towards the realization of abstract models. 
Strategies emerge when institutions such as business, armies, cities, or scientific insti-
tutions separate themselves in order to establish a panoptical position. Strategies are 
able to produce, tabulate and impose these places. As in management rhetoric, strate-
gies are being made to distinguish its own place, the place of its own power and will, 
from an environment. This Cartesian attitude is an effort to delimit one’s own place in 
a world bewitched by the powers of others. This is also a typical attitude in modern 
science, politics, and military strategy. (De Certeau 1988, 36-39) 
In de Certeau’s thinking, strategy can refer to anything between cities, organizations, 
and even individuals that is recognized as authorities and which has power over them-
selves and others. Strategies have their own spaces: they manifest themselves through 
the physical artifacts and/or discourses. Strategy can be set by someone with power, 
or it may have created its own power. Strategy is relatively stable and enduring having 
an institutionalized status. Strategy cherishes stability and order and it has power of 
knowledge making it an asset of the strong. Strategy is not a consumer, but more like 
a good or commodity that is being consumed with different tactics. (Ibid.) 
Tactics, on the other hand, area “calculus which cannot count on a proper” belonging 
to the other. “A tactic insinuates itself into other’s place, fragmentarily, without tak-
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ing it over in its own entity, without being able to keep it at a distance.” (Ibid., xviii-
xx.) Tactics describe the use of the products imposed by the dominant economic or-
der. Usage or consumption, as de Certeau calls it, is collective activity that uses these 
products off and within the dominant cultural economy in order to adapt them to 
user’s own interests and rules. (Ibid., xiv) So, while strategy forms an entity of its 
own, tactics are practices that are inter-discursively related to many other entities. 
Tactics are acts of the weak taking place within a discursive space of strategy. In de 
Certeau’s thinking they represent a hope of redemption over the panopticon of mod-
ern society. (Mitchell 2007.)  
Tactics are everyday resistance rooted not only in the realization of human nature, but 
also activity that is morally and universally good by nature. Although dependent upon 
the possibilities provided by circumstances (places), tactics do not obey the law of the 
place for they are not defined or identified by it. They can only manipulate and divert 
these places. Tactics means playing and foiling in the other’s game, the space insti-
tuted by others, since tactics lack their own place. They have to get along in estab-
lished networks and places. People have to make do with what they have. (De Certeau 
ibid., 18.) In tactics, subjects rely on opportunistic moments where they can exploit 
and use gaps, discontinuities or inconsistencies (Knights & Mueller 2004, 60).  
De Certeau describes tactics with many metaphors and examples. The users consume 
social codes and language like renters make changes and modifications in the apart-
ments they rent, but which they do not own. They “furnish” them with their own his-
tory, accent and phrases. Also, the pedestrians consume streets by filling them with 
their aspirations, desires, and goals, although they are unable to change or reshape the 
city map. (Ibid., xxvi.) Consumption might also mean making something of the im-
ages broadcasted by television or reading a health magazine and making something 
out of it (ibid., 30). Also, consumers show artful skills, like driving in the streets of 
Rome or Naples, when tacking in the middle of the labyrinths of powers (idib., 18).  
According to de Certeau, the central practice in the consumption process is language 
(or “enunciation” as he calls it). According to de Certeau, the act of speaking consists 
of four characteristics. Firstly, speaking operates within the field of the linguistic sys-
tem. Secondly, it affects the appropriation of language by its speakers. Thirdly, it es-
tablishes the present relative to time and place, and fourthly, it posits a contract with 
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the other in a network of places and relations. (Ibid., xiii) De Certeau (1980) con-
cludes that the study of rhetoric is a key to uncovering the everyday tactics used by 
users.  
“Relevant, for example, are the various ’figures‘ or ’tropes‘ analyzed by rhetoric 
[…] There is indeed nothing astonishing in such homologies between the ruses of 
practice and operations of a rhetoric. Rhetorical figures play their successful or 
unsuccessful moves out on a restricted terrain which is precisely that of self-
identity, namely, of rule-governed syntax and of the ’literal‘ or ’proper‘ meaning 
in just that sense evoked above: that is, a lawful space of identity and exclusion 
defined against its external other. Rhetoric offers the possibility of a manipula-
tion of language dependent on the appropriate occasion and aiming to seduce, 
entrap, or invert the linguistic position of the receiver.” (De Certeau 1980, 8) 
De Certeau outlines how the discipline of rhetoric offers models for differentiating 
among different types of tactics. While describing turns and tropes, they offer a way 
to analyze everyday acting. De Certeau not only concerns discourses as normative 
frameworks, but also as tools that are manipulated by the users. (De Certeau 1988, 21) 
2.3.2 RELEVANCE TO STRATEGY RESEARCH 
Today, strategy has colonized the world of organizing by becoming a popular and 
powerful management discipline or fashion of our time. It is a practice that has pene-
trated more or less every organization, forcing managers to create “strategies,” formu-
late “strategy” processes, and make “strategic” decisions. It seems that organizations 
belong to a community of strategy made up of other organizations, consultants, busi-
ness schools, and business media, which bring back and forth and reproduce different 
strategy practices that influence the way organizations are to be managed (Seidl 
2007). Like the sanctions imposed by the Spanish conquerors, strategy is hard – if not 
impossible – to escape in organizations. You just have to live with it and consume it.  
The story of Indians using and consuming sanctions that were imposed on them by the 
Spanish conquerors reminds us of the hegemony of strategic management in many 
ways. As the Spaniards tried to impose their own culture on the Indians by giving the 
rituals, representations, and laws, so does the discipline of strategy invade the every-
day life of managers. However, the Indians, although unable to reject or alter those 
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sanctions, used or consumed them for their own purposes, making them something 
quite different from what the conquerors had in mind. (De Certeau ibid., xiii.)  
Nowadays, I argue that an individual manager is as incapable to change or escaping 
the sanction, strategy discourse, imposed on him/her as the Indians were before. How-
ever, although strategy is a management discipline that cannot be escaped, it does not 
keep practitioners, like managers, as its prisoners. Following de Certeau’s argument 
(ibid.), managers, regarded as consumers, use and consume strategies discursively for 
their purposes and means. Although strategy discourse promotes and defines their 
subjectivity, they can also consume it in order to promote certain subjectivities. Strat-
egy is no more a discourse that is being imposed to them, but more like a product or 
consumable good that can be “poached” or used for totally different purposes than has 
actually been meant.  
De Certeau’s idea of consumption encourages us to study how macro-discourses are 
used and poached by the managers. By doing this, it also connects the macro-level 
structures to the micro-level talk. De la Ville and Mounoud (2003) have applied de 
Certeau’s idea of consumption in the field of strategy research. Their work, which is 
one of the few studies focused on strategy consumption, showed how managers resist 
the dominant strategy design by doing “la perruque,” a term used to describe how 
employees might divert time from the organization to do something that benefits the 
employees, instead of following the strategic direction of the organization. They also 
showed how strategy consumption may take the form of narrative tactics, such as 
poaching, which manipulates and haunts larger discursive arenas, humor, and plotting, 
telling stories to uncover the causal structure of the events. De la Ville and Mounoud 
use the term “poaching ability” (ibid., 97) to describe managers’ ability to use and 
transform the grand discourse of strategy. They also point out how consumption en-
tails two sides: a form of acceptance of the good and the creative and pleasure seeking 
form of using it.8  
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 This dualistic idea of the nature of consumption turned out to be a very important finding with regard to my 
analysis, see Chapter 3.3.3. 
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In this work, I use de Certeau’s thinking in the context of strategy. My attempt is to 
use de Certeau’s idea of consumption to make a contribution to the practice approach 
to strategy and to the discursive strategy view. The idea of consumption provides us 
with a framework to study and understand what managers make out of strategy and 
strategic management. It gives us a framework to understand how managers use the 
strategy discourse that is imposed on them. However, since consumption is hidden 
and fragmented on the terrain, which it does not own, it is scattered all over the “offi-
cial” strategy discourse. This makes it hard to study, which might be the reason why 
there is so little research on it (cf. De la Ville & Mounoud 2003).  
Here, I have proposed that strategy is a discursive practice and that managers con-
struct, produce and, especially, consume it in their talk. This idea constitutes a central 
theme of this work, where my aim is to study how managers consume strategy in their 
talk. In the following, I will describe how I have set out to do it.  
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3 RESEARCH PROCESS 
In this chapter, I will give an account of the research process of this study. Firstly, I 
will discuss the discourse analytic research tradition in general terms, and then define 
how I have used it in this work. Secondly, I will describe the research data and discuss 
how they were produced in the case organizations, and also reflect on my own role as 
a researcher in each case organization. Finally, I will describe how the data were ana-
lyzed using discourse analytic methods. The chapter was written in a personal tone in 
it to signal reflexivity (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2000) and authenticity, and to describe 
the choices that have been made during the research process, in other words, to make 
the process as transparent as possible for the reader.  
3.1 METHODOLOGY 
This research stems from the discursive perspective and applies discourse analytic 
methods to analyze the data. Before going into discourse analysis more thoroughly, I 
will discuss the constructivist and poststructuralist underpinnings of the discursive 
approach.  
3.1.1 POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Poststructuralism, by drawing on postmodernism, abandons the modernistic idea of 
the Enlightenment. Instead of relying on rational universal solutions and explanations, 
grand narratives of modernity that would guarantee progress in the development of 
knowledge, it stresses the role of local and provisory stories. It breaks free from the 
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structuralist view, according to which there is a dominating center that governs the 
structure. (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2000, 148) 
Poststructuralism views the nature of language as an ambivalent, metaphorical and 
constitutive play with signs. It questions the ability of the researcher to give objective 
and truthful accounts about reality since reality can be represented in a number of 
ways, and human experience is always discursively constituted. Poststructuralism 
does not embrace the idea of developing a best interpretation with superior or holistic 
meaning. (Ibid., 148-152.) Poststructuralists claim that subjectivity is constructed 
through language, and is a process rather than a structure. To them, human subjects 
are effects, rather than a cause, of the social and discursive process. How we speak 
and how others address us, constitutes our subjectivity in different contexts. Dis-
courses and language can give expression to particular power relations and lock peo-
ple into some forms of subjectivity. Certain discourses (such as strategy) may em-
power while others silence. (Ibid., 164-165.) 
Constructivism is an epistemological theory about the nature of knowledge. It claims 
that knowledge is constructed in social interaction, not discovered from the world as 
the modernist and positivist research tradition explains. (Silverman 2006, 128-130.) 
Thus, constructivism could be seen as a counterpart of the modernist, realistic scien-
tific tradition. Constructivism takes a critical stance towards taken-for-granted ways to 
understand the world and knowledge. It is critical of the idea that the world can be 
observed empirically and objectively and believes instead that we understand the 
world based on our historical and cultural background, wherein the concepts and cate-
gories through which we perceive and construct our world are derived. Knowledge 
and our view of the world is constructed and sustained in the social process of interac-
tion. What we regard as the truth, our current accepted ways of understanding the 
world, is not is a product of objective observations of the world, but more likely of the 
everyday social process of interaction in which we constantly engage with each other. 
Here, knowledge and our world are literally socially constructed by their nature. 
However, the construction process of our social reality is not unilateral, but more 
likely a many-faced and polyphonic process wherein many simultaneously existing 
socially constructed worlds and realities co-exist. (Burr 1995, 2-4) 
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The basic premise behind the constructivist epistemology relates to the poststructural-
ist idea of the nature of language, and to the notion of the nature of reality. According 
to the constructivist approach, language does not mirror reality as the realist episte-
mology assumes, but constructs, maintains, and renews it. (Alvesson & Kärreman 
2000b; Potter & Wetherell 1987, 32-55.) While a realist assumes that by analyzing 
language we can learn what strategy is, a constructivist studies language to learn how 
strategy is produced and constructed discursively. In this work, I am also interested in 
studying how strategy is consumed discursively.  
Constructivism takes knowledge as theory-driven, viewing the research process as 
interplay between a theory base and the phenomenon that is being studied. Through 
this interaction the model of reality, called knowledge, is being created. This means 
that the researcher approaches the problem he/she is studying with certain precondi-
tions that also affect the possible solution. Constructivism does not regard the phe-
nomenon under investigation and the researcher as separate. More than likely, find-
ings are determined by the philosophical positions of the researchers. Constructivism 
believes that researchers are never objective or value-neutral. This calls for transpar-
ency from the researcher both to explain the theoretical assumptions and to justify the 
decisions and choices that have been made during the research process. (Mir & Wat-
son 2000; Alvesson & Kärreman 2007.) Hence, all this means that research is the con-
struction of the researcher, and not a neutral nor objective account of what has 
“really” happened or what the research phenomenon is “really” about.  
3.1.2 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
Discourse analysis is neither a clear-cut research method as such, nor a unified enter-
prise, but more like a theoretical framework that includes and allows different kinds 
of applications and focus areas (cf. Potter & Wetherell 1987, 6-8). Discourse analysis 
has been influenced and informed by a variety of studies from sociology, anthropol-
ogy, and linguistics; it is a “plurivocal project” (Grant et al. 2004). The common 
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ground for all these approaches is a strong constructivist view, which regards reality 
as socially constructed, as described previously9.  
While social reality is constructed and maintained discursively, discourse analysis 
aims to uncover and study these construction processes and consequently provide us 
with an understanding of the construction, maintenance, and change of social reality 
(Hardy 2001). As Phillips and Hardy (2002, 2) put it, this is valuable because “with-
out discourse, there is no social reality, and without understanding discourse, we 
cannot understand our reality, our experiences, ourselves.” 
The term discourse refers to practices of talking and writing, in general. To be more 
specific, it can be defined as a set of texts and those practices that produce, dissemi-
nate, and consume them with the aim of bringing an object into being. Our social real-
ity is produced and made real and meaningful for us through discourse. Discourse 
analysis is an approach to explore this construction process of the social reality. (Ibid., 
3.) 
As mentioned earlier, there are multiple, somewhat competing and differing views, 
each of which has their own idea of how the discursive construction of social reality 
should be studied. In the following, I will discuss three complementary classifications 
of discourse analysis and evaluate their relevance and contribution for my research 
process. Firstly, I will bring out four different discourse types presented by Alvesson 
and Kärreman (2000a). Then I will review a discourse analysis classification provided 
by Phillips and Hardy (ibid.). And finally, I will sum up the discussion by discussing 
the thinking of Fairclough, who gives a rather comprehensive and holistic view of dis-
course analysis in his book Discourse and social change (1992). Each approach has 
contributed something to my data analysis, which is why they deserve to be discussed 
in more detail.  
                                                 
99
 However, there are also researchers within a discourse analytic research tradition that emphasize more 
realistic view of reality, calling the view a “critical realism” (see Fairclough 2005). 
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VARIETIES OF DISCOURSE 
In their article, Alvesson and Kärreman (2000a) recognize two major dimensions that 
seem to differentiate discourse analysts in their studies and approach. The first dimen-
sion is the connection between discourse and meaning. The question is whether the 
discourse precedes and incorporates cultural meaning and subjectivity or should it be 
understood purely as a text and talk that is only loosely coupled to meaning. This dis-
tinction has led researchers to think differently about the matter. Some believe that 
discourse and meaning overlap totally and are tightly coupled; others consider them 
loosely coupled, while still others assume that they are totally uncoupled. In practice, 
the question is about how far the conclusions drawn from the discourse studied can 
reasonably go, or should they be restricted entirely to the text and the use of language. 
Alvesson and Kärreman call the other spectrum of the dimension “discourse determi-
nation,” wherein the social and psychological consequences are also taken under con-
sideration in the analysis, and the other spectrum as “discourse autonomy,” which, on 
the other hand, stands on its own and is only loosely coupled to the social. (Ibid., 
1129-1133.) 
The distinction between autonomous and determinant discourse is very interesting and 
fruitful in terms of my own research. In this work, I studied how managers consume 
strategy discourse in their talk, which means that it was not just the text that I was in-
terested in, but also its usage and interpretation. Nevertheless, the usage and consump-
tion of strategy is in many cases clandestine by its nature and cleverly “hidden” under 
the official strategy rhetoric. This means that the text itself must be taken under close 
scrutiny. However, consumption and use are by no means context-free by nature, but 
more likely closely embedded into an organizational context. This is why my ap-
proach to discourse analysis is similar in various ways to discourse determination. In 
addition to showing how the contextual factors are related to the discourse, I was also 
interested in drawing conclusions on how and why the managers use strategy in cer-
tain ways, which requires that their cognition, motives, and subjectivity are in some 
way incorporated in a discourse. Here, discourse drives and embodies the subjectivity 
of managers and I was interested in analyzing it.  
The other dimension identified by Alvesson and Kärreman concerns the formative 
range of discourse. The “close-range” interest in discursive studies emphasizes local 
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and situational contexts of discourse. Language is here associated and related to a cer-
tain social context wherein it is produced. Discourse is considered to be local and 
rather context-specific by its nature. On the contrary, the “long-range” view sees dis-
course as a global and universal and not so context-specific by nature. For instance, 
strategy discourse could be seen as a sort of universal discourse that has been spread 
across different contexts. (Ibid., 1133.) 
As an example, Alvesson and Kärreman point out four versions of discourse analysis, 
each having its own particular emphasis and interests. The “micro-discourse ap-
proach” concentrates on social texts and calls for detailed study of language in a spe-
cific context. The “meso-discourse approach” is likewise interested in local context 
but along with the detailed textual analysis, seeks to compare and generalize texts be-
tween similar contexts. The “Grand Discourse approach” expands the range and 
pays attention, for instance, to discursive construction of organizational reality. The 
“Mega-Discourse approach” refers to those standardized ways of referring to general 
and universal discourses constructing a certain type of phenomenon. (Ibid., 1133-
1134.) 
The discourse typology provided by Alvesson and Kärreman (ibid.) shows that dis-
course is manifested at various levels, and it is these levels that should be taken into 
account in the analysis. However, they “express sympathy” for a more reduced range 
in the study of discourses and warn about the tendency to work with too grand or 
overly view of discourse. However, they also stress the risk involved in sticking too 
closely to the language and in forgetting the surrounding social context. The discourse 
analyst has to able to hear the story and understand the context where it was produced. 
(Ibid., 1145.) I read this advice as a suggestion to take into account both the 
text/discourse and the social context where it was produced, which is also what I aim 
to do in this work. In Alvesson and Kärreman’s terms, my aim is to show how the 
grand and mega Discourses are consumed at the micro-level.  
DISCOURSE AND POWER  
While Alvesson and Kärreman (2000a) emphasized the difference between the discur-
sive approaches that either take the contextual factors into account or not, Phillips and 
Hardy (2002) contribute to the discussion by emphasizing the role of power in the 
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discourse analytic research tradition. Phillips and Hardy identify (ibid., 19-27) four 
different traditions of research within the discourse analytic research stream (see Fig-
ure 2). The first two, “social linguistic analysis” and “interpretive structuralism,” are 
both un-critical approaches by nature. The social linguistic analysis takes a close look 
at the text in order to provide an insight into its organization and construction, and to 
understand how the text constructs certain phenomena. By doing this, the approach 
provides an understanding of the micro dynamics of the discourse. The interpretive 
structuralism widens the range of analysis and focuses on the social context and the 
discourses that support it. For instance, such studies have analyzed how organizational 
change is produced and legitimized by managers (Heracleous & Barret 2001).  
 
Constructivist Critical
Context
Text
Interpretive 
Structuralism
Social Linguistic 
Analysis
Critical Discourse 
Analysis
Critical Linguistic 
Analysis
 
FIGURE 2 DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO DISCOURSE ANALYSIS (PHILLIPS & HARDY 2002, 20)  
The third and fourth traditions, “critical discourse analysis” and “critical linguistic 
analysis,” are critical by nature, as their names suggest. The latter, critical linguistic 
analysis is focused on individual texts, but with a strong interest in the dynamics of 
power that surrounds them. It is concerned with the micro dynamics of the text. Criti-
cal discourse analysis, on the other hand, focuses on the role of the discursive activity 
in constituting and sustaining unequal power relations at group and institutional level. 
Researchers are interested in analyzing discursive struggles that privilege some and 
marginalize others. Drawing on the work of Fairclough (1992) and having a strong 
Foucauldian tradition, this stream is focused on studying how discursive structures 
shape the social space in which the actors act. (Phillips & Hardy ibid., 23-27.) 
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The issue of power is an interesting one with regard to my research. How should I po-
sition myself in relation to it? I am not as critical in my work as critical discourse 
analysis in its purest form, which assumes, by drawing heavily on Foucault, that dis-
courses have definitive power over us. Like Foucault (1972) himself put it: “discourse 
is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking, sub-
ject, but, on the contrary, a totality, which the dispersion of the subject and his dis-
continuity with himself may be determined” (ibid., 55). 
However, not all critical discourse analysts are so totalitarian in their view about 
power. Even Fairclough (ibid., 56-57) criticizes Foucault for being too pessimistic 
about the resistance to power. Also, Mumby (2004) suggests that organizational dis-
course studies should take a closer look at the dynamics of actual discursive proc-
esses. He also argues that too little time is spent examining the micro practices of the 
discourses that constitute organizational reality and their relation to larger macro 
processes of organizational power. Mumby also encourages researchers to explore 
subjectivity “as a complex, communicative accomplishment” that has a contradictory 
nature. He emphasizes that “self and world are created in relation to each other, and 
have no meaning as independent spheres of existence.” (Ibid., 252.) 
By drawing on de Certeau (1988), I also argue that while powerful discourses are 
hard, if not impossible, to escape, they are not complete totalities that leave no room 
for us. In other words, we are not powerless before them: they do not subjugate us to-
tally. More likely, we consume them for our own purposes playfully and creatively. 
Again, we do not consume these discourses only for creating and maintaining our sub-
jectivity, but also for pleasure and resistance to the dominant power structures. So, 
power is present in my research, but not in way that the critical discourse analysis 
might regard it. My approach to discourse analysis recognizes power and its presence 
in the discourse, but leaves more room to maneuver for the individual (cf. Laine & 
Vaara 2007). By doing this it tends to turn the Foucauldian idea upside down and 
“empower” and emancipate individuals, constructing them as users of discourse, and 
considering discourses as resources that they can use and draw on. In this way, dis-
courses are used as strategic resources (Hardy et al. 2000) to shape and ensure certain 
ends meaningful for the individual.  
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HOLISTIC VIEW 
Norman Fairclough is one of the seminal figures in the field of critical discourse 
analyses. I found his ideas and thoughts about discourse analysis highly fruitful in 
many ways. By the term discourse, Fairclough means “language use as a form of so-
cial practice, rather than a purely individual activity or a reflex of situational vari-
ables” (Fairclough 1992, 63). According to Fairclough, this has some serious implica-
tions. Firstly, discourse is a mode of action, which means a form with which people 
can act upon the world and especially upon each other, as well as a mode of represen-
tation. Secondly, there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and social struc-
ture. This means that while discourse is shaped and constrained by social elements, 
such as social class, discourse itself is also socially constitutive. (Ibid., 63-64.) Here, 
again, I find this two-way approach to discourse useful in terms of my own work.  
Fairclough distinguishes three different aspects of constructive effects of discourse. 
First of all, discourse contributes to the constructions of what are typically referred to 
as “social identities” and “subject positions.” Secondly, discourse helps construct 
“social relationships” between people. And thirdly, discourse contributes to the con-
struction of “systems of knowledge and beliefs.” These three effects correspond to the 
three functions of language and dimension to the meaning that coexists and interact in 
all discourse. Fairclough calls these functions “identity, relational, and ideational.“ 
(Ibid., 64.) 
Fairclough’s attempt to bring together three analytical traditions of discourse analysis 
is presented in Figure 3. In the center of his model is a linguistic tradition of analyzing 
text and linguistics (“text”) closely. At the other end, there is a macro-sociological 
tradition of analyzing social practice in relation to social structures (“social prac-
tice”). Between these two different ends, there is a micro-sociological tradition of 
analyzing the social practice, production, distribution, and consumption of discourse 
(“discursive practice”). Through these facilitating practices people actively produce 
and make sense of discourse. (Ibid., 73.) This is also the level at which de Certeau’s 
idea of consumption could be placed.  
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FIGURE 3 THREE DIMENSIONAL CONCEPTION OF DISCOURSE (FAIRCLOUGH 1992, 73) 
Intertextuality is one of the central concepts of Fairclough’s thinking. The concept 
relates to “productivity of texts, to how texts can transform prior texts and restructure 
existing conventions (genres, discourses) to generate new ones” So to say, the texts 
“absorb and are built out of the texts from the past.” (Ibid., 102.) Fairclough (ibid., 
118) distinguishes between three different kinds of intertextualities: 
1. in “sequential intertextuality” different texts or discourses alternate within a 
text (for instance, in the case where a credit card advertisement both tells the 
facts about the product and attempts to sell it), 
2. in “embedded intertextuality” one text or discourse type is clearly contained 
within the matrix of another, 
3. in “mixed intertextuality” texts or discourse types are merged in a more com-
plex and less easily separable way. 
Metadiscourse is one peculiar form of manifest intertextuality. Metadiscourse implies 
that the person is situated above or outside his/her own discourse, and is in the posi-
tion of controlling and manipulating it. Metadiscourse refers to cases where producers 
distinguish themselves from some level of the text, treating the distanced level as if it 
were another, external text. (Ibid., 122.) 
Although I am not so critical, I do understand Fairclough’s attempt to merge different 
traditions of discourse analysis. Thus, in this work, my attempt is not only to analyze 
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the text, i.e. the talk of managers, carefully, but also to track its relation to wider strat-
egy discourses regarded as social practice. I am also interested in knowing how dif-
ferent macro-level discourses are present in the talk of managers and how they are 
intertextually merged to each other. In my work, consumption is a discursive practice 
that mediates between the text, the discursive activity of the managers, and the social 
practice of strategy.  
Here, I have explained my methodological choices and their background. The follow-
ing question remains: How do I draw theoretical conclusions from the empirical data 
analyzed with the discourse analytic method? In the following, I will discuss this is-
sue of reasoning in more detail.  
3.1.3 ARGUMENTATION: CONTEXTUAL REASONING 
Scientific reasoning refers to the process through which we draw theoretical conclu-
sions from the data and justify them to others. Ketokivi and Mantere (2010) propose 
two alternative inductive reasoning strategies: “idealization” and “contextualization” 
(see Table 3). Idealization draws on the classical epistemic virtues of objectivity and 
truth. In it, inference is regarded as an autonomous process governed by normative 
and inter-subjective standards, while it seeks to provide normative guidelines for justi-
fying inductive arguments. In addition to truth, Ketokivi and Mantere (ibid.) argue 
that the de facto epistemic virtue of the idealization strategy is actually its “empirical 
adequacy,” the ability of the theory to produce empirical predictions. This has pro-
duced theories that are likely to be empirically valid. However, the fact that the ideali-
zation strategy separates inference from explanation is not unproblematic. By doing 
so, it suggests that there would be some sort of ultimate and idealized normative crite-
ria for reasoning, which there is not. It also ignores the role of the active “reasoner,” 
who conducts the research and makes (constructs) the arguments, and whose experi-
ence, competence and views affect the process. Theories do not emerge from the data, 
as is usually suggested; they are instead generated from it by the researcher, who is an 
active player in the reasoning process. (Ibid.) 
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TABLE 3 TWO REASONING RESPONSES TO THE REASONING DILEMMA (KETOKIVI & MANTERE 2010) 
STRATEGY IDEALIZATION CONTEXTUALIZATION 
CHARACTERISTIC FORM 
 OF INFERENCE 
Primary induction (eliminative, enu-
merative), but also deduction 
Inference to the best explanation (ab-
duction) 
INFERENCE AND  
EXPLANATION 
Separate activities: explanation fol-
lows after inference has been as-
sessed 
Intimately intertwined, assessed si-
multaneously 
EPISTEMIC VIRTUE Empirical adequacy Simplicity, plausibility, interesting-
ness, novelty 
BACKING FOR WARRANTS Compliance with methodological 
idealizations 
Making personal inference transpar-
ent 
Demonstrating empirical authenticity 
Conservation of paradigms  
ARGUMENTATION 
STRENGHTS 
Explicit and established rules and 
procedures 
Generalizable results 
Transparent, openly partial to the 
explanation 
Authentic to data and the research 
process 
CHALLENGES FOR  
APPEALING FOR  
WARRANTS 
Neither necessary nor sufficient to 
describe research practice 
May appear deceptive: idiosyncrasies 
of data and reasoning may appear to 
be intentionally concealed 
Unpredictability due to lack of meth-
odological consensus about rules and 
procedures 
Applicability of findings 
The challenge of subjectivism 
 
It is easy to acknowledge that I am not following the idealization strategy of inductive 
reasoning in this work. Instead, the second inductive reasoning strategy provided by 
Ketokivi & Mantere (ibid.), contextualization, seems to provide more suitable strategy 
for me. Contextualization regards inference as a context-depended process that fo-
cuses “on arriving at what the researcher and audience judge to be the best explana-
tion for the light of the epistemic virtues embraced” (ibid.). In practice, the contextu-
alization strategy can mean three different things. Firstly, subjective contextualization 
means that the researcher’s knowledge base and background affects his/her reasoning 
style. This calls for increased reflection from me when explaining authentically not 
only what I know, but how I have come to know it. Secondly, empirical contextualiza-
tion provides the “reader with the maximal access to the empirical context” of the 
research. Here, I need to be giving examples and contextual details about my case or-
ganizations, in order to establish empirical authenticity. I need to able to describe how 
the empirical material was produced in them, how I analyzed the material, and how I 
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drew theoretical conclusions from it. Thirdly, there is also theoretical contextualiza-
tion, which means that a theory can play an important role in the reasoning process 
and which calls for acknowledgement of the theoretical premises and views. (Ibid.) 
Having chosen the contextualization strategy of inductive reasoning means that I will 
not try to create nor defend my arguments based on the idealization strategy calling 
for generalization and predictability, but more likely, to create an interesting and 
novel, context-specific story, which tries to bring something new to previous strategy 
research. In a way, I am trying to solve the mystery of strategy consumption (cf. 
Alvesson & Kärreman 2007). This might, however, include some potential challenges 
that Ketokivi and Mantere (ibid.) also recognize. One challenge can be excessive sub-
jectivism and biases, the other a lack of generalization. In trying to avoid these pit-
falls, I seek to contextualize my work with three different contextualization tactics: 
subjective, empirical and theoretical. In the following, I will describe how the re-
search data were produced and analyzed hoping to provide an authentic account of it.  
3.2 RESEARCH DATA 
The data set, or “empirical material” (cf. Alvesson & Kärreman 2007), of this study 
was produced during 2003-2008 in three case organizations (see Figure 4). Since I 
was personally involved in producing and creating this material in every case organi-
zation, I have decided to call this phase of the research process “production” of the 
data, instead of data “collection,” which would suggest that the data are somehow ex-
ternal or unconnected to me. As a constructivist researcher, I was not a neutral or ob-
jective observer, but more likely I was involved in the data production personally and 
intimately myself, which calls for increased reflexivity from me. Reflexivity means 
justifying and explaining how I have produced, interpreted and reinterpreted the data.  
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FIGURE 4 SCHEDULE OF THE DATA PRODUCTION IN THE CASE ORGANIZATIONS 
At Industrial, the data were produced over a two-year period of 2003-2005; at Poly-
technic, the data was produced in 2004 during the months from May to August; and at 
Insurance, the production of data lasted from 2007 to 200810. These organizations 
were chosen as the case organizations for two reasons. Firstly, they represent different 
kinds of organizations in terms of their industry, organizational structure and geo-
graphical location. Industrial is a global corporation operating around the globe while 
having deep roots in industrial production. Polytechnic is a large public organization 
that has adopted the principles of the strategic management. It operates in a major 
Finnish city, and is a highly local operator compared with Industrial. Insurance has a 
rather large headquarters, while its customer operations unit has been spread across its 
business environment. The second reason for choosing these organizations was more 
pragmatic and practical by nature. I was given access to these organizations, and the 
data production carried out there turned out to be easy. These organizations also 
turned out to be original, interesting and even humorous in an interesting way, making 
them great contexts of consumption.  
Since this study is discourse analytic by nature, the data are mostly linguistic and 
qualitative. They consist of interviews, written documents, web pages, observations 
and media coverage. The whole interview data produced in all three case organiza-
tions consists of 33 individual and group interviews (consisting of 36 interviewees), 
all together. The interview data were literally produced, not gathered, since due to the 
constructivist view, the interview situation is always a situation wherein shared reality 
is produced by the interviewee and the interviewer. Here, the interviewer is not an ob-
                                                 
10
 The names of case organizations used here are fictitious originating from the case organizations’ industry 
and nature. However, these organizations are discussed in a way that ensures that their real identities cannot 
be identified from this work.  
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jective bystander or data collector in the situation, but more likely an active player, 
who participates in social interaction and in this way influences the construction of 
social reality. (Alvesson 2003.)  
The talk that is analyzed linguistically in this work was produced mainly in these in-
terviews. Each semi-structured interview took 1-2 hours and was recorded and tran-
scribed (for the interview outlines, see Appendices 1-3) with the approval of the inter-
viewee. The interviewing language was Finnish. The interviews at the case organiza-
tions were not conducted entirely by me, but by me and my colleagues, whom I will 
mention under each case organization. By using predefined questions in the inter-
views, it was ensured that different interviewers would ask the same questions and 
that the interview situations would focus on issues that relate to strategy and strategy 
work in particular. The case-specific interview outlines were formulated for each or-
ganization to ensure that the interviewees within every case organization were asked 
the same questions. There were also many similarities in the questions between the 
case organizations that related to the nature of the strategy concept and to the inter-
viewee’s own role in his/her organization’s strategy work. In addition, at Industrial 
the focus was put on the company’s strategy process and its functioning, and on the 
role of the interviewees in it. At Polytechnic, the focus was on strategy implementa-
tion with regard to a certain strategic theme and on research and development opera-
tions. And at Insurance, the interest was in strategy communication, i.e. how inter-
viewees acted as strategy communicators and how they perceive their role.  
In the interview situations, the interviewees were encouraged to share their thoughts 
and experiences about the issues and themes that they considered meaningful and im-
portant, whether they were included in the interview outline or not. Also, the inter-
viewees were asked to justify and describe their ideas and views through stories and 
examples in order to enhance the data with narrative. All in all, an effort was made to 
make the interviews an interventive and confrontative arena by discussing certain is-
sues more than once during the interviews and by encouraging the interviewees to 
share different and even contradictory ideas and opinions instead of emphasizing con-
sistency (Potter & Wetherell 1984, 164-165).  
In order to increase the validity of the study, also other data sources and methods were 
used to create triangulation (Silverman 2006, 291-292). Observations were a major 
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data source that was mainly used as background information when constructing case 
descriptions and analyzing the interview data. Because of the differences in the case 
organizations’ data production processes, there is more observation data available 
from Industrial and Insurance than Polytechnic. Observation data helped to put the 
interviews into perspective and locate them contextually. Also, different organiza-
tional documents, the web sites of the case organizations, and media coverage were 
used as background information when constructing case descriptions and analyzing 
the data. In the following, I will describe the contextual factors of the data production 
in each organization in more detail.  
3.2.1 INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 
Industrial Enterprise (henceforth Industrial), my first case organization, is a global 
industrial company. It produces industrial products for several customer segments and 
has traditionally been a product-oriented company. However, due to its newly created 
strategy, Industrial sought to become a market-oriented company and provide custom-
ized solutions to its customers. This represents a big strategic change for Industrial. 
(The more detailed description of Industrial is provided in Chapter 5.) 
When the research data were produced at Industrial, the organization had just finished 
describing its strategy process. The new strategy process chart was pictured on a 
PowerPoint slide and it was supposed to ensure and enhance strategy implementation 
at Industrial. The strategy process chart pretty was the main artifact of strategizing at 
Industrial. The chart consists of two circles, the first representing strategy creation and 
the second strategy implementation. Traditionally, Industrial had has robust methods 
what it comes to strategic planning, and now, due to the new strategy process dia-
gram, strategy implementation received more interest and resources. Many members 
of Industrial’s top management, including the senior vice president of strategic plan-
ning, who was responsible for the strategy process, seemed to have rather high expec-
tations for the strategy process.   
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I was invited to Industrial as a researcher/consultant11 to improve the functioning of 
the newly described strategy process in 2003, and I was involved in the company’s 
strategy work for more than two years. During that period, I evaluated the functioning 
of Industrial’s strategy process and proposed improvements in it. I also facilitated a 
number of strategy workshops for the managers of Industrial and was allowed to ob-
serve several strategy meetings of the top management, including the two-day strategy 
meeting held once a year. During that time, I became a rather familiar face for the 
many managers and employees of Industrial, and consequently they even shared some 
“inside information” about Industrial’s history and corporate culture with me. 
At the beginning of the cooperation with Industrial, I and my senior colleague12 con-
ducted a series of interviews with the top and middle managers of the company to 
evaluate the functioning of its strategy process. Ten managers were interviewed alto-
gether that were handpicked from Industrial’s top and middle managers in order to 
obtain a broad cross-section of managers from different parts of the company. The 
interview was semi-structured interview (for the interview questions, see Appendix 
1); although the primary questions were selected beforehand, there was a lot of im-
provisation in the interview situations, and many topics outside the interview outline 
were raised. The dominant theme in the interviews was obviously the previously de-
scribed strategy process of Industrial. However, the interviewees were also encour-
aged to explain how they had acted in the strategy process and how they regarded 
strategy in general.  
The research data also consists of many official strategy and other documents of In-
dustrial, which were given to us for background information. This information turned 
                                                 
11
 I use the term “researcher/consultant” to describe my role here. At Industrial, my aim was both to study 
the company’s strategy process and to develop it further based on the research findings. However, at Indus-
trial, I was known as “a researcher” from the Helsinki University of Technology. Working there with the 
status of researcher rather than consultant, may have provided me with more opportunity to participate in 
different strategy events and sessions as an observer. I had the same kind of a dual-role at Insurance. At 
Polytechnic, I was more like an evaluator, who evaluated the organization’s strategy implementation.  
12
 Saku Mantere 
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out to be very valuable when describing the context of consumption at Industrial. The 
sources of the data are summarized in Table 4.  
TABLE 4 DATA PRODUCTION AT INDUSTRIAL 
DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION  
INTERVIEWS Ten interviews conducted in 2003. Interviewees were chosen from the top and 
middle managers of Industrial from different parts of the company.  
DOCUMENTS I received several company documents concerning strategy and other subjects as 
background information. The material was useful when describing the contextual 
factors of Industrial. 
OBSERVATIONS I was present in various strategy workshops and seminars both as an observer and 
a facilitator. These sessions provided me with a chance to observe how strategy 
was communicated and consumed by the managers of Industrial.  
 
As described previously, my role at Industrial was anything but that of an objective 
bystander or observant. I was deeply involved in the company’s strategy work for 
more than two years, with the aim of developing and enhancing its performance. This 
almost made me an insider in its strategy process. This fact may be both a strength 
and a weakness concerning this study. The fact that I was involved in the strategy 
process may have given me some crucial information that enabled me to deepen my 
analysis and understanding of Industrial’s strategy consumption. Getting to know 
many managers of Industrial fairly well may have given me a closer look at their per-
sonal style of strategy consumption. However, this closeness might also have made 
me biased to some extent, since at the time the data were produced I was a rather 
young and inexperienced PhD student, who might have been particularly open to the 
influence of the experienced managers of Industrial.  
3.2.2 POLYTECHNIC 
The second case organization, Polytechnic, is a Finnish multi-sector polytechnic. 
Polytechnic provides education to thousands of students in three faculties that are fur-
ther divided into a dozen degree programs. Although Polytechnic operates under a 
City Council and the Ministry of Education, it has autonomy in its internal affairs and 
it is managed by a board and a rector. At the time the data were produced at Polytech-
nic, the organization was implementing its strategy. A special effort was put on the 
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strategic theme called “R&D operations,” which aimed to increase the amount of 
Polytechnic’s research and development conducted in cooperation with its external 
stakeholders. The motivation for promoting the R&D at Polytechnic was both internal 
and external. Due to previous changes in the Finnish legislation, the polytechnics 
were obligated to engage in R&D. However, Polytechnic also considered that the suc-
cessful R&D would legitimize its activities and improve its brand. This attempt to 
pursue R&D represented a big change at Polytechnic, especially for those who were 
supposed to engage in R&D along with their teaching duties. (For the more detailed 
case description of Polytechnic, see Chapter 6.) 
I and my colleague13 conducted an evaluation study of strategy implementation at 
Polytechnic. For the study, we interviewed two top managers, six middle managers, 
one support function manager, and twelve teachers at Polytechnic that were chosen at 
random from among the three personnel groups of the organization (top management, 
middle management, and personnel). The top managers and the support function man-
ager were interviewed individually while the middle managers were interviewed in 
pairs. R&D was chosen as a strategic theme that we tracked at different levels of the 
organization. Because the emphasis in this work is on the managers, the interviews 
with the employees (teachers) were excluded from this work, and the interviews with 
the top and middle managers have been used as the main interview data in the study.  
The interview outlines used for the top and middle managers were slightly different 
(see Appendix 2). Also, the interviewees were asked in the interview situations to fill 
out two questionnaires that asked how they had contributed to promotion of R&D op-
erations and what problems they connected with strategy implementation at Polytech-
nic. Although the numerical data received from these questionnaires were not used in 
the study, sequences where the managers thought aloud about their answers to these 
questions are included in the interviews and have thus been used as data.  
As background information, we received several documents from Polytechnic that 
discussed its organizational structure and strategy work in general. I have used these 
documents to contextualize the interviews and to construct Polytechnic’s case descrip-
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tion. Also, Polytechnic’s website proved useful in the analysis. It provided me with 
access to old annual reports of Polytechnic, which gave me important background in-
formation on the organization and its history. All data sources are summarized in Ta-
ble 5.  
TABLE 5 DATA PRODUCTION AT POLYTECHNIC 
DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION 
INTERVIEWS Six interviews (three individual and three pair interviews, a total of nine inter-
viewees) were conducted in 2004. The interviewees were chosen from the top and 
middle managers of Polytechnic from different parts of the organization.  
DOCUMENTS Different documents and web pages of the organization were used as background 
information in constructing the case description and analyzing the data.  
WEB PAGES I used Polytechnic’s websites and old annual reports as a source of background 
information in constructing the case description of it.  
 
My role as a researcher was different at Polytechnic from that at Industrial. I was not 
deeply involved in the strategy work at Polytechnic, except for conducting an evalua-
tion study and presenting its results once at a management board meeting. I was more 
like an outsider who was invited to the organization to evaluate the functioning and 
state of its strategy process. After that assignment, I have had no further contact with 
Polytechnic nor have I worked for it in anyway. After the evaluation study conducted 
in 2005, Polytechnic has undergone further major changes by merging with another 
polytechnic. Polytechnic, as such, does not exist any longer, since the merger changed 
its structures, management, and name.  
3.2.3 INSURANCE COMPANY 
Insurance company (henceforth Insurance) is a Finnish service organization that pro-
vides insurance services to its customers in different customer segments. These ser-
vices are produced at the headquarters of Insurance by the business units, and the 
market operations like marketing, selling and customer service, performed by the cus-
tomer service organization spread across the business area. Insurance has a long his-
tory in the business, and actually its current organization form is a result of rather 
many mergers and acquisition over the years. Insurance has a strong strategic intent of 
being a customer driven company. It also has a developed strategy process, which 
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governs and guides the strategy work done in the company. Recently, Insurance has 
pursued strategy communication extensively, emphasizing that every employee 
should understand and adopt its strategic intent and realize it in his/her everyday 
work. (For a more detailed case description of Insurance, see Chapter 7.) 
As in the case of Industrial, I was involved at Insurance as a researcher/consultant to 
improve its strategy work, especially strategy communication with regard to line and 
middle managers. For a period of two years, I was involved in Insurance’s strategy 
work in many ways. At the beginning, I conducted a preliminary interview study with 
my colleagues14 in order to evaluate the state of strategy communication at Insurance. 
Based on the results, we made suggestions on how to improve strategy communica-
tion at Insurance. I also hosted a number of strategy communication workshops for 
the managers of Insurance with my colleagues, to improve and enhance their strategy 
communication skills. We provided them with some new communication tools and 
methods that they could later use in their own work in discussing strategy with their 
own employees. I was also provided an access to observe several strategy meetings at 
Insurance.  
At the beginning of our collaboration with Insurance, we interviewed 18 managers of 
Insurance to find out how they considered their role as strategy communicators. The 
interviewees were handpicked from two business units and from the customer service 
organization of Insurance, six managers from each unit altogether. We tried to pick 
interviewees from different organizational levels so that there would be variance in 
the data. As at Industrial and Polytechnic, the interviews were semi-structured (for the 
interview outline, see Appendix 3) and the managers were asked to describe their own 
role and activities with regard to strategy communication. These interviews are the 
main source of data for Insurance in this work.  
As at Industrial, I was provided with an access to observe, host and facilitate a number 
of different strategy workshops and sessions for the managers of Insurance. These 
events provided me with an interesting chance to make observations concerning In-
surance’s strategy work and to better understand Insurance’s organizational culture. 
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These observations, along with the documents received from Insurance, helped me 
contextualize the interviews and construct the case description. During different train-
ing events, I also had many informal conversations with different people of Insurance 
that increased my understanding of the company’s strategy work. During the almost 
two year co-operation project with Insurance, I also discussed and pondered many is-
sues related to the company with my colleagues. This mutual sensemaking has obvi-
ously affected my view of the company. The sources of the data are summarized in 
Table 6.  
TABLE 6 DATA PRODUCTION AT INSURANCE 
DATA SOURCE DESCRIPTION 
INTERVIEWS 18 interviews conducted in 2007. The interviewees were chosen from the top and 
middle managers of Insurance in three different units.  
DOCUMENTS Several documents received from the company helped me construct the case de-
scription of Insurance and contextualize the interviews.  
OBSERVATIONS I was present in various strategy workshops and seminars both as an observer and a 
facilitator. These observations provided me with a more thorough understanding of 
Insurance’s organizational culture.  
 
At Insurance, my role as a researcher was similar to that at Industrial. I was engaged 
in the company for almost two years as a researcher/consultant with the aim of study-
ing and improving its strategy communication practices. The people with whom I 
worked at Insurance were exceptionally warm and friendly to me during our coopera-
tion, which may have influenced the way I perceive Insurance and its organizational 
culture. However, in this case I consider myself to be more experienced than in the 
case of Industrial, which is why my observations and findings concerning Insurance 
may be more accurate and mature.  
3.3 ANALYSIS 
The analysis process of this study has been anything but a straightforward effort. 
There have been some real ups and downs along the way, and I have literally muddled 
through the data for years. The process included four stages (see Table 7). The analy-
sis process began with confusion: I made various starts in trying to make sense of the 
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data. Most of them did not succeed. As a result, however, I became rather close and 
familiar with my empirical material, and at some point during the analysis, I came up 
with the idea of the macro-discourses of strategy. Next, I was being introduced to de 
Certeau by my instructor, whose writings gave me the idea of consumption. This pro-
vided me with a lens to analyze the data in greater depth. Finally, I came up with a 
framework that captures the process of strategy consumption as a whole.  
TABLE 7 ANALYSES PROCESS 
STAGE DESCRIPTION 
FIRST STAGE:  
GETTING TO KNOW  
THE DATA 
I took two false starts when analyzing the data: strategic learning and strategy 
implementation. The stage did not produce any concrete outcomes but allowed 
me to become rather familiar with the research data.  
SECOND STAGE:  
MACRO-DISCOURSES 
Managers seemed to draw on the larger discourses and isms when talking 
about strategy and its ideals. At this stage, I coded this kind of talk and con-
structed five macro-discourses of strategy. These macro-discourses are milita-
rism, mechanism, humanism, pragmatism and spirituality.  
THIRD STAGE: 
 CONSUMPTION 
At this phase, de Certeau’s term consumption provided me with a theoretical 
lens to analyze managers’ accounts of how they consume and use strategy in 
their talk. I came up with two discursive practices the (re)production and us-
age and three different usage tactics, instrumental, playful and intimate, to 
illustrate and describe strategy consumption.  
FOURTH STAGE: 
 FRAMEWORK 
Finally, I produced a framework that describes the strategy consumption proc-
ess as a whole. The framework helped me to conceptualize and portray strat-
egy consumption in the case organizations and in general.  
 
However, in reality the various stages of the process were much more overlapping and 
simultaneous than a description like this can ever portray. In the following, I will de-
scribe and reflect the journey of analyzing the data, which turned out to be a personal 
learning process. 
3.3.1 FIRST STAGE: GETTING TO KNOW THE DATA 
After being accepted as a PhD student in 2004, I took at least two, more or less, seri-
ous attempts to analyze my data. Both turned out to be “false starts” (Potter & 
Wetherell 1984, 168). Next, I will describe what these attempts were, why they did 
not succeed and what I learned from them, with respect to the current research inter-
est. Although neither of these starts took me far with my research, they laid the 
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ground for further ideas. As a result, I became rather familiar with the research data 
and to some extent they seemed to be necessary in order to get the work started.  
When I first started to do my PhD dissertation, I was interested in studying strategic 
learning, the process of strategic renewal and development of an organization. Since 
strategic learning is a highly abstract issue, I decided to approach the data produced at 
Industrial and Polytechnic from the deductive viewpoint. I applied two widely ac-
knowledged distinctions in the field of strategy as frames, in order to track different 
rhetorical strategies (discourses) related to strategic learning. The first frame was the 
distinction between organizational learning as exploration and as exploitation (March 
1991; Crossnan, Lane & White 1999; Crossnan & Berdrow 2003), and the second 
frame was the distinction between sensemaking and sensegiving (Gioia & Chittipeddi 
1991). Although finding the subject highly interesting and tempting in many ways, I 
found it really hard, when applied to my data. After several attempts to analyze the 
data, I decided to give up.  
After dropping the idea of studying strategic learning, I turned my attention to strat-
egy implementation since it seemed to represent an important theme in the data. Al-
though strategy implementation has been studied from multiple angles, e.g., in terms 
of tactics and models (Nutt 1986; Bourgeois & Brodwin 1984) and activities (Aalto-
nen 2007), little is known about the language of strategy implementation, and my in-
tention was to focus on this angle. More precisely, I was interested in studying what is 
actually constructed as strategy implementation in the talk of top and middle manag-
ers and how strategy implementation is constructed discursively. I was also interested 
in finding out what kinds of discursive practices are related to it and what kinds of 
subject positions are embedded in the strategy implementation discourse.  
Perhaps the study of strategy implementation did neither succeed because the entire 
concept of strategy implementation is in a way based on the rational strategy ap-
proach. It draws on the rather mechanical idea of separating planning and formulating. 
Connecting this kind of a rational ethos to the discourse analytic research tradition 
turned out to be an impossible task for me, which is why I never got far with it. How-
ever, while reading the data over and over again, I came across a certain pattern that I 
found interesting, that is, the macro-discourses of
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to use as resources (cf. Fairclough 1992, 84-86) when constructing strategy and their 
role in it. This finding turned out to be important for my dissertation.  
3.3.2 SECOND STAGE: MACRO-DISCOURSES 
While struggling with the data of mine, I found out that broadly speaking, the manag-
ers seem to discuss strategy work at two different levels. Firstly, they construct ac-
counts describing both their own and their organization’s current activities with regard 
to strategy. Secondly, they described the desired or ideal state of strategy, which de-
scribes how they would like to act in strategy work and what strategy should be in an 
ideal world. This category of talk attracted my attention and I started to analyze it 
more carefully.  
I coded the data and categorized it in terms of the differences, similarities and patterns 
that could be found in it (Potter & Wetherell 1984, 168). By drawing on Fairclough’s 
(1992, 64) three different aspects of the constructive effects of discourse, I con-
structed categories by asking a) how the talk constructs the systems of knowledge and 
beliefs in the case of strategy, i.e. what strategy is according to it, and b) how it is 
practiced. I was also interested in finding out c) how talk constructs social identities 
and subject positions, and d) how it produces social relationships between people. I 
soon noticed that different categories of talk contained features of the isms like hu-
manism and rationalism, and even religion, and they were used both as means and 
causes when the managers tried to build their point of view. They appeared to be re-
sources by nature that were being drawn upon (ibid., 85-86). 
As a result of the coding, I came up with different categories of talk that seemed to 
have their own special characteristics. I decided to call these categories of talk macro-
discourses of strategy, since they construct strategy as a universal phenomenon by 
drawing on broad societal discourses and isms (cf. Alvesson & Kärreman 2000b). 
There appeared to be five such macro-discourses.  
The militaristic macro-discourse brings strategy back to its ancient roots and seasons 
strategy with war rhetoric. The business environment is viewed as a “battlefield,” 
managers are “generals,” and strategy is a military plan or projection that guided the 
actions of organizational members, who are “soldiers.” The mechanistic discourse 
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views strategy as a posture: a position, scope, or plan that needs to be implemented in 
an effective manner as such. It outlines the role of “systems” and “mechanisms” in 
strategy work. The humanistic macro-discourse differs from the mechanistic and mili-
taristic discourses in many ways. It stresses the voluntaristic nature of humankind and 
outlines the importance of “participation” and “meaningfulness” in strategy work. It 
raises humans to the status of willing and mindful actors who are at the center of any 
organizational action. The pragmatic discourse highlights the significance of “con-
creteness” and “practicality” in strategy work. The pragmatic discourse considers 
strategy a part of the “everyday activities” of the organization and managers; in some 
cases it even says that strategy is action per se. The spiritual discourse draws on reli-
gious rhetoric, connecting strategy to a spiritual experience and/or practice. It assumes 
that “faith” and the experience of it are both the preconditions and antecedents of 
strategy. Strategy is a practice that gives people “mission” and “vision” and connects 
them with the higher level purposes of the organization, giving them a sense of be-
longing. (The macro-discourses are discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 4.1.) 
At some point in the analysis, there was also a sixth macro-discourse called consum-
erist that attached strategy to the rhetoric of commerce and trade. Here strategy was a 
consumer good, an idea or ideology that is “bought” and “sold” by members of the 
organization who are considered consumers or clients. However, while analyzing the 
data more thoroughly, somehow this discourse did not seem to be able to stand on its 
own feet and I decided to abandon it and merge it with other macro-discourses, 
mainly with the pragmatic, humanistic and spiritual discourses.15  
3.3.3 THIRD STAGE: CONSUMPTION 
After having constructed the macro-discourses of strategy, I wondered what to do 
with them and how to proceed with the analysis. My previous attempt to analyze 
strategy implementation had been made without any predefined theoretical frame-
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 I also chose to abandon the discourse because I became interested in de Certeau’s idea of consumption. I 
thought that the consumerist macro-discourse would confuse the reader at some point.  
RESEARCH PROCESS   
74 
work, excluding the discourse analytic methodology16. This may have been the reason 
why I was unable to find a meaningful pattern in the data that would have satisfied 
me. It became clear that in order to make a sound theoretical contribution of the kind 
required for a dissertation, some sort of framework was needed to take the analysis a 
step further.  
At that time, I came across Michel de Certeau’s book The Practice of Everyday Life 
(1988) and it soon proved to be a turning point for my research process. It changed 
and renewed my thoughts and gave the work a new course. When reading and digest-
ing de Certeau’s thoughts about subjectivity and human agency, and reading the re-
search data, I soon noticed soon that, indeed, managers consume and use strategy in 
their talk creatively – and even humorously. The managers were not just describing 
their role and activities in strategy work in general, but also using strategy for their 
own purposes. I became inspired by these findings, which opened up new horizons for 
my research.  
De Certeau’s term “consumption” provided me with a theoretical lens through which 
I could take the analyses to a deeper and more meaningful level (cf. theoretical con-
textualization, Ketokivi & Mantere 2010). The idea of consumption also suited my 
own thinking and ideology about human nature and made sense to me immediately. 
The structural idea that humans are entirely subject to the structures was too restrict-
ing and pessimistic from my perspective, which is why I was eager to adopt de 
Certeau’s ideas. In a way, de Certeau’s thinking provided me with “redemption” (cf. 
Mitchell 2007) in terms of both my research process and theoretical thinking.  
At this phase of the analyzing process, I started to read the data in order to figure out 
how the consumption of strategy is expressed in the talk of the managers. Here, I soon 
realized that there are (at least) two levels or categories of talk that constitute the art 
and practice of strategy consumption. De La Ville and Mounoud’s (2003, 108) idea 
that strategy consumption is something that includes both the production and use of 
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process, but at that point I did not have any theoretical idea through which I could have read the data and 
analyzed it systematically. 
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strategy confirmed my findings at this point. Likewise, I noticed that there is talk that 
does not particularly use or apply strategy, but more likely grounds and generates the 
whole idea of strategy for the further use of it. In this category, the managers define 
strategy at the societal level, adapting it to their own organizations here and there. I 
decided to call this category the (re)production of strategy. Secondly, there is an over-
lapping category that literally uses and plies strategy for the user’s own purposes and 
ends and I eventually decided to call this category as the usage of strategy.  
At this point, I struggled quite a long time in thinking what the two categories of talk, 
(re)production and usage, are in terms of their ontology. I pondered different ideas, 
starting from narratives and ending with genres until Fairclough’s (1992, 73) thinking 
gave me a simple answer. They are discursive practices that are used when consum-
ing strategy. In the following, I will describe these two overlapping and interlaced 
discursive practices in more detail. 
(RE)PRODUCTION 
The first discursive practice of the strategy consumption process, (re)production, rec-
ognizes and discusses strategy and strategy work ideals peculiar for the case organiza-
tion, with help of the macro-discourses of strategy. Similarly, it generates and grounds 
strategy as a management discipline. It brings strategy into being and produces mean-
ing for it for the further usage (Fiske 1989, 35). The managers (re)produce strategy as 
a general management discipline at both the societal and organizational level. The fol-
lowing quotes are examples of the (re)production, one from each case organization: 
“It [strategy] is such a big collective desired state and outlook, collective out-
look of how the company can succeed.” 
“I actually read the strategy as a sort of shared contract here within the poly-
technic.” 
“That it [strategy] would be taken to as concrete level as possible, so that the in-
dividual seller understands what this means ‘in my life‘. […] This is everyone’s 
thing.” 
The previous comments from the managers illustrate the (re)production of strategy. 
All of them define and describe what strategy is, or what it should be. I categorized 
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talk like this from the data and decided to call it (re)production, since it clearly 
(re)produced and maintained the discipline of strategy. However, I was interested in 
knowing how strategy was (re)produced, i.e. what the managers said it was. That is 
why I analyzed the (re)production of strategy more carefully under each case organi-
zation, to identify its different flavors and sub-categories.  
The case-specific analyses of the (re)production showed that (re)production consti-
tutes much of the talk that describes the official strategy process peculiar to each case 
organization. So, it was de facto not about the actual usage of strategy, but more likely 
about its construction and production at general and organizational levels. Anyway, 
once this introduction and (re)production of strategy has been done, strategy is used 
for the purposes of the consumer(s) in question. Then strategy is no longer a distinct 
phenomenon, but something that the managers use themselves; they make something 
out of it. Here, the usage of strategy takes the form of tactics that are manifestations of 
it. Each tactic has its own flavor and purpose.  
USAGE TACTICS: INSTRUMENTAL, PLAYFUL, INTIMATE 
As de Certeau (1988, xx) brings out, consumption is manifested through the consump-
tion tactics that are rhetorical by their nature. Keeping this in mind, I returned to the 
data and started to analyze what kinds of usage tactics managers seem to use when 
consuming strategy in their talk. This phase of the analyzing process became some-
what challenging, since the consumption of this kind is clandestine (de Certeau 1988, 
31) and tacit by nature and somehow hidden within the “official” strategy discourse.  
At first, I read the data as a whole with the aim of identifying some general patterns of 
strategy use. While reading the data, I noticed that there seemed to be roughly speak-
ing three kinds of talk about strategy that each seemed to fulfill its own function and 
purpose (cf. Potter & Wetherell 1984, 168). Firstly, there was a talk that constructs 
strategy as a device, something that is used as a tool or method in strategy work to 
gain something. The following comment from the manager of Insurance is an example 
of this kind of talk: 
“Especially, if an employee criticizes why something has to be done, ‘this kind of 
strange thing’, I’ll bring out the strategy angle or say that this is related to this 
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part of the strategy […] For me, it [strategy] is justifications and support for the 
thing that I take further.” 
Here, the manager clearly states that strategy provides him/her with “justifications 
and support” in different situations, for instance when his/her employee questions a 
decision that has been made. In cases like this, strategy is clearly a means to do some-
thing for the manager. I decided to call this tactic instrumental. Secondly, there was a 
talk that takes a rather ironical and critical stance against strategy and sort of plays 
with it. The following extract shows how the manager of Insurance plays with strat-
egy: 
“When the new employees arrive and when the new strategy period begins, a 
sort of strategy booklet is delivered to every employee [of Insurance]. It was like 
Mao’s Red Book.”  
This kind of talk differs clearly from the instrumental tactic. Here, strategy is not 
taken too seriously. First, I decided to call this tactic ironic because it included rather 
much ironical and satirical talk about strategy. However, when I realized that irony is 
created when the spoken words are intended or understood to mean the opposite of 
what is literally stated (Hatch 1997), I understood that it would be a too limited term 
to describe and illustrate the whole tactic. Then, I decided to call this tactic playful, as 
De la Ville and Mounoud (2003, 105) do in describing the nature of consumption. 
Thirdly, there was talk that constructs strategy as a personal experience or issue for 
the managers. In the following example, a manager from Industrial emphasizes his/her 
personal relationship to strategy: 
“I have never bought the strategy; neither shall I buy it today.” 
The manager has “never bought strategy,” meaning that he/she does not approve or 
adopt it on purpose. This kind of talk constructs strategy as an intimate phenomenon, 
something that describes a manager’s personal relationship to strategy. Here, manag-
ers give accounts on how strategy affects them and how they understand it. I decided 
to call this tactic intimate.  
After producing these three usage tactics at the general level, I started to analyze how 
they were manifested at the level of the individual managers in different case organi-
zations. To do this, I read the individual interviews again, one-by-one, beginning with 
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the case of Industrial. Under each interview, I recalled how the manager constructed 
strategy as a general phenomenon (reproduction) and, especially, how he/she uses and 
consumes it in his/her own work. In other words, I tried to understand what the man-
agers make out of the strategy in their talk. I applied the three usage tactics described 
previously as a template in this phase of the analysis, and tried to figure out how they 
were manifested in the case of each individual manager. Here, I also evaluated how 
the tactics fit into the data in order to validate them. Based on each interview, I wrote 
short mini-narratives that described who the manager was, what strategy was for 
him/her, and how he/she used it in his/her work. Especially, I tried to analyze how the 
three usage tactics were manifested in the talk of managers and how the managers 
used the macro-discourses of strategy as their resources.  
3.3.4 FOURTH STAGE: FRAMEWORK 
At the end of the day, I had three different elements of strategy consumption at hand. 
At this point of the analyzing process, I found out that I need to categorize these ele-
ments in a certain manner to make sense of all this, and to be able to describe how 
these different phases of the process relate to each other. Here, John Fiske’s book Un-
derstanding the Popular Culture (1989, 36) increased my understanding of the prac-
tice of consumption. His idea that popular culture, as a form of consumption, is “an 
art of being in between” the dominant structures and their use, helped me to under-
stand that strategy consumption is also something that happens between “us and 
them.”  
Having this in mind, I started to consider the two extremes mediated by consumption. 
Obviously, the structure here is the discipline of strategic management that is mani-
fested in the form of macro-discourses of strategy. These macro-discourses represent 
structures that the managers, as users, use when consuming strategy. Here, the term 
“poaching,” brought up by de Certeau (1988, 31), and used by De la Ville and 
Mounoud (2003, 109), enters the picture. Consumption is an activity that uses strategy 
for the purposes of an individual with different functions (instrumental, playful and 
intimate). The macro-discourses of strategy, on the other hand, are used as resources 
in this consumption process. This usage is poaching by nature, since it borrows and 
hunts these larger discursive entities to build one’s own point of view (ibid.). So, the 
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two discursive practices of strategy consumption poach the macro-discourses of strat-
egy in subtle and creative ways.  
So, in terms of my own work, strategy consumption is something that happens in be-
tween the dominant strategy discourse and managers’ own use of it. Consumption is a 
mediating factor between structure and subject. As identified before, the strategy con-
sumption process, or the trajectory, as de Certeau would call it, includes two sides 
(see Figure 5). Firstly, managers consume strategy by (re)producing it with the help 
of the macro-discourses of strategy. The (re)production of strategy brings strategy into 
being by constructing it as management discipline. Secondly, the managers use strat-
egy tactically for their own purposes through three different tactics (instrumental, 
playful, intimate). The consumer performing this process is an individual manager 
located in particular local discursive context. In order to understand strategy con-
sumption, this context has to be taken into account, since the talk does not exist in a 
vacuum. The primary local context of consumption, wherein the manager operates, is 
his/her own organization, which is taken under consideration in this work. However, it 
has to be noted that the manager also operates in a wider social context that extends 
beyond the limits of a particular organization. This is the context that hosts the macro-
discourses of strategy that are imported into the case organizations for strategy con-
sumption.  
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The framework also fits Fairclough’s (1992, 73) three dimensional conception of dis-
course nicely. The macro-discourses represent the social practice of strategy while the 
(re)production and usage are discursive practices. Here text is considered as the dis-
cursive activity of the managers (Fairclough 2005) that are poets of their actions, in 
the midst of the strategy discourse. In my view, the different elements of the strategy 
consumption process (macro-discourses, (re)production, and usage) are collective by 
nature. That is, they are shared categories of talk, although they consist of different 
kinds of variations and styles that are further illustrated in detail in this work.  
After constructing the framework and writing the case-specific results, I asked my 
colleagues17, with whom I had produced the data in the case organizations, to read my 
framework for strategy consumption and the case-specific results, in order to evaluate 
the validity and “correctness” of my interpretations and constructions. Although a 
constructivist study like this is always a construction of the researcher, who is an au-
thor of his/her work, I decided to do this checking, in order to ensure that the “facts” 
presented in the case descriptions are correct, and to get feedback on my analysis. 
This could also be read as a means to increase the validity of the results (Potter & 
Wetherell 1984, 169-171). As a result of this review, my three colleagues gave their 
feedback and suggestions for minor revision that I implemented in the text. 
As discussed earlier, consumption is an activity that uses strategy to adapt it to its own 
interest and rules (de Certeau 1988). In this chapter, I have showed how I have set out 
to study it in this work by discussing the premises of my research methodology, de-
scribing the production of the research data, and reasoning how I have analyzed it. 
The following four chapters present the results of this study.  
 
                                                 
17
 Saku Mantere (Industrial), Jouni Sipponen (Polytechnic) and Katriina Karkulehto (Insurance) 
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4 ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY CONSUMPTION 
In this chapter, I will discuss the elements of the strategy consumption process de-
scribed in the previous chapter. Firstly, I will discuss the macro-discourses of strategy 
that managers use as resources when consuming strategy. After that, I will elucidate 
and introduce the tactics of strategy usage, that is, the micro-level ways in which 
managers consume and use these macro-discourses in their talk.  
4.1 MACRO-DISCOURSES OF STRATEGY 
Macro-discourses of strategy are discursive resources; they are macro-level structures 
that are used in strategy consumption. Since they are called macro-level discourses, 
means they are not only present in the case organizations, but also exist in the sphere 
of culture of a larger management and strategy discourse. They are derived from the 
social context of strategy (Fairclough 1992, 73) used and maintained by different 
strategy practitioners of the strategy community. In this respect, they are “imported” 
to the case organizations from outside (Phillips et al. 2008, 782). Managers use and 
poach these macro-discourses in both the (re)production and usage of strategy.  
All five macro-discourses presented in this chapter discuss the nature, conditions, and 
actors of strategy and they are present in all three case organizations, although some 
of them are of course more dominant than the others. In a sense, all of them are ideal 
discourses because they portray strategy as it should be in an ideal state. I will discuss 
under each macro-discourse a) how they construct the practice of strategy, i.e. how 
strategy is done according to them, b) what subject positions they produce for differ-
ent actors in strategy and c) how these different subject positions are related to each 
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other. (Cf. Fairclough 1992, 85-86.) The macro-discourses are the following: 1) mili-
tarism, 2) mechanism, 3) humanism, 4) pragmatism, and 5) spiritualism.  
4.1.1 MILITARISM: DISCOURSE OF WAR AND COMMANDING 
The militaristic macro-discourse brings strategy back to its ancient roots by seasoning 
strategy with war rhetoric. The following comments from the managers of the case 
organizations illustrate the nature of the militaristic macro-discourse: 
“The execution [of strategy] is like the Finnish offensive against the Soviet Union in 
the Second World War. It was the boys in the front line who shot the enemies, not the 
generals.” 
”The role of the unit manager is to see […] the battlefield. And sometimes you need 
to give resources to pioneers so that they can go and build the bridge there before-
hand; otherwise we can’t across the river.” 
”[…] the boys will go around the Eastern Europe market area […] those front line 
fellows will start to pull the trigger.” 
The militaristic macro-discourse paints a rather violent and warlike picture of strat-
egy. Accordingly, strategy is a bloody business, practiced through the principles and 
ideals of the military. The discourse portrays strategy as a “war plan” or projection 
that guides the actions of organizational members. Strategy aims at winning battles or 
killing enemies, while a business environment is viewed as the “battlefield,” and 
managers as ones capable of seeing the whole battlefield. The organization is seen to 
be in a constant battle against its environment and competitors, who are referred to as 
“enemies.” 
The militaristic discourse also glorifies managers, stressing their role as commanders 
of their troops. It clearly positions them as the officers, who are not just highly capa-
ble but also legitimized to give orders to people executing the strategy orders. Strat-
egy is executed through the commands and orders given by these “generals” or 
“commanders.” The employees, considered as “troops” or “soldiers,” are responsi-
ble for executing these orders obediently, while fighting on the “front line.” Besides 
that, the militaristic discourse is also very masculine by nature. Soldiers are consid-
ered “boys” and the generals and commanders most likely as men. 
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The militaristic discourse sees humans as rather mechanistic and rational actors. The 
discourse more or less separates the thinkers and doers, planners and implementers of 
strategy. The chain of command is very top-down, leaving little, if any, room for im-
provisation at lower levels of the organization. In this respect, the militaristic macro-
discourse has its roots in the rational strategy approach in various ways. The discourse 
is also close to what Mantere and Vaara (2008) call a “disciplining discourse” that 
reproduces and maintains certain organizational hierarchies and command structures 
in strategy process and organizational decision-making. The discursive strategy re-
search has also identified the militaristic roots of the strategy discourse before. 
Knights and Morgan (1995) emphasize how strategy, before entering the business 
community, was predominantly connected to the military, where it provided profes-
sional officers a means to scare resources, legitimize their exercise of power and sus-
tain their privileged status and prestige. The militaristic macro-discourse reflects these 
ideas rather closely.  
4.1.2 MECHANISM: DISCOURSE OF PROCEDURES AND SYSTEMS 
Like the militaristic discourse above, the mechanistic discourse constructs strategy as 
a posture: a “position,” “set of targets,” or “plan” that is designed or planned by the 
top managers of the organization. However, the mechanistic discourse draws on the 
mechanical rhetoric, constructing organization as a machine that executes strategy ac-
curately.  
The following quotes illustrate the mechanistic discourse in more detail: 
“We set the targets for them in our steering team and they cascade to different 
areas and to every fellow himself.” 
”Strategy will be then driven downwards.” 
“It’s like implementing the strategy given from above to the practical people. That’s 
it.” 
“But then, we’ve had a pretty consistent strategy implementation process.” 
“Here, when they control these [business units], it is top-down action, guarding and 
controlling.” 
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”The inputs of the process are the changes in the business environment. And the out-
put should be that at the individual level things are done [according to it]. The lead-
time of this thing [strategy process] should be short and efficient, just like any other 
process.” 
The mechanistic macro-discourse explains little of the content of strategy, but dis-
cusses the processes and mechanisms through which strategy is (or should be) accom-
plished in the organization. According to the mechanistic discourse, the strategy proc-
ess is a one-way, mainly a top-down process, where strategy “cascades” downward 
through different organizational levels and layers. The discourse includes many dis-
cursive practices that highlight this vertical dimension and nature of strategy. Strate-
gies are made on the ”top” of the organization, and they are ”implemented” to “prac-
tical people” at the lower levels of the organization. After the strategic objectives are 
set, they “cascade” downwards in the organization. In the mechanistic discourse such 
strategy implementation is described with metaphors like “rolling out” and “cascad-
ing.” These expressions show how strategy implementation is regarded as a goal-
setting process wherein a grand strategy is divided into sub goals and targets. These 
procedures and mechanisms are designed and set by the top management.  
While the militaristic macro-discourse positioned managers as central players in the 
strategy, the mechanistic macro-discourse outlines the role of systems and mecha-
nisms in strategy. However, the discourse views implementers of strategy as parts of 
the machine, passive recipients of strategy, who are capable, motivated and willing to 
implement strategy when provided with sufficient objectives and targets through the 
mechanisms. They are given “inputs,” and certain “outputs” are expected. Like the 
militaristic discourse, the mechanistic discourse leaves little, if any, room for improvi-
sation or application. It assumes that strategy should be implemented as such, and be-
havior and organizational structures should be changed according to it. In some cases 
the mechanistic discourse even says that people should be “forced” to implement 
strategy.  
The mechanistic macro-discourse has the elements of the “technologization dis-
course” (Mantere & Vaara 2008). In it, strategy work is linked to concrete technolo-
gies, and strategy processes are driven by specific systems, which set the rules to be 
followed. These procedures are usually constructed and defined by top managers, 
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while organizational members are to follow them. This kind of Foucauldian panopti-
con usually legitimizes certain mechanisms and technologies and makes them an end 
in themselves. (Ibid.) 
4.1.3 HUMANISM: DISCOURSE OF PARTICIPATION AND COMMITMENT 
The humanistic macro-discourse is in many ways different from the militaristic and 
mechanistic macro-discourses discussed above. The humanistic discourse stresses the 
importance of participation and the significance of the entire personnel in strategy 
work. It places humans, as willing and thoughtful actors, at the center of strategy work 
at the every level of organization.  
The following comments are manifestations of the humanistic discourse: 
“My idea was to involve a lot of people in strategy so there would be commitment.” 
“When shared strategies are agreed, people should be involved in them and in that 
way they would also commit themselves to them.” 
”Understanding is a different thing from acting according to it. In the strategy 
[documents], the phrases have been written in plain Finnish […] Certainly everyone 
understands them, but do they feel that it’s important for me?” 
”I think the creation of competence strategies and their synchronization will enable 
us to have a constructing dialogue and in that way we can find the shared outlook. 
[…] Strategy won’t work if the people feel that it has been given [to them] from out-
side.” 
The humanistic discourse stresses the voluntaristic nature of humankind. It claims that 
people cannot be forced to follow strategy of any kind, without their consent. The dis-
course emphasizes the role of “participation” as a precondition for a successful strat-
egy process. It assumes that when people at different levels of the organization are 
allowed to “participate” in the strategic planning, they will also “commit” them-
selves to the strategy implementation. And on the contrary, if people are excluded 
from the strategy creation process, they are unlikely to feel “ownership” for the strat-
egy, which distances them from it.  
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The discourse of humanism also brings up “meaningfulness” as a condition of suc-
cessful strategy implementation. The more meaningful people find strategy, the more 
willing they are to act according to it. The humanistic discourse does not make a 
strong distinction between different actors in strategy. Instead, it is more likely to 
suggest that all members of the organization have an important role in strategy, and 
that strategy should belong to everyone in the organization. It says that strategy is a 
common issue “shared” by the members of an organization. Strategies are not com-
mands given by top management, but are instead like agreed and fixed “contracts” 
that are guide the coherent and consistent action of the organizational members.  
This kind of a discourse, emphasizing dialogue between different groups in organiza-
tions and inviting (at least formally) people to participate in strategy processes (cf. 
“the dialogization discourse,” Mantere & Vaara 2008), has become also popular 
among the popular strategy literature. For instance, Kim and Mauborgne in their best-
selling book, Blue Ocean Strategy (2005), emphasize how the execution of blue ocean 
strategies requires a culture of trust and commitment that motivates people to execute 
“agreed” strategies. They argue that the successful execution of strategy requires a 
fair and participatory process that consists of engagement, explanation, and expecta-
tion of clarity. The fair process leads to intellectual and emotional recognition, to trust 
and commitment, and finally to voluntary cooperation in strategy execution. The au-
thors even suggest that the idea of separating strategy formulation from planning is 
artificial and even harmful for the success of the strategy, and that they should instead 
be overlapping and coexistent processes. (Ibid., 171-184.) The humanistic macro-
discourse presented here is rather close to this kind of thinking.  
4.1.4 PRAGMATISM: DISCOURSE OF CONCRETENESS AND PRACTICALITY 
As the humanistic macro-discourse enhanced willingness and meaningfulness in strat-
egy work, the pragmatic discourse highlights the significance of concreteness and 
practicality as a means of understanding and adopting strategy. The pragmatic dis-
course considers strategy a part of the everyday activities of the organization; in some 
cases it even says that strategy is action per se. It also stresses the importance of trans-
lating strategies into grass root action by making them practical and understandable.  
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In the following comments, the pragmatic macro-discourse becomes evident:  
”We have most consistently taken the strategies to the grass roots.” 
“There’s no sense of putting some hieroglyphs into strategy that no one understands. 
[…] That actually means nothing. […] I’ve tried to say those phrasings in a way that 
everyone would understand what it says.” 
”We have to try to make those strategy guidelines as such that they would catch the 
people. That they would be easily adopted and […] concrete.” 
”[…] keeping the manual and objective clear in mind and doing things, instead of 
keeping the strategy in the drawer.” 
“Strategy implementation means that it [strategy] will be taken to the users rela-
tively clear. That what this means just for me?” 
“Someone has said that strategy that cannot be changed is a bad strategy. I.e. the 
ability of the strategy to transform […] world changes, situations change.” 
The pragmatic macro-discourse views strategy as some sort of “guidance” that steers 
the everyday actions of the organization. It says that this guidance should be consid-
ered and reflected when making decisions at every level of the organization, all the 
time. While the macro-humanistic discourse emphasized the meaningfulness of the 
strategy for the individual, the pragmatic macro-discourse highlights its concreteness 
and practical value, applicability. The pragmatic discourse also outlines the language 
of strategy. It says that strategies should be made “clear” so that their meaning for 
practice is understood. The discourse is against the high-flown and abstract strategy 
language, regarding it as “hieroglyphs.” When strategies are concrete and clear, they 
are understood and adopted, it concludes. 
Like the humanistic macro-discourse, the pragmatic discourse does not make a strong 
distinction between different actors in strategy. It actually does not even discuss the 
role of different organizational players a lot. It states that managers are in responsible 
for concretizing strategy, but says little of their role otherwise. However, the discourse 
still maintains the top-down approach to strategy by saying that strategies are “taken 
to the grass roots,” implying that strategies are made at the top and then taken down-
wards.  
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In their paper, Mantere and Vaara (2008) discussed a “concretization discourse,” 
which is rather close to the pragmatic macro-discourse. They concluded that the con-
cretization discourse seeks to establish clear processes and practices in strategizing 
and it views strategy as an inherent, almost mundane part of organizational decision-
making. This kind of a cry for the practicality and applicability in strategy work is 
very popular and recurrent, for instance, in popular business books and business press 
nowadays, where the issue of strategy implementation has been given a lot of interest 
and attention. The common saying goes that it is not the planning of the strategy, but 
the implementation that is the most difficult and challenging part of strategy-work. 
The pragmatic macro-discourse discussed here is a manifestation of that kind of think-
ing.  
4.1.5 SPIRITUALITY: DISCOURSE OF FAITH AND BELIEVING 
The spiritual macro-discourse does not discuss religion or religious issues as such, but 
more likely draws on the spiritual rhetoric by comparing strategy to a spiritual experi-
ence and practice. The spiritual discourse brings up faith and the experience of it both 
as preconditions and antecedents of strategy. It regards strategy as something that is 
almost beyond the material world, connecting it to a metaphysical reality greater than 
oneself. According to it, strategy is thus a practice that connects oneself with the 
higher level purposes of an organization and gives people a sense of belonging.  
The following quotes are examples of the spiritual macro-discourse:  
“Well, it’s our intent of where we are heading at, including the vision that is our il-
lusion. […] Values, for instance, those have remained the same for 20 years. It in-
cludes sort of permanent elements.” 
”Strategy is the means to reach our vision.” 
”[Strategy includes] assumptions and actions or broadly speaking means that the vi-
sion is reached.” 
“The number of true believers [of strategy] has to be increased.” 
”Well, from my opinion it requires that you have faith in strategy, and then every-
thing else comes with it” 
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The spiritual macro-discourse constructs strategy as a matter of “faith.” Faith in strat-
egy enables people to serve something purposeful and greater than their personnel as-
pirations. Strategy is manifested through “vision” and “mission” statements, both 
concepts adopted originally from the spiritual vocabulary. Strategy is a practice that 
gives people mission and vision, a purpose and direction, and connects them with the 
higher level purposes of the organization. Strategy is a “journey” into the vision for 
the people. The spiritual macro-discourse also brings up the sense of belonging. Ac-
cording to it, faith in strategy gets people to feel that they belong to the organization 
and realize its purpose for their own part. While committed to the “values” of the or-
ganization, they feel a sense of purpose and significance. Hence, the spiritual dis-
course emphasizes the symbolic nature of strategy. Strategy is a sacred mission or vi-
sion that requires faith in order to live according to it.  
The spiritual discourse positions managers as “messianic” leaders, prophets or 
priests, who have “wisdom” to lead their people to a better future, a prophetic prom-
ised land. The role of managers is to believe in strategy sincerely, in order to be able 
to make their own subordinates believers and disciples of the strategy too. Their obli-
gation is to share and spread the gospel of strategy further. Again, the employees are 
considered as “followers” closely following the guidance of strategy. Organizational 
members favorably disposed towards strategy are called “true believers of strategy.” 
Having become believers of strategy, the subordinates become spokesmen of the 
strategy themselves.  
The spiritual discourse is close to what Mantere and Vaara (2008) call a “mystifica-
tion discourse.” When strategies and strategy processes are mystified, neither the con-
tent of the strategy nor the role of the top managers is normally not to be criticized or 
questioned in organizations. Hence, the discourse maintains the hegemony and legiti-
macy of the management. (Ibid.) The spiritual macro-discourse is also related to a 
phenomenon called “workplace spirituality.” Ashforth and Pratt (2003, 93-94) suggest 
that this phenomenon has three major dimensions. Firstly, it includes the transcen-
dence of the self, meaning a connection to something larger than oneself. Secondly, it 
means holism and harmony that relate to authenticity, balance, and perspective of the 
individual. And thirdly, spirituality means personal growth of the individual calling 
for the self-development and realizations of one’s dreams and aspirations. It has been 
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noted (Pfeffer 2003) that spirituality is manifested in different ways in workplaces. In 
general, people are willing to realize their full potential in workplaces seeking the 
ways of self-actualization (cf. Mantere & Vaara ibid.). They also search for social 
meaning and value for their work and want to be able to feel part of the larger com-
munity (Pfeffer ibid.). Many popular business writers (cf. Hamel 2007) have empha-
sized how this kind of a phenomenon should be capitalized in successful management 
thinking and practice.  
Again, de Certeau (1988, 180-181) discusses how believing, referring to a religious 
belief, has been exhausted and been transported into different areas of life, such as 
business. Business has captured the rhetoric peculiar to religion, but the people using 
that kind of religious discourse no longer believe in religion as such. As a conse-
quence, companies produce credos concerning their values that are inspiring and that 
motivate their people, and advertising is more and more evangelical by nature. (Ibid.) 
The spiritual macro-discourse discussed here is a one example of that kind of con-
sumption. 
Here, I have discussed the five macro-discourses of strategy, military, mechanism, 
humanism, pragmatism, and spirituality, in more detail. These discourses are summa-
rized in Table 8. In the following, I will discuss the other two elements of the strategy 
consumption process, (re)production and usage.  
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TABLE 8 SUMMARY OF THE MACRO-DISCOURSES 
MACRO-DISCOURSE DESCRIPTION 
MILITARISM (MIL) Strategy is a war plan or projection that guides the actions of organizational mem-
bers. Strategy aims at winning battles or killing enemies on the battlefield. The or-
ganization is in a constant battle against its environment and competitors. 
Managers are commanders of their troops, and strategy is executed through their 
commands and orders. The employees, considered as troops, are responsible for exe-
cuting these orders obediently.  
MECHANISM (MEC) The organization is a machine that executes strategy through mechanisms and proc-
esses. Strategy is a plan that is manifested through targets and objectives that are 
measured and reviewed with different technologies and practices.  
Managers design and set strategy procedures. Through these mechanisms, strategy 
cascades throughout the organization leaving little room for improvisation or appli-
cation.  
HUMANISM (HUM) Strategies are shared contracts in organizations. Organizations consist of people who 
are competent actors at every level of the organization.  
Participation and dialogue are central requirements of strategy, and the whole per-
sonnel should be able to participate in strategy work. Strategy should belong to eve-
ryone in the organization and make their work meaningful and motivating for them. 
PRAGMATISM (PRAG) Strategy is an everyday matter in organizations. It should be considered when mak-
ing decisions at every level of organization.  
Strategies should be made concrete and practical by managers. They need to be taken 
to the grassroots consistently, so that people would understand their meaning for 
everyday work.  
SPIRITUALISM (SPIR) Strategy is a mission and vision driven intent that requires faith in it. It connects 
people to a higher level of purposes in an organization and gives them a sense of 
belonging.  
Managers are messianic leaders, who provide direction for their subordinates. How-
ever, they have to believe in strategy themselves; otherwise they cannot communi-
cate it in a credible way.  
 
4.2  (RE)PRODUCTION 
(Re)production is a discursive practice that constructs, (re)produces and maintains 
strategy as a management discipline.18 It brings strategy into being by defining the 
discipline of strategy at the societal level and localizes it to the case organizations. 
(Re)production describes how the managers see and consider the discipline of strategy 
but unlike the usage of strategy, (re)production does not discuss the actual use of the 
                                                 
18
 A more detailed description on how the (re)production was constructed from the data, was provided in 
Chapter 3.3.3. 
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strategy. (Re)production is done by means of the five macro-discourses of strategy 
discussed previously. As each of these macro-discourses constructs and holds its own 
views and ideas about strategy and strategy work, the managers may use them skill-
fully as resources when (re)producing strategy. These macro-discourses exist in a 
wider social context, which means that they are brought into the case organizations 
from outside and are imported discourses by nature. They can be recognized from the 
case organizations as well as from the wider strategy and management discourse.  
The (re)production of strategy is a very dominant, obvious and visible part of the 
strategy consumption in the data. In most cases, (re)production originated as a result 
to a question like “How do you see strategy?” in the interviews, but it was also the 
topic that the interviewees returned to at different phases of the interview situations. 
(Re)production constructs an epic narrative of strategy outlining and discussing not 
only strategy and strategy work peculiar to each case organization, but also ideals that 
are present in the wider strategy discourse. (Re)production is a rather normative and 
idealistic discursive practice by nature. It often consumes strategy as something that it 
should be, rather than something it actually is at the moment. For most parts, 
(re)production is also faithful to the rational strategy approach, and managers seem to 
be very keen on it. This could be read as a sign of dominance, which the rational strat-
egy discourse has over managers.  
4.3 USAGE 
Although (re)production is an essential part of the strategy consumption process, the 
main interest in this study is put on the second phase of the process, usage, which 
could be characterized as a “quiet” part of strategy consumption.19 Usage is a discur-
sive practice, which describes how the managers use and poach the strategy, 
(re)produced preciously, with creative ways. The macro-discourses of strategy are 
also applied as resources in this discursive practice, but with a more clandestine and 
subtle manner. Usage is rather hidden by nature, since it is scattered over the 
                                                 
19
 A more detailed description on how the usage was constructed from the data, was provided in Chapter 
3.3.3. 
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(re)production of strategy. It represents “devious” and “dispersed” talk that does not 
manifest itself through its own products, but more likely through “ways of using” 
strategy. (De Certeau 1988, xii-xiii.) 
Previously, the nature of consumption was characterized by two examples. Firstly, the 
Indians used the laws, practices and representations that were imposed on them by the 
Spanish conquer in ways that did not comply with their original purpose. Secondly, a 
North African living in Paris lives there in a manner peculiar to his/her native Kabylia 
and furnishes his/her new neighborhood with the desires and dreams that longed to 
his/her old home. (Ibid., 31-32.) In both examples, these human subjects were not able 
to escape or own the structures (sanctions and an urban environment) that were im-
posed on them, but they could subvert, apply, and use them in ways that they find use-
ful and fitting for themselves. By so doing, they operated between the imposed struc-
tures and the use of them creating space to maneuver and improvise within and be-
tween those structures. Here, the strategy usage practiced by the managers resembles 
this kind of consumption in various ways. Like the Indians and the Kabylian, the 
managers use strategy that is imposed on them in creative and original ways.  
Strategy usage can be further divided into three sub categories of talk that each de-
scribe different sides and styles of strategy usage. Here, the strategy usage is mani-
fested with three types of tactics, the concept adopted from de Certeau (ibid., xiv), to 
illustrate different sides of polyphonic strategy use. These three tactics are instrumen-
tal, playful, and intimate. When coping with the strategy discourse, managers are like 
drivers in the streets of Rome or Naples (ibid., 18), who are navigating forward 
through strategy labyrinths with these three usage tactics.  
4.3.1 INSTRUMENTAL TACTIC 
The instrumental tactic uses strategy as a device, an instrument, which is used as a 
means in a managerial work. The tactic aims at making strategy habitable by adapting 
and poaching it for managers’ purposes of some kind. The instrumental strategy usage 
may, at first glance, appear like a literal adoption of strategy discourse, but once you 
take a closer look into it, you notice that it is often the letter of strategy that is used, 
not the spirit. To some extent, instrumental strategy use bends the rules of strategy by 
revising and applying them to drive one’s own agenda.  
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When using strategy instrumentally, managers catch the rational ethos of strategy and 
the language of it, but use it for their own purposes and intentions instrumentally with 
ways that may fall apart from the (re)production of strategy. This is an example of 
“bricolage,” (“an artisan-like inventiveness,” cf. Jarzabkowski 2004) an activity that 
combines and connects bits of strategy discourse to managers’ own repertoires. Strat-
egy is obviously an instrument that is being played rhetorically. The instrumental talk 
is manifest in the expressions that describe strategy as a “way” or “means” to do 
something, or managers may describe how “strategy means” this and that for them.  
For what purposes is strategy used instrumentally, then? In some parts of the instru-
mental tactic, strategy is used for a manager’s personal goals and purposes. Here, the 
managers may apply strategy for their own purposes, such as building legitimacy for 
their work (cf. Knight & Morgan 1991) and solving practical problems. However, in 
many cases strategy is used for more collective purposes, mainly for the benefit of a 
manager’s unit, in some cases even for the sake of the whole organization. In many 
cases, instrumental strategy consumption aims at coping (Chia & Holt 2006) with the 
strategy. It may not necessarily turn strategy into something totally different, since it 
does not have the power to do it, but more likely operates within it by plying it and 
trying to cope with it.  
4.3.2 PLAYFUL TACTIC 
The second usage tactic is called playful. While the instrumental tactic adopts strategy 
and maintains its rational ethos by using it instrumentally, the playful tactic takes 
strategy more creatively and less seriously. It is also more critical towards strategy 
than the instrumental tactic. For most parts, the playful tactic embodies a critique and 
resistance towards strategy, which can be read as a sign of cynicism from the manag-
ers. However, playfulness is not an explicit resistance of strategy, but more likely op-
portunistic, subtle and silent pragmatism, which resists and subverts strategy implic-
itly and quietly in its own terms (Fleming & Sewell 2005).  
Humor is a central feature of the playful strategy consumption. Ironical and cynical 
humor is used with a carnivalistic way to subvert and resist the power of the strategy 
discourse imposed on the managers. Irony provides a way to criticize and challenge 
the sacred norms of the strategy in a way that might be considered illegitimate, if ex-
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pressed in any other words. Irony represents rhetoric that brings managers apart from 
strategy and channels criticisms, disagreement, and/or frustration towards it, and it is 
dissembled in such a way that it is difficult to understand without knowing the context 
wherein it is used. Playful strategy use could also be read as cynical by nature. Being 
cynical, it sees through the strategy and its practices, and considers them to be repres-
sive by nature. The playful tactic also uses contradictions and comparisons as rhetoric 
resources when illustrating the absurdity of strategy in some cases. (Ibid.) 
The playful tactic is used to maneuver and create space within the hegemony of stra-
tegic management. The playful tactic is also a comedic strategy narrative that con-
structs strategy as a carnival. In the playful tactic, managers take strategy and con-
sume it in a playful way to amuse and entertain themselves. Strategy is used playfully 
mostly for pleasure: “the pleasure of providing one’s own meanings of social experi-
ence and the pleasure of avoiding the social discipline of the power-bloc” (Fiske 
1989, 47). Since the managers are in a position of not getting away with strategy, they 
are obligated to live with it. In de Certeau’s terms (1988, 31-32) they “transfer it into 
to another register.” Playful usage does not produce any material outcomes for the 
managers, and neither are the managers able to accumulate what they win, but what 
they do keep is their status and subjectivity (Fiske ibid., 36). Managers may also dis-
indentify themselves from strategy, criticize it, and amuse themselves with the ridicu-
lous aspects of it, but still perform it in their work. By doing this, they both dis-
identify and (re)produce strategy at the same time. (Fleming & Spicer 2003.) 
4.3.3 INTIMATE TACTIC 
The third tactic is called intimate. In this case intimacy means personal experience, 
managers’ personal relationship and attachment to strategy. Here, strategy is neither 
an instrument to do something, nor something to play or amuse oneself with, but an 
arena that provides managers a way and means to construct their existence, subjectiv-
ity, and identity in relation to it. Where as in the playful tactic, the managers resisted 
strategy’s colonization of their subjectivity playfully, here they instead use the strat-
egy discourse to construct and shape their subjectivity and identity as managers. They 
use strategy “narcissistically pleasing oneself, instead of others” to summon up their 
emotional desires and pleasures (Featherstone 2007, 27).  
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The intimate rhetoric also describes managers’ own personal feelings, such as fears 
and insecurity, towards strategy. The intimate talk has a shade of shyness or sensitiv-
ity in it, while it reveals something private and literally intimate about manager’s rela-
tion to strategy, something that is not told publicly. By using strategy with this way, 
managers reflect and construct their subjectivity in terms of strategy work. Here, in 
the case of the intimate strategy usage, de Certeau’s remarks about the “clandestine” 
nature of consumption become materialized most obviously.  
This chapter has provided a description and overview of the elements of the strategy 
consumption process. The following three chapters present the case-specific results of 
this study. I will answer the primary research question “How managers consume 
strategy?” by describing how the strategy consumption process, described previously, 
is manifested in each case organization. Also, the case-specific “contexts of use,” as 
de Certeau (1988, 32) calls them, are outlined in order to illustrate and elucidate the 
contextual factors of strategy consumption. Particularly, I will try to narrate how 
strategy is practiced in each case organization and what the managers make out of 
strategy by analyzing the strategy (re)production and usage in them. I will also study, 
how different discursive resources, imported strategy discourses, are utilized and used 
in strategy consumption in each case organization.  
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5 INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 
Industrial Enterprise (henceforth Industrial), my first case organization, is a traditional 
industrial corporation with a rather extensive history, dating back to the beginning of 
the 20th century. Industrial manufactures industrial products for different customer 
segments and it is divided into five business units, each taking care of their market 
operations around the globe. The personnel of the business units consist mainly of 
sales and marketing people. The manufacturing operations of Industrial take place 
mainly at a number of production sites situated in Europe. Industrial’s top manage-
ment and main support functions (finance, personnel, communication, IT, etc.) are 
located in its corporate center situated in Finland. Industrial’s business is regarded as 
“heterogenic,” because of many lines of business in different countries and cultures.  
Although Industrial operates like a self-governing company, it is fully owned by its 
parent company. However, it seems that its relation to the parent company is rather 
complex. The parent company does not regard Industrial as its core business and has 
tried to sell Industrial during the past few years, although it has not yet succeeded. It 
is obvious that in this situation the parent company does not want to invest any extra 
money or resources in Industrial. This stalemate frustrates Industrial’s managers. Ob-
viously, they are not satisfied with their role as cash flow producers, but would like to 
develop and invest money in their businesses. In some way, it seems that Industrial 
has been – more or less – abandoned by the parent company. Some managers even 
say that the current situation is preventing Industrial from realizing its strategy in the 
preferred way, and that the parent company does not know what to do with Industrial. 
Many of them seem to be waiting (and hoping) that something will sooner or later 
happen in the ownership of Industrial, but no one seems to know what that would be. 
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE   
98 
Some even say that they do not see an “inspiring future” for the Industrial in the cur-
rent ownership.  
Industrial has traditionally been first and foremost a product-oriented company. 
Hence, the site managers were previously dominant players in its strategy process. 
One site manager recalls how the site managers used to drive to the “big meetings” 
held at the head office in their “black cars,” and explained what they had decided to 
produce during the next year. Back then, the production sites were “small monar-
chies” within Industrial. However, during the last few years the management of In-
dustrial has advocated a more customer-oriented strategy that is based on knowledge 
and solutions. According to this new strategy, it wants to be a trusted and qualified 
partner to its customers and provide tailor-made solutions to them, instead of being a 
bulk manufacturer. It aims to move closer to the end user in the supply chain. This is a 
classic example of moving from a cost leadership strategy to a differentiation strategy. 
It is a typical strategic change recently sought by many industrial companies in West-
ern Europe. At Industrial, this change creates tension between the intended strategy 
and the current state of Industrial.  
Industrial’s new strategy is explained and justified by the changes that have taken 
place in the company’s business environment. The prices of raw materials have in-
creased dramatically, thereby causing pressures on product prices. And at the same 
time competitors from Eastern Europe have cut market prices heavily, causing heavy 
pressure on Industrial’s pricing. Managers repeat over and over again that Industrial 
operates in a very turbulent, challenging and “competitive” environment, and that the 
entire industry will most likely face rearrangement and consolidation in the future.  
Due to the changes in Industrial’s strategy, the business unit managers have replaced 
site managers as the dominant players in the strategy process. The site managers are 
not, for example, invited to the annual strategy meeting anymore, which is a crucial 
symbolic milestone in Industrial’s strategy process. The meeting is an away-day, held 
in the summer at a countryside mansion. The meeting lasts for two days and also in-
cludes a leisure program with good food and beverages, making it not only a strategy 
meeting, but also an institutionalized socializing event for the top managers of the 
company. The fact that the site managers are no longer invited to these meetings is 
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interpreted as a symbolic gesture by them: it means that they are no longer important 
and that their insight is no longer needed in Industrial’s strategy process.  
Nowadays it is the business unit heads that bring the strategy to the site ones a year at 
site-specific target setting events. In these sessions, the business-unit managers com-
municate the strategic targets for the site managers, who primarily listen to what the 
business expects from them. This phase of the strategy process is called “strategy 
sharing,” although at least the site managers think that it is more likely one-way im-
plementation.  
Although Industrial tries to emphasize customer focus and customized services in its 
new strategy, especially the sites seem to operate with mass production logic. Their 
culture is “ton-oriented,” as one interviewee describes it, and they aim for “produc-
tive efficiency.” In contrast, the business units have a different standpoint. While re-
sponsible for market operations, they have adopted a new customer-oriented strategy, 
in which they can see their own handwriting more easily. They sell “customized con-
cepts” to customers. This difference causes some conflicts between these two groups 
from time to time.  
Industrial has a documented strategy process chart that basically constitutes the cen-
tral artifact of strategizing in the company. It is the way the “machine works,” as 
some managers describe it. Strategy work at Industrial follows certain annual proce-
dures like planning, target-setting and review practices.  
5.1 STRATEGY (RE)PRODUCTION 
As discussed earlier, strategy (re)production is a discursive practice that defines, ex-
plicates, and acknowledges the premises of strategy for the further usage. In this chap-
ter I will show how strategy is (re)produced by the managers of Industrial. Strategy 
(re)production at Industrial follows three paths. The first (re)produces the nature and 
conditions of strategy at Industrial. Strategy is constructed as a means to reach the vi-
sion, referring to the spiritual macro-discourse. The second path discusses how strat-
egy is done in the company, especially how its strategy process functions. According 
to it, Industrial’s organization works like a machine to realize the intended strategy, 
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which refers to the mechanistic macro-discourse. The third path invites the personnel 
of Industrial to the strategy work. Strategy is (re)produced as an activity that requires 
participation and commitment, and invites the humanistic macro-discourse along. 
These three (re)production tactics set the scene for further strategy usage at Industrial.  
5.1.1 WAY TO REACH THE VISION 
The following quotes from the managers of Industrial illustrate how strategy is 
(re)produced firstly by them. 
”It [strategy] is the way we reach the vision […] like the condition of life or a 
manual for success.” 
”Strategy is a plan, a concrete plan how to reach the vision.” 
“We have like vision and mission […] strategy is a means, then, certain actions 
and projects through which the desired state is aimed at.”  
“It [strategy] is such a big collective desired state and outlook, a collective out-
look of how the company can succeed.” 
In this rhetoric, the spiritual macro-discourse is used as a resource to (re)produce 
strategy. Strategy is portrayed as the “way,” “plan” or “means” to reach the “vi-
sion.” It is like a journey to salvation for the strategy believers. A journey that re-
quires consistency and strength, but once you get there, it rewards you extensively. 
This kind of journey metaphor is commonly used in strategy discourse and in man-
agement rhetoric in general (Inns 1996). It is interesting how the terms “vision” and 
“mission,” both of which derive from the spiritual macro-discourse, are (re)produced 
by the managers of Industrial so frequently and consistently. This may indicate that 
the spiritual macro-discourse is deeply rooted at Industrial, although the consumers, 
here managers, probably do not recognize the religious underpinnings.  
Strategy is also portrayed as the “precondition of life,” “the manual for success,” or 
“a collective outlook of the desired state:” this also suggests that the nature of strat-
egy is almost metaphysical. Nevertheless, it is at least something that can be seen in 
the future as the following comment suggests: 
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“Well, if we think about strategy creation, it is very important that we are able to 
analyze the environment and customer expectations. It’s like, we are able to see 
far ahead.” 
It appears here that strategy is (re)produced as something that requires seeing “far 
ahead,” as the previous manager says. Sight is in fact strongly highlighted in the 
strategy (re)production. Strategy can also be a war plan, as the following quote re-
veals: 
”[Strategy is] the way we try to win the war against competitors and against the 
environment. This is the starting point.” 
The previous quote is a reference to the militaristic macro-discourse. Strategy aims at 
“winning the war.” What is striking here is that strategy is considered as a war not 
only against “competitors” but also against the “environment.” According to this in-
terpretation, it seems that Industrial is at war on many fronts. This may reflect both 
Industrial’s tough competitive situation in the markets and the unclear ownership 
situation that is puzzling many managers.  
5.1.2 PROCESS ORIENTED 
The second path of the strategy (re)production treats strategy as something that is ac-
complished in the organization through the process. A manager describes the strategy 
work at Industrial as follows: 
“Yeah, and let’s say that this big machine then spins like the clockwork de-
scribed [in the annual strategy cycle].” 
Again, another manager illustrates how the Industrial strategy is further divided into 
business plans: 
“Well, to put it shortly, we have some intention of what we want to accomplish, a 
vision state, and then we have a predefined mode of operation, and then we have 
a disciplined practical implementation. The process is very logical, as it can be 
in an engineer-based firm. The strategy is formulated at the top management 
level of a firm and then it is cascaded through these different business plans into 
practical action.” 
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Here, another manager illustrates how Industrial level strategy is taken further in the 
organization: 
”Well, how is it implemented? Well, it sort of happens through this process […] 
The chosen strategy […] the BU business plans are made of it […] and the mar-
ket based and country based business plans are made of it, and then, based on 
those business plans, the team and personnel discussions are held […] we will 
hopefully get those targets in synchrony so that the machine works in the same 
rhythm.” 
All three descriptions of Industrial’s strategy work reveal the clearly mechanistic un-
derpinning of the (re)production. The organization is a “machine” that should work 
“in the same rhythm,” in “synchrony,” in order to realize the desired strategy. It is 
this machine that spins like “clockwork” or according to a specified procedure. Strat-
egy relies on the “logical process,” natural for the “engineer based” firm, that “cas-
cades” strategy into “practical action,” presumably downward in the organization. 
Strategy is created by “the top management” of the firm.  
This kind of strategy (re)production leaves little, if any, room for improvisation and 
creativity. Strategy requires literally “disciplined” implementation. Strategy cascades 
in the organization, starting from the corporate level and ending on the personal level. 
Strategy should clearly guide the activities and goals of individuals and teams. What 
is interesting here is that those managers do not seem to place themselves in this ma-
chine. Managers are engaged in strategic planning processes; they analyze the busi-
ness environment, produce strategic plans, and then try to implement them effectively 
throughout the organization, which is considered to be a machine. But they do not re-
veal that are they part of the machine themselves.  
5.1.3 EVERYONE’S CONCERN 
In the third path of the strategy (re)production, the managers of Industrial explain how 
their strategy process involves people, referring to the humanistic macro-discourse. 
However, the mechanistic and spiritual macro-discourses are also brought into play, 
which makes the (re)production an interesting mixture of different macro-discourses.  
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Here a manager describes Industrial’s strategy process: 
”[Strategy process is] an on-going process and it should touch as many Indus-
trial people as possible, i.e. the whole personnel.” 
Industrial’s strategy process chart includes a phase called “strategy sharing,” refer-
ring to the phase where Industrial level strategy is further communicated to the busi-
ness units and production sites. In the following, a manager explains what this means: 
”[…] share strategy, this is how we have to get the people to understand the en-
vironment and the validity of the vision, and then how the organization commits 
to the strategy.” 
Further, another manager explains the company’s strategy process: 
”This is a process that concerns the whole personnel. It will be taken to the last 
person, since everyone can sort of implement strategy. It is only frame setting, so 
that people would begin to think the right way. […] You can find things in the 
strategy that you can easily identify with. It also kind of guarantees better work 
quality for them. It sort of explains why these things are done. […] It cascades 
right [down] there to the employee level, right there where the strategy is ac-
complished in their work.” 
The previous quotes reveal how the humanistic discourse is (re)produced at Industrial. 
Humanism is almost a normative rule for the managers. It is said that the strategy 
process “should touch the whole personnel” of Industrial and the process “is taken to 
the last person” in the company. As a result, strategy guarantees “better work qual-
ity” at Industrial and appear almost like the source of emancipation or salvation. 
Strategy gives people “an idea” of why certain things are done at Industrial. Here, 
strategy provides people with a sense of meaningfulness and purpose, which could be 
read as a reference to the spiritual macro-discourse.  
However, as can be seen, the mechanism is also used here as a resource. Sharing 
strategy means “getting people to understand the environment and the validity of the 
vision” almost as if they were machines that should be tuned into the right frequency. 
This is called “frame setting” and aims to get “people to think the right way.” Based 
on this clause, there is obviously the right way to think about strategy, according to 
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the manager. But who gets to decide what the right way to think about strategy is? Is 
it the frame-setter? So it appears, since the strategy “cascades” down to “the em-
ployee level” where the “practical” work is done. Compared with the humanistic and 
spiritual macro-discourses present in the very same quotes, this kind of mechanism 
sounds almost violent.  
The (re)production of strategy described here sets the scene for further strategy usage 
at Industrial by bringing strategy into being at the societal level and by contextualiz-
ing it into Industrial. As has been mentioned, this is the most outward and obvious 
part of strategy consumption. Next, I will show how this (re)produced strategy is used 
and applied by the managers of Industrial in a more clandestine and tacit manner. I 
begin with the instrumental usage tactic.  
5.2 USAGE: INSTRUMENTAL TACTIC 
At Industrial, the instrumental strategy usage seems to include four types of talk. 
Firstly, managers use strategy as a sort of sensemaking tool to analyze and understand 
their business environment. Secondly, they use strategy to formulate and set objec-
tives and targets for themselves and their subordinates. Thirdly, they use Insurance’s 
strategy as a loose framework on which to build their own sub-strategies and goals. 
The looseness leaves them some room to maneuver and act more independently in 
their work. And finally, managers create sub-strategies to ensure and secure that their 
unit is in line with Insurance’s strategy to appear important and legitimized for others.  
5.2.1 “UNDERSTANDING THE BUSINESS” 
The first element of the strategy usage at Industrial is no surprise by any means, since 
it probably reflects the most typical managerial activity related to the strategizing. 
Here, managers use strategy as an instrument to analyze and evaluate their and their 
units’ businesses. In the following, two managers describe this kind of strategy usage 
in more detail: 
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“We have a sort of pretty wide strategy team, where we discuss strategic issues. 
[…] With that crowd, we think about changes in the business environment and 
how they affect our strategy.” 
“Understanding customer needs and understanding the business environment. 
Understanding our own strengths and also understanding our own development 
areas, that you’re not allowed to be weak. […] Well, […] we started a sort of 
strategy process last year, where we defined […] what our strengths and weak-
nesses are, and tried to understand where our customers are heading, and the 
business environment.” 
What does analyzing the “business environment” mean for the managers? The obvi-
ous purpose seems to be to “understand” the business environment and the conditions 
related to it. It seems that this kind of strategy use allows managers to gain an under-
standing of their external conditions, such as customers and “changes,” and also of 
their internal conditions, such as “strengths” and “weaknesses.” It appears that the 
managers have applied the SWOT analysis in their strategy sessions.  
This first element of the instrumental strategy usage draws loosely on the humanistic 
and mechanistic macro-discourses. Firstly, strategy-making is portrayed as an activity 
that is done in a rather wide circle of managers, who “discuss strategic issues.” This 
comment is influenced by the humanistic ideals of open participation, communication 
and dialogue. The second quote relies on the mechanistic macro-discourse by describ-
ing how strategy-making is driven by the “strategy process,” which has been started 
some time ago. It almost sounds like you were not capable of thinking strategically 
without a sufficient process that ensures the quality of strategies.  
Here, strategy clearly appears as an analytical sensemaking tool for the manager. By 
launching the strategy process, the manager has been able to gather his/her people to 
think about the nature and conditions of their business unit together. Strategy-making 
may also provide them with space and time to stop and ponder some basic questions 
concerning their unit and its work in a legitimized setting – something they would be 
unable to do while running the everyday business. As a result of the process, manag-
ers “define” and construct their strengths and weaknesses, which means that the strat-
egy-making gives them some outcomes that can be returned to later.  
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The manager also mentions how the strategic analysis is done because “you are not 
allowed to be weak.” Could it be that the managers are engaged heavily in creating 
their own sub-strategies to avoid appearing vulnerable or weak? Does the strategy and 
strategy process give them a sense of being in control of things? Does the strategy 
make them look strong and appear to be rational managers? It seems that the manag-
ers use strategy as the instrument like this, not only to ensure that they are aware of 
what goes on in their business environment, but also to legitimize and ensure that they 
are tough business managers capable of managing their units within Industrial. This is 
an example of strategy usage that follows the spirit of the rational strategy approach 
consistently and obediently.  
5.2.2 “THE GOALS ARE DERIVED FROM THE STRATEGY” 
The second feature of instrumental strategy usage is a tactic that applies strategy for 
setting targets and objectives. Here, the targets set are derived from Industrial’s strat-
egy and then cascaded further in the organization. In the following, a manager de-
scribes how these strategic targets are set in his/her unit: 
“Then we have this target setting day, where we get the general Industrial lines 
[…] The output is the Balanced Score Card that we put on the intranet. […] 
Then we […] make the objective matrixes […] Teams will do an exercise, that 
what does it mean for them, and set their own targets […] The targets are being 
taken to the team level […] If this process works, they [targets and goals] are 
derived right from Industrial’s strategy. […] Here, we have some concrete sug-
gestions […] that you have to drive the fork lift faster, and so forth.” 
“In practice, […] everyone’s personal goals are derived right from the strat-
egy.” 
While the unit has received the Industrial level strategic “lines,” those guidelines are 
translated and divided into team level targets for all employees in the unit. The man-
ager acts like an operator who runs this process, which is an example of pure mecha-
nistic talk. Practices like the Balanced Score Card and objective matrixes are used as 
tools in this target setting process. The manager ensures that the “goals are derived 
right from the strategy,” which hints that strategy is taken seriously here. Then, the 
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targets are “taken” downward in the organizations so that even “the fork lift driver” 
on the plant floor follows some sort of strategic guidance.  
Here, strategy appears as an apparatus that both defines and cascades the “targets” 
and objectives at Industrial. The manager uses Industrial’s strategy as the bases for 
targets and goals at his/her plant. While instrumental usage treated strategy as a sort of 
collective sensemaking tool, here the strategy disciplines and controls the activities of 
individuals. Although teams do “an exercise” where they reflect what the strategy 
“means for them” and “set their own targets,” the targets are derived straight from 
the strategy.  
5.2.3  “IT’S A GOOD GUIDELINE, BASICALLY” 
In the third feature of the instrumental strategy usage, managers take more freedom to 
maneuver and manipulate the strategy. Here, they use Industrial’s strategy as a loose 
framework on which to build their own sub-strategies and goals. They reinterpret and 
shape it to make it habitable for themselves and their own units. In the following, a 
manager describes how he/she takes Industrial’s strategy and what he/she makes out 
of it in his/her unit: 
“Well, particularly the investment side. That is quite essential for us. Otherwise, 
[…] you can work quite independently, as long as you make a profit. They don’t 
pay an awful lot of attention to how you make the profit. […] Industrial's strat-
egy tells mostly the businesses we want to be in. [...] Industrial's strategy limits 
the scope of the business units, but as such, a business unit can create its own 
strategy rather freely on those conditions." 
The manager regards Industrial’s strategy as a rather loose framework. It tells him/her 
“the businesses” that the company “wants to be in” and limits the “scope of busi-
ness,” but otherwise lets him/her manage the unit “quite independently.” The only 
thing that seems to be essential to him/her is “the investment side” of strategy, not the 
vision or mission, nor the strategic intent. As a result, he/she can create his/her “own 
strategy rather freely.” What justifies a manager’s behavior here is the ability to 
“make a profit.” As the manager puts it, “they don’t pay an awful lot of attention to 
how you make the profit.” Money matters here.  
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In the following, the same manager explains how he/she takes the intent of Indus-
trial’s strategy: 
"Well, the ‘partnership’ thinking, this is the leading thought [in Industrial’s 
strategy]. On our behalf, I'll try to live with the message, but I can't go on and 
tell it to our customers, because they won't understand [it]. [...] We are so differ-
ent than the others [...] Basically, we can subscribe to that and try to develop it. 
But at the moment, we have little ‘partnership’, and ‘knowledge’ we don't have 
at all, and if you don't have them, you can't provide ‘solutions’ either. But it 
[strategy] is a good guideline […] It's only a matter of will. [...] It's the direc-
tion." 
“Partnership thinking,” which is the cornerstone of Industrial’s newly described cus-
tomer focused strategy, is regarded and used as an unsuitable choice for the business 
unit in question. The business unit manager is trying to cope with the strategy, be-
cause he/she cannot tell it to his/her “customers,” who would not understand it. The 
manager’s unit differs from the others. Since they have “little partnership” and they 
lack “knowledge” totally, neither they can “provide solutions” to their customers. 
The manager seems to acknowledge that strategy requires some sort of faith when it is 
regarded as “a matter of will” and a “direction,” which could be read as references to 
the spiritual macro-discourse.  
Here Industrial’s strategy is used instrumentally as a basic guideline, as a direction, 
that has little impact on the actual activities of the business unit. In de Certeau’s 
terms, Industrial’s strategy is made habitable here. The manager is trying to cope with 
the strategy, which he/she doesn’t find useful for his/her unit, but since he/she cannot 
fully ignore it, he/she “tunes” it. He/she makes it function in another register, as de 
Certeau put it, so that he/she and his/her unit can live with it. By doing this, he/she 
can work quite independently, as long as he/she makes a profit.  
5.2.4 “WE HAVE CREATED OUR OWN SUB-STRATEGY” 
At Industrial, the managers seem to have a rather strong need and interest to formulate 
their own sub-strategies, which are based on Industrial’s corporate strategy. In the fol-
lowing, the managers of Industrial discuss this phenomenon and reveal why they en-
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gage in such activity. Here, a communications manager describes how his/her team 
has created a communication strategy based on the Industrial’s business strategy: 
“Well, we of course have […] a communication strategy that is, of course, totally 
based on the corporate strategy. […] Our task is to advance those key issues and 
key targets that are derived from the corporate strategy […] We create a sort of 
corporate image that is in line with our mission and vision […] But, then again, 
internally […] we have a very important task [to ensure] that people [would] 
understand what our strategy is all about and why it is like that […] Our task is 
to [translate] the message that they [would] understand what we are talking 
about.” 
The communication strategy is “based totally on the corporate strategy” of Indus-
trial. What does this strategy include? It seems to be the manifestation of the tasks of 
the communication department. Their task is to “create a corporate brand” and to 
ensure “that people understand” what Industrial’s strategy is about. Here strategy ap-
pears to be a framework that legitimizes the work of the department and ensures that 
its work is in line with Industrial’s strategy. Strategy describes and defines what the 
department does and makes its work meaningful and tangible for others. By creating a 
sub-strategy, it is assured that the department performs an “important” strategic role 
at Industrial.  
Here, a site manager describes his/her efforts to create a similar kind of a strategy: 
”I also have a task from my supervisor to create a production site strategy. The 
hell with it! I can do it. I will do a one hour slide show [presentation] about it, 
but, you know, there’s no channel to integrate it into the rest of Industrial. I think 
you needed some frankness. […] A vision of what our plant will be after two 
years, that’s what we are after. That’s what I would like to finally find out, since 
I’m responsible for the unit. It’d be really nice to know in which direction this is 
being taken.” 
The site manager has been given a “task” to create a strategy for his/her production 
site, but unfortunately he/she finds no way to “integrate it into the rest of Industrial.” 
The production plant strategy would define “what the plant will be after two years” 
and where the manager should take it. Here, the site manager is missing the security 
that the communication manager enjoys; he/she does not have a way to link his/her 
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work into the whole. Right now, he/she lacks a strategy that would ensure that his/her 
work is meaningful and important for the company. He/she is missing a connection to 
Industrial’s strategy and thus regards his/her work un-important and unattached by its 
nature. Here, the mechanistic macro-discourse is visible through expressions such as 
“channel,” “integration” and “input.” The previous comment could also be inter-
preted as a slight reference to the spiritual macro-discourse, since it emphasizes the 
security that results from belonging to the community and feeling connectedness to 
something greater than oneself.  
It is obvious that the managers of Industrial create sub-strategies to secure and ensure 
that their and their unit’s work is related to the whole and appears important and 
meaningful. They want to appear strategic and thus important for the rest of the or-
ganization. They use strategy to legitimize their and their units’ activities and to build 
a connection between their work and the goals of the organization. Strategy is used 
almost like a glue to connect and link one’s own activity into the organization. 
5.3 USAGE: PLAYFUL TACTIC 
The playful usage tactic questions the status of Industrial headquarters as the central 
strategist and jokes about the ability of the top management to act as a visionary 
leader. The playfulness also brings out the cultural differences between different parts 
of Industrial preventing it from operating as one “machine” in “the same rhythm” as 
the (re)production insisted.  
5.3.1  “THE IVORY TOWER AND THE FORKLIFT DRIVER” 
As the (re)production of strategy described previously, the strategy process has an im-
portant role in Industrial’s strategy work and it intends to take the strategy mechani-
cally down to the last employee of the company. In the following, a manager uses 
strategy playfully by joking about the role of Industrial’s headquarters as an operator 
of the strategy process: 
“These folks can twist those [strategy] processes by themselves and think about 
those methods and think how the strategy will be achieved and how it will be 
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taken to the folks. But what we can’t always see by ourselves, of course, is that 
why do I bang my head on the tree? That what is that tree that I’m banging my 
head on? It’s difficult, when you are, like we say at the production site, here in 
the ivory tower [headquarters of Industrial]. It’s difficult to understand why the 
damn forklift driver doesn’t understand what we have decided in the manage-
ment board.”  
This satiric description jokes about the top management of Industrial. The quote cre-
ates tension between the two extreme groups of Industrial. The top management, posi-
tioned at the “ivory tower” above the rest of the organization, does not seem to have 
an idea of what is going on elsewhere in the organization. It seems that they can see 
far from their tower, but fail to see near. Here, ivory tower represents wealth, power 
and status, something that the personnel, “these folks,” can only dream about. It 
seems that the top management has somehow isolated itself from the rest of the or-
ganization. The ordinary people of Industrial, like “the damn forklift driver” working 
on a production site, do not understand the strategies created by the management. 
The manager also jokes that the top management is “banging” its head on a “tree” 
without knowing what that tree actually is. It is clearly trying to get the “folks” to 
adopt its strategy without being able to do it. The reason, “a tree,” remains somewhat 
unclear here. It almost appears that the manager is advising the top management to 
step down from their tower.  
What is the purpose of this kind of consumption? The manager telling this satiric de-
scription obviously knows the problematic situation at Industrial. Nevertheless, he/she 
is not a forklift driver him/herself, neither does he/she belong to the ivory tower; but 
he/she is somewhere in between these two extremes. It seems like he/she has his/her 
own way to do strategy. He/she is also somehow above this situation, being able to 
make fun of it. He/she can watch both the top management and the forklift driver, the 
one banging its head on the tree and the other driving with his/her forklift in his/her 
own direction. The manager might be cynical about the strategy and dis-indentify 
him/herself with it.  
This is also an example of how the mechanistic macro-discourse is used playfully. 
The manager is sure that “these folks” at the production sites and elsewhere can take 
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care; they can “twist” the processes by themselves. They do not need the ivory tower 
to do that. 
5.3.2  “OCCULTISM AT THE UPPER FLOOR” 
Previously, Industrial’s strategy work was (re)produced as a vision- and mission-
driven process, with the spiritual macro-discourse as a resource. In the following, a 
manager uses strategy playfully when describing the efforts taken to communicate 
these visions thoroughly in the organization: 
“Well, now it has been agreed […] that this [strategy] won’t be occultism, man-
agement’s coffee moments where soft things are discussed, […] strategic feet off 
the ground things. This [strategy] will be communicated intensively to the whole 
company.” 
This statement illustrates the future intentions of Industrial with regard to strategy 
communication. Strategy will be communicated “intensively to the whole company.” 
But why do this? This is where the playful usage steps in. Without communication, 
strategy can appear as an “occultism,” which refers to the spiritual discourse. By 
comparing strategy work with occultism, the manager hints that sometimes Indus-
trial’s strategy work could have been regarded as a clandestine discipline or activity, 
kept secret from the public. It may also hint that when kept secret, the strategy work 
may seem paranormal, supernatural or magical to others not involved in it. This kind 
of an activity is also portrayed as “management’s coffee moments” where they dis-
cuss “soft, strategic feet off the ground things.”  
This kind of rhetoric does not paint a particularly favorable picture of Industrial’s top 
management. On the contrary, it actually hints that without communicating the strat-
egy, the top managers appear as occultist figures discussing high-flown “strategic” 
things that do not have much to contribute to the everyday work of the organization. 
This is playful rhetoric, indeed. The pragmatic discourse is also present here. The 
comment can be read as a cry to concretize and make sense of the strategy. The com-
ment can also be interpreted as a struggle between the spiritual and pragmatic macro-
discourses.  
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The following comment from a manager continues the thought: 
“Previously […] there was a feeling, let’s say like before the current manage-
ment, that we drifted. The upper floor dreamed up something, and the ground 
floor did something else, something like it.” 
This comment plays with a common stereotype associated with strategy work. As the 
instrumental tactic indicated, at Industrial, too, strategy is created mostly by the top 
management, referred to here as “the upper floor,” and implemented by the person-
nel, “the ground floor.” In this quote, this whole thing is made fun of. Top manage-
ment has previously “dreamed up” something, and the personnel have done “some-
thing else.” This is a satiric account of the situation, where two floors definitely do 
not “play in the same rhythm” as was demanded previously. More likely, this con-
structs a humoristic picture of Industrial’s top management dreaming strategy dreams 
on the “upper floor” without knowing what is being done downstairs. The comment 
can also be read as a wish to concretize and clarify strategy for preventing further 
“drifting.” This is a reference to the pragmatic macro-discourse.  
Here, managers use strategy not only to entertain and amuse themselves, which is ob-
viously one purpose of this kind of talk, but also to criticize the current (or previous) 
way of the strategy making at Industrial. Also, while giving them some pleasure, it 
may also distance them from that kind of strategy work and construct them as capable 
and knowledgeable with regard to these issues.  
5.3.3  “TRIMMED PRODUCTION PLANTS AND SERVICE PROVIDERS” 
The (re)production of strategy highlighted how Industrial’s strategy process should 
ensure that the organization works as a whole. In the following, a manager plays with 
the differences between the business units and productions sites in a manner that ques-
tions the idea of unity: 
“Then, here at the production sites, well, they are trimmed production plants all 
the way. […] Goddammit, they push as much stuff from their pipes as they can. 
And their goal is productive efficiency. And then, all of a sudden, these [business 
units] are trying to sell services and focused concepts according to the strategy. 
Well, this creates a contradiction.” 
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According to the manager, the production sites of Industrial are “trimmed production 
plants” that are producing goods with mass production logic, trying to be as effective 
as they can. “They push as much stuff from their pipes as they can,” says the man-
ager. On the other hand, the business units, as the pioneers of the newly created strat-
egy, pursue customized solutions and concepts. Here, these two contradictory logics 
collide, creating the “contradiction.” “Goddammit,” groans the manager, while shar-
ing his/her concerns about this stalemate.  
The previous comment is an example of the playful strategy usage that is targeted 
against the ideals of strategy (re)production. Here, a dichotomy is constructed be-
tween the business units and productions sites as a sign of the controversies and diffi-
culties that Industrial is facing in the strategy work. Here, strategy appears as a source 
of amusement for the manager. It is almost like he is watching this entertaining play 
and laughing up his/her sleeve. This is pleasure felt in front of the almost impossible 
challenge. What else can you do but laugh? This kind of talk can be read as a refer-
ence to the pragmatic macro-discourse, since it plays clearly with the problem of turn-
ing the intended strategy into concrete action.  
5.4 USAGE: INTIMATE TACTIC 
In the following, I will show how the intimate usage tactic is used for three different 
purposes at Industrial. Firstly, managers use strategy to glorify themselves as strategic 
leaders who are capable and legitimized to lead the company. Secondly, managers use 
strategy to highlight the lack of support and loneliness felt in the company’s strategy 
process, which constructs them as disrespected and misunderstood. And thirdly, strat-
egy is used to illustrate managers’ dis-identification with the strategy that portrays 
them as independent and unconnected of it. The intimate tactic discusses how the 
managers feel personally about Industrial’s strategy and how it either emancipates or 
neglects them.  
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5.4.1  “BRILLIANT GENERAL” 
Previously, the playful usage criticized the role of Industrial’s top management in the 
strategy work. However, this does not prevent a member of the top management from 
glorifying him/herself as a strategic leader. In the following, the manager shares an 
intimate account on how he/she and some other members of the management team did 
some strategic thinking previously:  
“For instance, last year we did it quite brilliantly […] There was a small caucus 
of five business responsible leaders of the management board and [we] went to 
[…] Rome for an international seminar […] When the morning lectures were 
over, there was a really long two hour lunch break […] We went to eat sand-
wiches and asked ourselves, what the morning lectures had told us with regard 
to our strategy. […] When we’d been [there] for three days, our summary was 
that […] we are right and that we have figured out this strategy in a completely 
valid way. However, how do you implement it and how do you do it in practice? 
And that the trend is our friend, but how do you take advantage of it?” 
A seminar in Rome, attended by the managers confirmed their faith in the strategy 
they had formulated for Industrial. They had been doing some reflection at the lunch 
breaks of the seminar, while eating “sandwiches.” They considered themselves to be 
“right,” since they had “figured out the strategy with the completely valid way.” 
Only question to remain uncertain is “how to implement it.”  
This kind of talk constructs the top managers as very effective; they work during the 
“really long lunch breaks” not even thinking of having a Mediterranean siesta as one 
might in Rome. It appears that they will not rest until the strategy is finished. Sec-
ondly, this kind of intimate strategy usage constructs them as highly capable of for-
mulating successful and current strategies that are in the forefront of development. It 
seems that they are already doing what the others are only intending to do. While they 
have done “a brilliant” job as visionary leaders, now it is time for the pragmatic side 
of strategy, implementation.  
The following extract is an example of how the militaristic macro-discourse can be 
used as resource in the intimate usage of strategy when discussing the strategy imple-
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mentation. Here the manager describes the strategy work at Industrial in terms of war 
rhetoric: 
”The role of a manager is to see the entirety, the battlefield. And sometimes you 
have to give resources to the pioneers so that they can build the bridge there be-
forehand; otherwise we can’t cross the river […]. The execution [of strategy] is 
like the Finnish offensive against the Soviet Union in the Second World War. It 
was the boys on the front line who shot the enemies, not the generals.” 
The war itself does not make this strategy usage intimate, but the context where the 
war is situated. The manager compares “strategy execution” at Industrial with the 
Finland’s role in the Second World War, which is one of the great narratives of mod-
ern Finnish history. The war fought against the Soviet Union is to many Finns a cul-
tural representation of morale, guts, and stout-heartedness in front of a gigantic en-
emy. It represents a patriotic survival battle that kept Finland independent, although 
the war itself was lost.  
Taking this context into account, comparison of the war fought by Finland and the 
strategy implementation at Industrial, is a rather brave discursive and rhetorical move. 
This usage hints that strategy requires the same kind of effort and morale as war. The 
tactic at hand also makes a distinction between “generals” and soldiers, referred to as 
“boys on the front line,” which is very typical of the militaristic macro-discourse. It is 
as if the manager positions him/herself among the heroic Finnish generals, command-
ing his/her troops in the very same war.  
The intimate tactic like this might be used for multiple purposes. Firstly, it definitely 
positions the manager in question as a powerful and capable actor in the strategy 
work. As a commander or general, he/she is able and capable of seeing the “whole 
battlefield” and it is in his/her power to give resources to “pioneers” who are strug-
gling on the “front line.” It may also be used to glorify the strategy work done in the 
organization. By comparing it to the war, it seasons the strategy with the discourse of 
honor and glory related to the military. The strategy usage like this is used to glorify 
managers. It constructs them as capable and competent to create perfectly valid strate-
gies and to implement them with their troops. Here, strategy is used as an epic narra-
tive that enables managers to build their self image as heroic managers and leaders in 
it.  
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE   
117 
5.4.2 “WHEN THE OWNER IS LIKE THIS” 
In the following, a manager uses strategy with the intimate tactic when constructing 
the current ownership of the Industrial. The tone of the usage is disappointed, frus-
trated and even bitter, to some extent: 
”[…] our strategy is pretty, could I say, reformist that would require patient in-
vestments from the owner for years. And now, all of a sudden, the owner 
changed its mind. We are a cash-flow-production-machine since they were un-
able to sell us. The owner’s support, which is very important during a time of a 
strategic change, is limping at the moment. When this owner is like this, we are 
not allowed to take risks. Well, what is this strategy for, then?” 
This manager would probably not use strategy like this in front of the board of the di-
rectors of Industrial. This is a piece of the intimate talk that illustrates Industrial diffi-
cult situation. The managers of Industrial have created a strategy that is “reformist” 
by nature, and hence the company is in a phase of the “strategic change” that would 
obviously require risk-taking. This is what the manger of Industrial would like to do. 
He/she would like to take his/her company to the next level, but is unable to do it be-
cause of the “limping” support from the owner.  
Overall, the tactic does not paint a particularly good picture of the owner or “this 
owner,” as the manager puts it. The owner has “changed its mind” suddenly, failed to 
“sell” Industrial, and is not “supporting” – either consciously or unconsciously – the 
management of Industrial in its efforts to change the company “strategically.” It has 
turned Industrial into a “cash-flow-production-machine.” It is like the company’s free 
will, the capability to determine its own strategic destiny, had been taken from it. It 
has been subjugated in the will of the owner. The manager is almost like trapped; 
“what is this strategy for, then?” he asks. 
The reference to the machine obviously means the mechanistic discourse, which is 
used here as a resource to construct and symbolize the current state of Industrial. In 
this usage tactic, the mechanism is something that is restricting and limiting by nature. 
It hinders the managers of Industrial from acting in the desired manner, positioning 
them as parts of the predefined strategy apparatus operated by the parent company. 
This is interesting since in the (re)production of strategy the mechanism was con-
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structed as a virtue that would ensure the swift strategy implementation and function-
ing of the company. It seems that the mechanism is constructed as a strength when it 
can be targeted at others, but as a weakness and limitation when it is targeted at the 
speaker him/herself.  
De Certeau (1988, xxi) uses the example of furnishing a rented apartment as a meta-
phor to clarify the activity of consumption. The metaphor is very fitting in the case of 
Industrial because of the prevailing ownership situation. As in the previous extract, 
the manager of Industrial is operating in terrain which is not his/her own. He/she is 
living in a rental apartment, the company is in a sense not his/her “own,” but belongs 
to the parent company, which is actually making the strategic decisions instead of 
him/her. He/she is frustrated with the situation. Although he/she has created the strat-
egy of his/her own, he/she is not able to implement it with a desired manner. In a 
metaphorical sense, he/she can furnish and re-refurnish the company with his/her 
strategy as he/she likes. But as he/she does not own the company, he/she cannot fully 
renovate it according to his/her own plan.  
However, although the managers of Industrial live in a rented apartment, why do they 
want to decorate it with their own strategy? Referring to the previous manager, “what 
is this strategy for, then?” Maybe it is for maneuvering. Maybe it is a practical ruse to 
secure the independence of Industrial. Maybe it is the means with which managers 
show that they still have some power over their organization.  
5.4.3  “YOU DON’T GET HELP AROUND HERE” 
The following talk shows how a manager uses strategy with the intimate tactic, paint-
ing a picture of loneliness and a lack of support felt in the strategy work: 
“Our plant is out like a snowman [from the strategy process].” 
“And starting a conversation here at Industrial is very difficult since you don’t 
have an opponent. […] The business units are some marketing people.” 
”[…] we got inputs from the business units, then we got inputs from the steering. 
It’s me who is mainly the only one [who receives this “input”] It’s of course nice 
that this is very independent, this job, when the steering is so incoherent. You get 
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to decide pretty much where to go. But actually, you don’t get a lot of real help 
around here. It’s actually disturbing, when you don’t get help. Such a clear strat-
egy is missing.” 
One word to describe the previous consumption would be loneliness. The manager is 
angry and frustrated because of not getting enough support and help in the strategy 
work. Firstly, he/she regards his/her unit as being an outsider (“out like a snowman,” 
a typical Finnish expression) with regard to the Industrial’s strategy process. Sec-
ondly, having “a conversation” seems to be hard for him/her since he/she lacks an 
“opponent” to talk to. Obviously, the people working in the business units are not ap-
propriate opponents since they are all “marketing people.” The manager also gets a 
lot of direction and “steering” from different sources, but is lacking “a clear strat-
egy” and thus feels him/herself lonely when not getting enough “help.”  
When in the instrumental usage, managers literally use strategy; here the manager 
constructs him/herself as a lonely rider, who is being used by the strategy. He/she 
feels left alone. It seems like he/she is dwelling in a foreign city that he/she neither 
knows nor has a map of. The humanistic macro-discourse is brought into the play 
when the manager discusses the lack of “help” and support. They refer to the needs of 
an individual. And finally, the pragmatic macro-discourse can be spotted in the desire 
for a “clear” strategy. The comment can also be read as a reference to the spiritual 
macro-discourse, since it discusses the issue of belonging to the wider entity, which 
the manager is clearly lacking here.  
5.4.4  “I’VE NEVER BOUGHT THE STRATEGY” 
The intimate tactic is also used for describing how the current strategy of Industrial 
does not match some parts of the company. The following extract shows how a man-
ager of Industrial reveals what he/she actually thinks of the company’s strategy: 
“I’ve never bought the strategy; neither will I buy it today. But then again, I 
think that maybe I can live with it, since it doesn’t influence this business a lot. 
Well, okay, this time.” 
The manager has not “bought” the strategy of Industrial. Here, buying is used as a 
synonym for adoption or acceptance of the strategy. “Never” refers to a rather strong 
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statement made by the manager, hinting that this particular strategy has never been the 
favorite of his/hers, and nor will it be, since he/she does not have any intention of 
buying it “today.” This kind of strategy usage is very intimate by nature. It is likely 
that this particular manager would not use strategy like this in front his/her own su-
pervisor or in front of the other managers. It almost sounds like he/she would secretly 
disassociate him/herself from the corporate strategy to wander his/her own paths, in 
de Certeau’s terms.  
However, the manager seems to know that a complete separation is not possible for 
him/her. He/she is still a manager of Industrial, who is expected to preach the gospel 
of strategy. However, he/she states that he/she “can live with” the strategy, since it 
“doesn’t influence” his/her “business a lot.” Here, strategy is something you can live 
with, but which you do not necessarily have to adopt or accept. It is almost treated 
like an instrument (like in the instrumental tactic), but this instrument is rarely used. 
The strategy does not influence the manager’s business a lot, which is good from 
his/her perspective.  
In the following, the same manager uses Industrial’s customer approach strategy as a 
something to dis-identify from:  
“We are in the state, where we have a sort of an intermediate phase strategy […] 
We clearly noted that we don’t understand what our customers do and what they 
want. So, we are unable to formulate a customer approach strategy yet. […] At 
this time we are a grocery store.” 
According to the manager, his/her unit is “unable to formulate a customer approach 
strategy” because it is a “grocery store” by nature. The term “grocery store” is used 
here as a contrast to customer-approach thinking. The manager is leading a unit that 
does not “understand” what their customers want and is thus unable to provide cus-
tomized tailor-made solutions to them. Here the manager uses strategy as a target to 
dis-identify from. He/she constructs it as something that is by far unfitting to his/her 
unit and is thus something to avoid. The comments could be read as references to the 
pragmatic macro-discourse. The first comment reflects a practical coping with the 
strategy, and the latter show how the coping is done in practice.  
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In this chapter, I have shown how the managers of Industrial have (re)produced the 
strategy as a management discipline and then used it tactically for their own purposes. 
Both the (re)production and usage of strategy used the macro-discourses of strategy as 
resources in this process. The strategy (re)production and usage and the macro-
discourses related to them are summarized in Table 9.  
TABLE 9 STRATEGY CONSUMPTION AT INDUSTRIAL  
I N D U S T R I A L 
(RE)PRODUCTION USAGE 
Strategy is a way or 
means to reach the vision 
or to win the war. (Spir & 
Mil) 
Strategy is created and 
executed through the 
systematic strategy proc-
ess. (Mec) 
Strategy concerns the 
entire personnel. (Hum & 
Prag) 
Instrumental: 
Managers use strategy to analyze and understand their business. (Hum & Mec) 
Managers use strategy to set targets and objectives. (Mec) 
Managers create sub-strategies to secure and ensure that their unit is in line with 
Industrial’s strategy and appears legitimized. (Hum & Mec) 
Managers use Industrial’s strategy as a loose framework, guideline, which leaves 
them room to maneuver with their own sub-strategies. (Prag) 
Playful: 
Managers question and joke about the role of Industrial’s headquarters and top man-
agement as central strategists. (Mec & Spir) 
Managers play with the cultural differences between different parts of Industrial, 
preventing it from operating coherently and realizing its strategy in a desired way. 
(Prag) 
Intimate: 
Managers use strategy to glorify themselves as strategic leaders. (Mil) 
Managers outline how they lack support in Industrial’s strategy process. (Hum & 
Prag) 
Managers dis-identify themselves from Industrial’s strategy, which does not concern 
them. (Prag) 
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6 POLYTECHNIC 
In Finland, higher education is provided by universities and polytechnics. While the 
universities have a long history in Finland and their status as higher education provid-
ers is institutionalized and strong, the system of polytechnics is still fairly new. The 
first polytechnics started to operate on a trial basis at the beginning of the 1990’s. The 
polytechnics are practically oriented and they train professionals in response to labor 
market needs and conduct research and development that supports and promotes re-
gional development, in particular. Polytechnics award professionally oriented higher 
education degrees (mainly bachelor’s degrees), which take 3.5 to 4.5 years to com-
plete. 
My second case organization, Polytechnic, is a multi sector polytechnic situated in a 
major Finnish city. It was established in the late 1990’s when different institutes of 
higher education maintained by the city were merged. Polytechnic is funded by the 
Finnish government and the City. The Government allocates resources to it in the 
form of core funding that is based on unit costs per student, project funding, and per-
formance-based funding. Polytechnic also has some external sources of funding.  
Although Polytechnic operates under the City Council and the Ministry of Education, 
it has autonomy in its internal affairs and it is managed by a board and a rector. The 
board members consist of staff, students, and business community representatives. 
The daily management of the organization is handled by the management team that 
consists of the rector, two vice rectors, faculty heads, and support function managers. 
Polytechnic is divided into three faculties, based on their teaching fields. The faculties 
are further divided into degree programs, of which there are dozens. The activities of 
Polytechnic are situated on different campuses around the City, and the faculties run 
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their education programs rather independently within the common frames, aims and 
regulations provided by the board and the Ministry of Education.  
The culture of Polytechnic is characterized as “bureaucratic” and inflexible by some, 
caused by the city administration and labor unions. Polytechnic is also characterized 
by many as “a young organization.” It seems that since its beginning, Polytechnic has 
undergone constant change. There have been lots of changes in its structure and even 
in the legislation that governs its activities. Some managers are afraid that the constant 
changes cause too much stress for the teachers and other staff and turn competent em-
ployees away. Some claim that the decision-making procedures are somehow blurred 
and that no-one is willing to take responsibility for the decisions that have been made 
at Polytechnic.  
The management board of Polytechnic plays a crucial role in its strategy work. Like at 
Industrial, strategy work at Polytechnic also follows a certain systematic annual strat-
egy cycle that includes milestones and tasks related to strategy. This process is owned 
by a development manager working under the rector. Once the strategy for the whole 
organization has been created, the faculties create their own sub-strategies based on it. 
Polytechnic’s strategy cycle has a close link to the budget cycle of the City Council, 
and Polytechnic is thus obligated to produce certain strategic plans that are discussed 
and reviewed at the City Council. In this way, the strategy is a sort of institutionalized 
must for Polytechnic; it is required by the financiers, legislators, and other authorities.  
However, it seems that the human relations between the members of the board are 
rather tense. There is apparently discord between the faculty heads and central ad-
ministration managers. The faculty heads criticize strategy-making for being overly 
administration-driven. Although they have attended the strategy-making sessions, 
they have noticed that the final outcomes are quite different from those agreed in the 
planning sessions. In de Certeau’s terms, they operate here in terrain which is not their 
own. The central administration managers represent the administration of Polytechnic, 
and according to faculty heads, this “central kitchen,” as they call it, tries to dominate 
everything, including them. In contrast, faculty heads represent the voice of the field 
work hard to secure and defend their limited resources and focus on running their own 
faculty. On the other hand, the administration managers claim that the faculty heads 
oppose all “coordination” that they are trying to provide. As a consequence, the at-
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mosphere in the strategic planning sessions has been poor. This schism between the 
center (administration) and periphery (faculties) of the organization is similar to In-
dustrial’s situation in some ways.  
6.1 STRATEGY (RE)PRODUCTION 
The (re)production of strategy seems to follow two paths at Polytechnic. The first 
stream (re)produces strategy as an agreed contract or “vision” between the personnel 
of the organization. In other words, it (re)produces strategy as a humanistic phenome-
non that requires the participation and involvement of the whole personnel and em-
phasizes Polytechnic’s nature as an expert organization. Secondly, strategy is con-
structed as something very pragmatic that should be taken to “the grass roots.” Here, 
the strategy (re)production gets a strong practical emphasis drawing on the pragmatic 
macro-discourse of strategy.  
6.1.1 TOOL FOR REALIZING VISION 
To begin with, this is a sample of the (re)production from the manager of Polytechnic. 
In this case, strategy means clearly a vision for him/her: 
”Well, for such a professional manager, they [strategies] are the most crucial 
tools. You must have the most inspiring vision. […] And in order to realize the 
vision, sorts of actions are derived from it, strategic ladders that are climbed up 
into the vision.” 
Here the manager constructs him/herself as a “professional manager.” For such a 
manager strategy is “the most crucial tool.” For what is this tool used? Strategy 
means “the most inspiring vision,” which is a reference to the spiritual discourse. 
Again, mechanism is brought into the play. Firstly, the word “tool” hints at the 
mechanistic discourse as well as the “strategic ladders” along which the vision is to 
be reached. Also the actions are “derived from” the vision. The mechanistic macro-
discourse is used here as a resource to add systematic flavor to otherwise spiritual 
comment, which talks about “vision.”  
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Here, the strategy (re)production is similar to that of Industrial in many ways, which 
is why I will deal with it rather quickly. Instead, I will focus on the next feature of 
(re)production, which regards strategy as an agreed contract within Polytechnic.  
6.1.2 AGREED CONTRACT  
The following dialogue produced in a pair interview by two managers of Polytechnic 
reveals an interesting struggle between the spiritual and humanistic macro-discourses.  
”Strategy as such doesn’t exist before there’s a sort of goal, vision. […] Not un-
til we all have a sufficiently unanimous picture of where we are going can we 
understand those strategic actions and decisions. […] In my opinion, the strat-
egy is a set of road signs.” 
“The whole personnel have to be involved in it.” 
”Yes, probably the personnel will get involved in it, but on the other hand, I think 
it’s the management’s responsibility […] A reasonable set of road signs […] 
how to proceed. […] The management needs to have wisdom to do it reasona-
bly.” 
”But let’s say that us, the whole personnel, should be able to see the common 
destination, because then you can get committed into those strategic targets.” 
”I think everyone has a bit same problem […] strategy can’t only belong to the 
management. I think that the management is responsible for it, but, indeed, it 
really has to belong to the whole work community.” 
In the beginning of the dialogue, the whole existence of strategy is said to be condi-
tional on the “vision.” This “unanimous picture” is required before the “strategic 
actions and decisions” are understood thoroughly. In a journey to the vision, the strat-
egy is “a set of road signs.” This is clearly a spiritual rhetoric derived from the spiri-
tual discourse. The management is (re)produced here to be in a responsible position 
liable for the direction. It almost seems that they are messianic leaders, who are lead-
ing their people to the Promised Land, a “common destination.” This duty of setting 
“reasonable road signs” for others to follow requires “wisdom.” This rhetoric reveals 
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the rather managerialistic nature of the spiritual discourse. It constructs managers as 
both wise and capable of leading the way for the others to follow.  
On the other hand, the humanistic macro-discourse is also intensively present in the 
dialogue. The success of strategy requires the involvement of the “whole personnel.” 
Strategy cannot belong only to the management, but has to belong to the whole work 
community, which is agreed by both managers. Here, strategy is constructed as some 
sort of shared vision. The humanistic macro-discourse is present here in a purer form 
than it was in the case of the Industrial’s strategy (re)production.  
The following comment from a manager of Polytechnic brings in the pragmatic dis-
course along with the humanistic talk: 
“I actually read the strategy as a sort of shared contract here within the poly-
technic.[…] But then, I have thought that somehow it should be made a common 
operations model, how it is taken to every level.” 
It is as of the manager suggests that the “shared contract” of strategy is not enough 
until it is taken to every level of the organization. Also, mechanism is present here 
when the manager states that strategy should be made “a common operations model.”  
6.1.3 EVERYDAY DECISION-MAKING  
The instrumental strategy (re)production at Polytechnic also has a very pragmatic em-
phasis. The next example outlines how the strategy should be considered when mak-
ing decisions: 
“I think that in the case of every decision making situation, we should reflect 
whether this decision leads in the right direction. Strategy isn’t realized as such, 
but it’s like the guidance of the everyday action.” 
The first comment is a piece of the pragmatic macro-discourse at its purest. According 
to it, the strategy should always be taken into account when decisions are made. This 
is how it “guides everyday action.” The first comment is also instrumental in the 
sense that it respects and adopts the spirit of the strategy instead of challenging it. 
Strategy literally “guides” action. The pragmatic macro-discourse is also used here as 
a resource to highlight the practical nature of Polytechnic’s strategy. It suggests that 
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the strategy should be considered to reflect “whether the direction is right” in every 
decision-making situation.  
Here, the pragmatic macro-discourse is used for the first time to take the strategy out 
of the platform and bring it to the “everyday” life of the members of the organization. 
What is also interesting here is the idea of how strategy is realized in the everyday 
actions of the people, and not as a separate matter.  
The strategy (re)production discussed earlier describes what strategy is and/or what it 
should be. At this point, we know how strategy appears to the managers of Polytech-
nic. Next, we will turn our attention to the usage of strategy by studying how the 
managers use strategy instrumentally, playfully, and intimately.  
6.2 USAGE: INSTRUMENTAL TACTIC 
The instrumental strategy usage at Polytechnic follows three different lines. Firstly, 
the managers of Polytechnic write strategies for the City Council and other stake-
holders to report and legitimize their activities. Here strategy is used as a separate pol-
icy-making procedure that does not have too much to do with the actual everyday 
work activities of the organization. Secondly, managers create strategies for improv-
ing and polishing Polytechnic’s brand for the public, thereby aiming to differentiate 
Polytechnic from its competitors. And thirdly, managers use strategy in their own 
units for their own purposes and intentions. This category represents internal strategy 
usage at Polytechnic.  
6.2.1 “ELEGANT STRATEGY PAPER” 
Polytechnic works under the Government and the City Council, who oversees and fi-
nances its activities. The faculties of Polytechnic are coordinated by the management 
board of the organization and the central administration, and the degree programs are 
controlled and steered by the faculties. It seems that at the Polytechnic level, strategy 
is used as a policy-making project to report and legitimatize its activities to the City 
Council, and the same spirit seems present in the faculties and degree programs. In the 
POLYTECHNIC   
128 
following, a faculty manager describes how Polytechnic’s strategy work is done an-
nually: 
“We have tried to systemize this job [strategy] quite far. […] There’s an annual 
cycle according to which certain things related to the strategy are done. […] 
And partly this thing is also controlled by the budget cycle of the city. […] We 
need to have certain plans at certain time of the year ready to be taken in city’s 
direction. And of course, it also defines those phases where strategy is reviewed. 
And not only the strategy review, but also the results are evaluated. […] At the 
moment, we have maybe created more plans.” 
Polytechnic’s strategy work is here described as a “systematic” procedure, or “job,” 
as the manager calls it, and that proceeds through the annual strategy “cycle.” This 
cycle seems to have a close connection to the procedures and timetables of the City 
Council, especially “budgeting,” which defines when Polytechnic should do “certain 
things.” As a consequence, Polytechnic is obligated to produce documents for the 
City Council, which reviews and evaluates its strategy and performance based on 
them.  
Strategy is clearly a tool for the managers (and Polytechnic) to report and legitimize 
their activities for different stakeholders. This kind of strategy usage represents bu-
reaucratic strategy usage in its purest form, which is done because of obligations and 
official rules. References to the mechanistic macro-discourse are also apparent in ex-
pressions such as “systematic” and “control” that refer to the formal and methodical 
style of doing strategy.  
However, it seems that the faculties imitate this manner of creating strategies and pro-
duce the same sorts of strategy papers for themselves. In the following, a manager 
tells how a strategy was created in his/her faculty: 
”We sat several days […] Then we produced the similar papers for the faculty, 
strategy and scorecard […] I think that it took too much time because it lasted 
more than a year all together.” 
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In the following, the same manager tells what happened to the strategy he/she de-
scribed previously: 
”Strategy is a focused operations model. The structure and the vision […] are 
related to it. During this period, strategy was built quite forcefully, and then it 
cascaded down step-by-step. But you could say that this fine construction has 
been buried under the organizational change […] The strategy has actually sort 
of disappeared. In a way, it appears that there’s no clear policy that would have 
been followed.” 
Two previous comments highlight one way of using strategy at Polytechnic. The in-
strumental tactic constructs strategy as a rather massive policy-making project done 
every once in a while by the managers of Polytechnic. The result of this project is 
strategy “papers.” These papers set a “vision” and “focused operations model” for 
the rest of the organization to follow. However, in this case it seems that this paper 
has been “buried” under other things such as the “organizational change.” This is 
interesting, since in many cases it is the strategy that dictates organizational change, 
and not the other way around as seems to be in this case. Nevertheless, at Polytechnic 
the strategy has “disappeared” and consequently there is no “clear policy to follow” 
anymore.  
But why are these strategy papers drafted if they do not guide the actions of Polytech-
nic? Maybe they are made to legitimize its activities for the City Council, legislators, 
and other stakeholders. It seems that when you have “strategy papers” you are a le-
gitimized and taken seriously as a player in the educational field. In the previous 
comments, the manager does not, however, seem to complain although he/she thinks 
that strategy making took too much time - “over one year.”  
The previous usage style is also an example of merging several different resources 
together. The mechanistic discourse is present when talking about the “scorecard,” 
“operations model,” and “structure.” The manager also mentions how at the begin-
ning the strategy “cascaded down step-by-step” in the organization. The spiritual dis-
course is used in the form of “visions” and “following.” And, the pragmatic discourse 
is also present at the end of the comment when the absence of “a clear policy” is 
brought up. 
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The following comments shed more light on how strategy work is done at Polytech-
nic. In the next quote, the manager makes a distinction between strategy and opera-
tions: 
”You easily get the idea that strategy work is done because it’s so elegant […] I 
think that there are two different things. There’s operative activity and there’s 
strategy.”  
In the next account, another manager complains how he/she has separated strategy 
from other activities: 
”Why I’m at least partly dissatisfied with my own activity is because the strategy 
work is a little separate box and these others have then been the other box.” 
The previous comments illustrate how strategy work at Polytechnic seems to follow 
its own logic and operative activities their own. Strategy work seems to include some 
sort of glamour or “elegance,” as the first manager highlights. This talk can be la-
beled as pragmatic, since it requires strategy to be more practical by nature. It also 
indirectly suggests that strategy should not be separated from the other activities of 
the managers.  
6.2.2  “IMAGE BUILDER” 
As mentioned above, the whole system of polytechnics is a rather new in Finland. 
And because there are several different providers of higher education in the City, 
where Polytechnic is situated, it competes with them for the best students. That is why 
the managers of Polytechnic use strategy to clarify and crystallize Polytechnic’s im-
age for the public, as the following example shows:  
“We have already succeeded quite well in image building […]. You see that it 
wasn’t useless, the strategy, to clarify the image. The search for students and all 
this proves that we are known and that this polytechnic system overall is so new 
that we have a lot to do so that we can differentiate from this big mass of educa-
tors.” 
Polytechnic is in the business of “image building” with the aim of “clarifying” its 
image for the public. The manager sees that the effort put into this has not been 
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wasted; vice versa it has been proved that it pays off in attracting students. Polytech-
nic has become “known” in the eyes of the public, which seems to be good, since 
there is a “mass of educators” that provides similar kind of education to that offered 
by Polytechnic. What is interesting here is that the strategy is used as a tool in promot-
ing and clarifying Polytechnic’s image and reputation. The manager also adds that 
more needs to be done in order to “differentiate” Polytechnic from the “big mass of 
educators.” 
The previous quote could be read as a sign of the pragmatic macro-discourse, since it 
follows a pragmatic spirit by aiming to clarify things for the public with the help of 
the strategy. Compared with the (re)production of strategy, strategy is used here in a 
rather creative and unexpected way. Strategy is no more an internal, agreed vision that 
guides the activities of the organizational members, but more likely something that is 
used for external purposes. Here, strategy appears as a fancy marketing device that 
managers use to attract desirable students and partners. Maybe strategy also appears to 
them as a marketing policy to follow.  
6.2.3  “STRATEGY – AT OUR OWN LANGUAGE” 
As mentioned earlier, the general strategy of Polytechnic is further translated into fac-
ulty-level strategies and plans by the faculty heads and their management teams. This 
is an interesting phase of Polytechnic’s strategy process, since here the faculty man-
agers play a crucial role in translating and crystallizing the strategy for their units. The 
following account describes how a manager of Polytechnic tries to concretize Poly-
technic’s strategy in his/her faculty at this phase of the strategy process: 
“Our success as a faculty here within Polytechnic is based on the fact that we 
have taken the strategies into the grass roots most consistently. These [strate-
gies] say people nothing. I’m the […] direction that is trying to take care that we 
would act according to the strategic objectives. We are trying to crystallize and 
explain the things Polytechnic is aiming at in our own language. And my duty is 
to see that Polytechnic’s aims are realized. But the ways of realizing and desti-
nations are such that our people can commit themselves to them from the bottom 
of their hearts.” 
POLYTECHNIC   
132 
The comment portrays a manager that is leading his/her faculty actively by translating 
the Polytechnic level strategy, which “says nothing” as such, to his/her own “peo-
ple.” This requires that the strategy is translated and “explained” in their “own lan-
guage.” Although the manager outlines that it is his/her “duty” to see that Polytech-
nic’s strategy is followed in his/her faculty, it seems that he/she might also take some 
liberties while translating it to his/her staff. As the strategy itself does not say any-
thing, he/she restates it in a form that touches his/her people. They commit to it “from 
the bottom of their hearts.”  
“Heart” is used here as a metaphor for deep commitment. It describes the deepest 
motives and intentions of an individual, and in this case the manager is willing to win 
his/her people’s hearts. This is rather strong rhetoric. The rhetoric has its roots in the 
spiritual discourse. Here, the manager appears as a charismatic leader, who is willing 
to touch his/her people’s inner world with the strategy, aiming to change the course of 
their life. It is obvious that it is not Polytechnic’s strategy that would have such an 
impact on the people, since it is trivial and empty by nature, but it is the manager 
him/herself who translates the strategy into such an inspiring and powerful asset. This 
might be read as a reference to the manager as a chosen leader. Also, the pragmatic 
macro-discourse is present in the manager’s comment. His/her unit’s “success” is 
based on the practical view of the strategy of consistently taking it to the “grass-
roots.”  
This kind of instrumental strategy use plies strategy as a loose framework, which al-
lows managers to use it quite independently for their own purposes. By tuning and 
shaping it, they re-create it and make it habitable for their units in a way that suits 
their ideas and thinking.  
6.2.4 “PROBLEM SOLVER” 
While the previous extract showed how managers might use Polytechnic’s strategy as 
a slack framework to create their own strategies to inspire people, here strategy is 
used in a more pragmatic way. In the following, a manager describes how strategy is 
used in his/her unit: 
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“The objectives of our faculty are derived from Polytechnic’s common objec-
tives. And especially, the reporting that we go through annually, and we try to 
specify the objectives and try to agree on the metrics […]. In a way, those Poly-
technic strategies are being translated in a catechistic way […]. And of course, 
different faculties have different kinds of problems. The biggest problems in our 
faculty are the dropouts. […]. And in that respect, the strategic objectives re-
lated to it […] are considered to be the most important by us. Again, [other] fac-
ulties have some other things.” 
At the beginning of the quote, the manager describes how the objectives of his/her 
unit are derived right from Polytechnic’s strategy. The metrics used to evaluate the 
objectives refer to the mechanistic macro-discourse of strategy. Also the spiritual 
macro-discourse is used when the manager describes how Polytechnic’s strategy is 
translated to his/her unit “in a catechistic way.” However, the main emphasis is put 
here on the rest of the quote, where the manager describes how strategy is used as an 
instrument to solve a problem particular for the manager and the unit in question, 
“dropping out.” The manager uses strategy to set “strategic objectives” related to 
that particular problem and these objectives are considered to be the most important in 
his/her unit.  
This example is a piece of the instrumental strategy usage that also departs from the 
(re)production of strategy. This kind of strategy usage is not visionary by nature nor 
does it seek to have an impact on people, on the first hand, but more likely focuses on 
the everyday struggles of an organization. Strategy is used to solve a problem and 
cope in the current situation. 
6.3 USAGE: PLAYFUL TACTIC 
The emphasis on playful strategy consumption at Polytechnic is rather critical and has 
two main targets. Firstly, it is used to criticize the poor quality of Polytechnic’s strat-
egy. Secondly, Polytechnic’s administration-driven strategy work and its mechanisms 
are criticized in a satirical manner. It seems that the playful strategy usage is largely 
due to the schism between Polytechnic’s administration and faculties, and it is mostly 
the faculty heads that target playfulness in Polytechnic’s strategy and strategy work. 
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This may indicate that they have no other choice than to joke and amuse them with 
the entire strategy.  
6.3.1  “HAVE YOU EVER SEEN ANYTHING SO MISERABLE?” 
The playful tactic criticizes the content of Polytechnic’s strategy. In the following a 
faculty manager shares his/her thoughts about it: 
“It’s quite hard to find strategies that would have a significant guiding impor-
tance. A paper flavor tends to remain in them, [they’re] really miserable. Have 
you ever seen anything as miserable as our strategy? They don’t tell people any-
thing.” 
“I believe that the most [of Polytechnic’s staff] are thinking that this kind of 
strategy we have at Polytechnic won’t get realized. It’s somehow unrealistic and 
like somewhere from Ufoland.” 
This playful rhetoric is based on the spiritual macro-discourse. According to the man-
ager, Polytechnic’s strategy is so “miserable” that it does not have significant “guid-
ing” importance for the organization and its people. As instrumental consumption 
outlined the role of strategy as a guiding principle, here the playful tactic makes satiric 
remarks about its quality. Indeed, Polytechnic’s “unrealistic” strategy would appear 
to be from “Ufoland.”  
In the next quote, the same manager brings out how strategy creation at Polytechnic 
has been an exhaustive process and taken a lot of time and effort: 
”We’ve had such situation here that this strategy work has actually never ended 
here. This has been forced for two years now and several shelves have been 
filled with different kinds of papers in which strategy is changed back and forth. 
With that respect, communicating it [strategy] has been difficult because you ha-
ven’t known what the final version is.”  
While the instrumental tactic consumed strategy as a massive policy making project 
aiming to produce strategy papers, here it is joked about playfully. “Several shelves 
have been filled with” different kinds of strategy papers and the strategy work seems 
to travel back and forth. The manager considers strategy communication “difficult” 
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because he/she does not know what the final version of strategy actually is. This kind 
of strategy usage is targeted against the content of Polytechnic’s strategy and the 
process where it was created and formulated.  
6.3.2 “RIDICULOUS ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS” 
The following comment is a hilarious example of playful rhetoric using satiric talk to 
build a point of view: 
”The rewarding system and strategy have no sufficient connection. That’s a 
pretty big problem, in my opinion. Whether you do it or not, you always get a 
sanction. Or those who don’t, they never get sanctions. And those who prevent 
strategy from being realizing, in fact they get rewarded.” 
This is a mechanistic talk in a sense that it discusses the systems and procedures re-
lated to the strategy. The manager criticizes the missing connection between the strat-
egy and rewarding by joking about the rewarding criteria. Here, contradictions are 
used as rhetorical resources: the manager says that “you always get a sanction.” 
He/she also adds that those who “prevent strategy from being realizing” are re-
warded. In other words, he/she says that there is no benefit from realizing strategy in 
one’s work. Instead, you may be better rewarded if you do not follow the strategy.  
In the following example, a middle manager outlines how different strategic practices 
are imposed on him/her and how the managers are obligated to use them although 
they do not find them useful. The strategic practices are consumed in a very critical 
manner: 
”[…] we have the EFQM, clearly a system taken from the industry […] It’s suit-
able for a sausage factory […] People take evaluation like ‘OK this is a kind of 
bullshit again, let’s fix this now’ […]. Those indicators are ridiculous. We laugh 
at them once we write them down. It makes no sense at all that the management 
of Polytechnic gives us strategic targets, and then there’s these foolish metrics. 
[…] We laugh our heads off at them but we still do it.” 
Here, the playful criticism is targeted at the quality system EFQM, which is used at 
Polytechnic to produce review data. The manager seems to find this system rather irri-
tating and obviously inappropriate for Polytechnic. The system, following her words, 
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is suitable for “a sausage factory,” not for the polytechnic. This is a lively compari-
son. Sausage factory is used here to illustrate something totally different than Poly-
technic. It says that Polytechnic is not a production factory, but a professional organi-
zation that operates with anything but mass production logic. However, it is reviewed 
with mechanisms that are adopted from industry.  
This statement also constructs Polytechnic’s management in a pretty ridiculous light. 
The system at hand is theirs, and not that of the middle managers, who are “laugh-
ing,” and thereby showing disrespect and a lack of confidence in the management 
when forced to use “the foolish metrics.” While “people” are forced to participate in 
the evaluation they consider it “bullshit.” This kind of rhetoric is clearly used for the 
purpose of carnevalization. It seeks to criticize the Polytechnic administration and 
make fun of it.  
6.4 USAGE: INTIMATE TACTIC 
The intimate strategy consumption at Polytechnic is used for three purposes. Firstly, it 
highlights how the managers are quick to ignore the strategy if they consider it inap-
propriate. Secondly, the intimate usage tactic reveals how the managers use some 
“semi-illegal” tricks to cope with it. And thirdly, intimate consumption discloses 
some internal contradictions present at Polytechnic that hinder its strategy work.  
6.4.1  “IT’S LIKE A SEMI-ILLEGAL ACTION” 
In the following, a manager of Polytechnic describes a practical ruse that he/she has 
done when coping with the strategy. This is an interesting notion of intimate talk. The 
manager reveals something that would get him/her into trouble if it were to be made 
public. While confessing something intimate about his/her activity in the strategy 
process, the manger also constructs his/her identity and subjectivity. 
“It’s like a semi-illegal action that you can enable something. […] Our re-
sources to do it, well we don’t actually have them. Then, we have to build those 
resources sort of semi-illegally from the educational recourses. […] So, then I 
internally rig and build those recourses there. And I’m not allowed to make a 
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public announcement of it, because otherwise I would get an admonition. […] 
But I hope that this won’t end up in there [report], since I would get caught.” 
The manager has taken action that he/she characterizes as a “semi-illegal” in Poly-
technic’s strategy process. If he/she were to be caught red-handed, he/she would get 
an “admonition.” And this is just “an example” of the kind of activity which hints 
that this kind of action is not an individual case but more likely activity that is vital 
accomplishing things the proper manner. This activity is resistance against the current 
structures of Polytechnic. However, it is silent resistance; creative usage that takes 
place in the midst of Polytechnic and obeys the official rules or procedures. It almost 
sounds like this kind of activity is obligatory, an everyday practicality needed to cope 
with the strategy.  
In the following, a manager of Polytechnic seems to be speaking in the same tone: 
“We have a desire to work in a certain manner that would support our strategic 
targets. Some pretty rigid bureaucratic operational modes are related to the city 
organization. In practice, they prevent us from working smartly. It’s related to 
the central sectors of the polytechnic, that is, the external cooperation. […] Let’s 
say that if you want to act in a way that the partners don’t regard as odd by us, 
then you have to do something that’s actually not permissible. But then after-
wards, you notice that was quite wise to do so.” 
The mechanistic discourse is used here as an obstacle for the managers to act accord-
ing to the strategy. “Bureaucratic operational modes” prevent “smart” action. In or-
der to act in a way that is socially acceptable to the “external” partners, you need to 
act in ways that are not “permissible” by the organizational rules. This account con-
structs a contradiction between the strategy and Polytechnic’s structure. These struc-
tures almost disturb the individual, making him/her look ridiculous and “odd” in the 
eyes of external partners. Here managers are like lonely riders who are trying to sur-
vive in the midst of the system. They compete against the system. They perform 
clever tricks to outsmart the strategy system. They bend the rules and take some risks. 
However, they do not make too much noise about it, otherwise they would end up in 
trouble.  
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6.4.2 “SIDELINED AND INTIMIDATED” 
The humanistic accounts in the strategy (re)production outlined the nature of Poly-
technic’s strategy as “a shared contract” among the personnel of the organization. 
This ideal of unity is questioned here, as the managers of Polytechnic describe how 
they have been mistreated in the organization’s strategy process. In the following, a 
faculty head gives an account of how he/she was persuaded to use the strategy: 
Of course I know it [Polytechnic’s strategy] quite well, because I have had to 
swallow it. […] Probably some persons of the management, who have been re-
sponsible for the strategy process, say that it has been the management team that 
has created it together. But is has been shoved down your throat, given to you 
ready-made. You have learned here over the years that they are not worth ques-
tioning. You’ll just get revenge for your faculty.” 
This intimate rhetoric describes how the strategy has been forced on the manager, 
“shoved down” his/her throat, as he/she puts it. The manager also hints how the par-
ties responsible for the strategy process may give a false idea that the strategy has 
been done “together,” while it has actually been provided “ready-made.” The quote 
becomes even more grotesque when the manager says that the opponents of strategy 
will get their revenge if they dare question the strategy.  
In the following, this idea is supported, when another faculty head gives an intimate 
description of his/her and his/her colleagues’ role in Polytechnic’s strategy work.  
“Faculty heads, who are involved in it [strategy work] kind of alongside their 
actual management duty […]. Preparation has been done at the development 
unit. So, maybe there have been some contradictions and, of course, the personal 
relations haven’t been [the best ones]. So, maybe it has disturbed and inter-
rupted the [strategy] working. It has been pulled too much from one direction. 
[…] The other faculty heads are exactly in the same situation. They haven’t had 
so much time to invest in this [strategy work]. And thus the ones responsible for 
creating the strategy, they have not just taken care of it, but have also taken it in 
their own direction.” 
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In the following, the same manager continues the previous thoughts: 
”That whose voice is heard there mostly? It hasn’t been any from the faculties 
but other participants […]. It’s related to personal chemistry, that the work at-
mosphere hasn’t been the best possible. […] There’s been quarreling [over the 
strategy]. Although I feel that I haven’t participated in it. […] Confrontations 
between people have disturbed the [entire strategy] working.” 
Here, the humanistic discourse is consumed as a means of describing the poor “per-
sonal relations” of Polytechnic’s top managers and the role of the faculty heads in the 
strategy work of organization. Humanism is present in this talk through the words 
such “personal relations” and “personal chemistry.” Clearly, strategy is a task ac-
complished by humans through their mutual interaction. However, in this intimate talk 
the interaction does not work in the desired manner. It seems that there are “confron-
tations” and some “quarreling” over the content of the strategy among the managers. 
The poor “personal relationships” among the top managers interrupts and disturbs 
the strategy work done in the organization. The faculty head also complains about 
how his/her and his/her colleagues’ contribution to the strategy, the contribution of 
those who are “involved” in strategy work “alongside” their actual “management 
duty,” has somehow been ignored. The administration, and in this case “the develop-
ment unit,” has taken care of the strategy work and its preparation and also taken the 
strategy “to their own direction.” This seems to irritate the faculty heads who are all 
in “exactly” the same situation, according to the manager. The strategy “has been 
pulled too much from” the development unit, it is their “voice” that dominates the 
strategy work.  
What is also interesting in this account is how the manager describes strategy as 
something that the faculty heads do “alongside” their actual management duty. So, 
strategy is not their management duty, but some separate part of it. It almost sounds 
like strategy is their hobby. This intimate talk is used to portray strategy as something 
the administration of Polytechnic is doing instead of the faculty heads, who are more 
or less bystanders in this process. Here, strategy is manifested to managers as a source 
of intimidation and sidelining. They are no longer capable of using it as an instrument 
nor will they joke about it, since they have been almost hurt and offended in the strat-
egy work.  
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6.4.3 “IT’S LIKE SOME STUPID THING” 
Strategy (re)production constructed Polytechnic’s strategy as a sort of an agreed con-
tract within the organization. In the following, a manager of Polytechnic describes 
how he/she takes strategy. It appears that this strategy contract does not include 
him/her. 
”If there’s some [strategic target] that doesn’t suit [me], I don’t necessarily care 
about it [the target]. We don’t have any sort of supreme strategy controller here 
that would control. […] For me, it’s not a big problem, since I just don’t react to 
it [strategy]. It’s like some stupid thing.” 
This is rather strong intimate strategy consumption. The manager, drawing on the 
mechanistic macro-discourse, passes the strategy and its relevance for his/her skill-
fully. Mechanistic discourse is present here, when the manager mentions the “su-
preme strategy controller” that does not control the execution of strategy at Polytech-
nic. Due to this, when strategy does not “suit” him/her or his/her unit, he/she does not 
“care about it.” The manager also reveals that for him/her strategy is a “stupid 
thing.” This comment paints a picture of an organization that does not care too much 
about whether strategy is taken seriously. Here, the strategy does not concern the 
manager. He/she is above strategy, and not affected by it. He/she constructs 
him/herself to be free as a bird and strategy as a problem that does not include 
him/her.  
This chapter has discussed how the managers of Polytechnic have (re)produced and 
used strategy with the means of the macro-discourses of strategy. The strategy 
(re)production and usage and the macro-discourses related to them are summarized in 
Table 10.  
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TABLE 10 STRATEGY CONSUMPTION AT POLYTECHNIC 
P O L Y T E C H N I C 
(RE)PRODUCTION USAGE 
Strategy means realizing 
the inspired vision. Strat-
egy is ladders or road signs 
that lead to the vision. (Spir 
& Mec) 
Strategy, as an agreed con-
tract, requires participation 
and involvement of the 
entire personnel. (Hum) 
Strategy is pragmatic and 
should be taken to the grass 
roots, where everyday deci-
sions are made. (Prag) 
Instrumental: 
Managers produce elegant strategy papers for the City Council to legitimize and 
report the organization’s activities as an administrative task. (Mec, Spir & Prag) 
Managers use strategy to differentiate Polytechnic from its competitors and im-
prove its brand. (Prag) 
Managers use strategy to build commitment and involvement in their own units. 
(Prag, Hum & Spir) 
Managers use strategy to solve problems in their own units. (Mec & Prag) 
Playful: 
Managers regard Polytechnic’s strategy as poor in quality. (Spir) 
Managers construct administration-driven strategy work and its mechanisms as 
unsuitable and ridiculous for Polytechnic. (Mec) 
Intimate: 
Managers take risks and use semi-illegal tricks to cope and maneuver with Poly-
technic‘s strategy. (Prag & Mec) 
Managers feel themselves intimidated, sidelined and dominated in Polytechnic’s 
strategy work. (Hum) 
Managers pass and ignore Polytechnic’s strategy swiftly when considering it un-
suitable for themselves. (Mec) 
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7 INSURANCE COMPANY 
Insurance company (henceforth Insurance), my third case organization, is a Finnish 
service organization that provides a wide range of insurance services to its customers 
in different customer segments. The services are produced mainly at the headquarters 
of the company, while market operations like marketing, selling and customer service 
are conducted by the customer service organization spread across the business area. 
Although Insurance is known in the industry for its rather conservative growth strat-
egy, the recent years have been financially very successful for it. During the last 18 
years, the company has improved its profit record annually. Thus, some are afraid that 
this unparalleled success might have made people feel too “comfortable,” which may 
prevent further changing and development.  
Many employees of Insurance call its culture participatory and conversational by na-
ture. People actually call it a “Swedish” organization, referring to a common belief 
that Swedish organizations are by nature participatory and democratic. Being conver-
sational means that there are lots of different meetings and forums at Insurance and its 
decision-making tends to be consensus-driven. However, some argue that there is too 
much discussion and participation in Insurance, causing slowness and inefficiency.  
Insurance has a reputation for being a good employer. The firm tops the Best place to 
work charts regularly. The saying goes that it has never laid people off for financial 
reasons. Although it may not pay the best wages in the industry, it provides some 
fairly generous job-based benefits to its employees, according to some managers. At 
Insurance, jobs are lasting and many people have worked for the company all their 
working life. Overall, people seem to be satisfied with working for Insurance.  
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Like at Industrial and Polytechnic, strategy-making at Insurance is driven by the com-
pany-wide procedures, consisting of a strategy process that is structuring and schedul-
ing strategy-making, and a strategy workbook that advices executives on how to cre-
ate their own unit-specific strategies. Because of the company structure, many strate-
gies co-exist in the organization simultaneously and the procedures aim at congruence 
between them.  
Insurance’s strategy is created for a three-year span, although it is reviewed every 
third month by the top management to find out whether it is still valid. After the cor-
porate strategy has been created, Insurance’s subunits and companies create their own 
strategies and plans based on it. After the strategies have been devised, they are real-
ized and assessed with the Balanced Score Card method. This kind of company-wide 
strategy process at Insurance is considered both a strength and a weakness. On the one 
hand, it may provide consistency and structure, but on the other hand, some consider 
it too heavy and abstract. The newly described content of Insurance’s strategy high-
lights customer focus. According to it, Insurance wants to provide sustainable solu-
tions for its customers to improve their wellbeing. Here, as well as in the case of In-
dustrial, the company wants to transform itself into a solutions provider, instead of 
being a mere product-oriented company.  
The main artifact of Insurance’s strategy is a PowerPoint document that describes the 
company’s vision, strategic intent and values. This document was written on purpose 
in an elevated and abstract style to evoke strategic thinking at the lower levels of the 
company and to encourage them to surpass themselves. Many managers of Insurance 
feel that they can identify themselves with Insurance’s strategy, since they believe that 
it genuinely aims at improving customers’ life. However, critics say that the strategy 
is too abstract and grandiose and that it can mean almost anything.  
Due to the participatory culture, employees of Insurance are often invited to partici-
pate and influence the strategy work in different phases of the strategy process. Strat-
egy communication is also regarded as a crucial element of the strategy implementa-
tion at Insurance. The organization has, for instance, arranged company-wide strategy 
seminars for the whole personnel at the ice hockey arenas and fair centers, wherein 
the strategy has been launched and illustrated. Insurance has a wide intranet that is 
used for many purposes, including strategy communication. For instance, during the 
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last strategy period, the strategy was illustrated by cartoon figures, which were widely 
used as symbols of the new strategy and they were placed all over the intranet. Even 
the PC screensavers were programmed to show them. The company also provides 
employees with various strategy booklets, where the strategy is discussed and illus-
trated.  
Although at first glance Insurance seems to be a remarkably happy organization in 
terms of its organizational culture and way of operating, there are some contradictions 
and disagreements under its calm surface. Like at Industrial and Polytechnic, there 
seem to be differences at Insurance between the “center” and “periphery”, here the 
headquarters and customer service unit. The headquarters of Insurance is rather large 
and thus it also has a great influence on Insurance’s culture and operations. At the 
headquarters, many people are proud of being “Insurance people” and consider them-
selves to be at the core of the organization. The customer service unit, on the other 
hand, being fragmented and spread across the business area, is more loosely coupled 
to the center and thus operates more independently. The people who work for the 
sales organization are more critical towards the headquarters and its ideals than the 
people who work at the headquarters. 
7.1 STRATEGY (RE)PRODUCTION 
At Insurance, the (re)production of strategy follows rather closely the same lines as in 
the case of Industrial and Polytechnic. Here, strategy is described as a direction or 
means that shows the way toward the desired destination or vision. At Insurance, 
strategy is also given a strong pragmatic emphasis by highlighting that it should be a 
concrete part of everyday work activities at Insurance.  
7.1.1 DIRECTION AND CONDITIONS 
Firstly, Insurance’s strategy is (re)produced as a direction and conditions that guide 
the actions of Insurance. In the following, a manager from Insurance describes his/her 
view of strategy by using an illustrative example: 
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”It [strategy] is a pipeline in the direction we want to move in, and what actions 
are wanted. […] I’ve heard a terrific example […] of how a sort of flight of mi-
gratory-birds flies. Well, there are two guidelines. Take the direction from the 
sun, and don’t collide with others. That illustrates strategy quite well. The strat-
egy is not for telling that now it’s time to flap your wings, flap the wing up, and 
flap the wing down. But strategy is about telling that this is the direction and 
then the conditions that keep you from colliding with a friend.” 
At the beginning of the comment, the mechanistic discourse rears its head. Accord-
ingly, strategy is a “pipeline” for the desired destination and direction. After that, the 
manager shares an example that compares strategy to the “flight of migratory-birds,” 
which contains two “guidelines:” head for the “sun” and do not “collide with a 
friend.” In line with this, the manager considers strategy as a something that gives the 
company and people, the “birds,” a general direction, instead of detailed advice on 
how to act in certain situations. Strategy is a rather loose framework that includes 
some conditions, but that allows individuals to act and behave in their own ways – as 
long as they remain in the “pipeline.” The following comments from two other man-
agers confirm this idea: 
“Strategy is choices of what we do, where are we heading, and how do we get 
there.” 
”In strategy, you think further, that where are we heading and what actions are 
done.” 
It is interesting that the previous comments from two different managers are almost 
exactly the same. Strategy is something that defines both the direction of the company 
and the means to get there. It answers the questions “where we are heading” and 
“how do we get there.” This kind of rhetoric is also a manifestation of the pragmatic 
macro-discourse, which highlights concreteness and clearness in strategy work. Here, 
strategy is something that guides the everyday actions of the organization by provid-
ing it with a direction and means to get there. There is also some sort of a reference to 
the spiritual macro-discourse, which discusses the journey to the chosen vision.  
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7.1.2 CONCRETE PART OF EVERYDAY LIFE  
While the previous way of (re)producing strategy treated strategy as a rather loose vi-
sion that provides liberties to the people who follow it, here strategy gets a more 
pragmatic emphasis. This is an example of how the pragmatic discourse that is very 
dominant in the (re)production of strategy, is used at Insurance. In the following 
quotes, the pragmatic discourse is rather obvious:  
”That would try to bring it [strategy] to everyday action, to everyday life in some 
way. But it should be a natural way. That it should not be an unnatural way.” 
“That it [strategy] would be taken to the most concrete level possible, so that the 
individual seller understands what this means ’in my life.‘ That it wouldn’t re-
main somebody else’s thing. This is everyone’s thing, and this brings benefits for 
the customers, for us, as well as for the company.” 
”There [in strategy] are still such fancy words, that what is the message to your 
own unit. That what would it mean in practice, in your own work? That it won’t 
be experienced as some separate thing, some [of the] things made up by the 
bosses.” 
The first comment is a call to take the strategy to the everyday life of the people. 
Here, strategy is clearly considered something that belongs to everyone in the organi-
zation. As can be seen, the strategy (re)production by drawing on the pragmatic 
macro-discourse can be quite normative, even demanding by nature. According to the 
comments, “everyone” should understand what strategy means in their “life;” it 
sounds almost like strategy is something more than just a management discipline. This 
could also be interpreted as a reference to the spiritual macro-discourse. The second 
comment emphasizes the importance of concreteness in strategy work. Even “an indi-
vidual seller” should be able to understand what strategy means in his/her life. Strat-
egy should also belong to everyone, it is “everyone’s thing,” like the manager con-
cludes. Again, strategy should not be a separate “thing” or “things made up by the 
bosses,” referring to the top management of Insurance, but a part of the “everyday 
action” of individuals. The third comment grasps the abstract and general language of 
Insurance’s strategy. The manager acknowledges that there are “fancy words” in the 
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strategy documents and insists that these words be concretized when taken to different 
units and their people.  
As can be seen, there is a certain contradiction present in Insurance’s strategy 
(re)production. On the one hand, there are comments that construct strategy as a gen-
eral guideline that does not even aim at providing practical and everyday advice on 
how to operate, and on the other hand, there is evidence that the strong pragmatic dis-
course insist on a pragmatic approach to strategy. This is by no means an accident 
considering the abstract nature of Insurance’s strategy.  
Now strategy has been (re)produced by the managers of Insurance. Based on it, we 
know how strategy is considered by them at a general level. Next, the other element of 
the strategy consumption process, strategy usage, is discussed.  
7.2 USAGE: INSTRUMENTAL TACTIC 
It seems that at Insurance strategy is applied instrumentally mainly for three purposes. 
Firstly, managers carry out strategy as company’s intent that they concretize and sell 
to their subordinates. This activity is considered to be a part of their duty and job as 
managers, which at the end of the day also benefits them. Here strategy is used as a 
deliverable of company’s intent. Secondly, strategy appears to managers as a source 
of meaningfulness and purpose, which they take forward to their subordinates. Strat-
egy is employed as a means to make subordinates’ everyday work meaningful and 
purposeful. And thirdly, managers take strategy as a device to build and establish le-
gitimacy for the decisions and choices that have been made.  
7.2.1  “INTENT THAT IS CONCRETIZED AND SOLD” 
The first element of the instrumental strategy consumption at Insurance is an example 
of a rather non-personal strategy usage. Here, strategy is treated as an embodiment of 
Insurance’s intent, which managers execute. It seems that Insurance’s intent is almost 
incarnated in the strategy, and managers apply this instrument to carry the intent fur-
ther. Strategy is a managerial deliverable that managers take further, which they con-
sider to be their basic job. Managers are almost like waiters and waitresses of the 
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strategy serving it to their subordinates. The following examples outline how owner-
ship of the strategy belongs to the management of Insurance. Strategy is mostly their 
intent and the managers sell this intent forward.  
“But it [strategy] is the company way to take things further into some direction. 
[…] When it’s top-down, the strategy [is] done up there and then we act so that 
things would get realized. In other words, [strategy is] management’s clear in-
tent and we execute it. That’s our purpose.” 
”The company has some policy that is being sold […]. My job is based on that.” 
”Of course, the strategic choices are made at the house level. And then they are 
considered very carefully right at the team level, that what does this mean for 
our work and how do we notice it.” 
In the previous comments, the strategy is clearly regarded as something that belongs 
to the company, the “house.” Strategy is “the company way, policy, or vision” or 
“management’s clear intent.” It is as if the managers wash their hands of the content 
of the strategy and put their effort solely into its execution. This is no surprise, since 
strategies are made “up there,” and then executed by the middle managers and their 
teams. The managers’ job is to “sell” the strategic intent of the company to their sub-
ordinates. The emphasis in this talk is put on the execution of the strategy in a clear 
and concrete way, which suggests the pragmatic macro-discourse. Also, the mecha-
nism could be spotted from here, as the managers talk about a rather straightforward 
execution of the strategy. They almost seem to consider themselves part of a strategy 
machine.  
The term “intent,” which is used here, stems from the strategy documents of Insur-
ance. The most crucial strategy document of Insurance describes the strategic intent of 
the company at a rather general and abstract level, and it is this intent that the manag-
ers are selling here. Obviously, the managers conclude that this intent belongs to the 
“management,” not to them, which is interesting to note.  
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7.2.2  “THE BRINGER OF MEANINGFULNESS” 
The second element of Insurance’s strategy usage considers strategy as a source of 
meaningfulness and purpose that managers use to justify their everyday work both to 
themselves and to their subordinates. Here strategy is a framework or outline that pro-
vides a reason for the work activities of Insurance. The following quotes show how 
this kind of an instrumental use is constructed by the managers:  
“Why we do like this, what does that mean now, and what for […]. Whenever it’s 
possible, you reflect it to strategy. So, although we talk about an individual 
change, it has always a greater meaning. Like why is this done right now.” 
“Well, I think [that] everything needs to have a purpose and reason and expla-
nation for why we do it, what we do, and where we are heading. […] This [strat-
egy] gives a sort of framework for everything. It clarifies. If we didn’t have a 
clue, we would be quite lost.” 
In the first quote, the manager brings out how he/she uses strategy as a mirror to “re-
flect” things, such as changes, to it. Even “an individual change” needs to have “a 
greater meaning,” as he/she puts it. For him/her, strategy seems to explain and justify 
why something has to be done “right now,” and this brings “meaning” and purpose 
for him/her. The second comment follows the previous thought. The manager outlines 
how strategy provides a framework for everything, including what is being done and 
why, and where the organization is heading. Here, strategy is used as a “reason” and 
“explanation” for why things are done in a certain manner. Strategy provides a clue 
for the work activities of the organization, and without it “we would be lost,” the 
manager concludes. Here, the manager uses strategy as an instrument to increase the 
meaningfulness felt by the subordinates.  
This kind of strategy use stems from both the humanistic and spiritual macro-
discourses. On one hand, the comments could be interpreted as humanistic statements 
emphasizing the meaningfulness felt by an individual in the strategy process. On the 
other hand, this kind of talk could also be read as a call for a deeper purpose and 
meaningfulness, almost like the meaning of one’s life, which stems from the spiritual 
macro-discourse.  
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7.2.3  “JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DECISIONS AND CHOICES” 
In the following, the instrumental strategy use gets a pragmatic emphasis as the man-
agers use it as a justification for the choices and decisions that have been made. Here, 
the managers use Insurance’s strategy as a means to justify and legitimize the choices 
and decisions that have been made. In a way, strategy is used as a back-up to cover 
and secure managers’ actions. Here, a manager describes how he/she uses strategy in 
his/her work to justify decisions and choices:  
“Especially, if an employee criticizes why something has to be done, ‘this kind of 
strange thing’, I’ll bring out the strategy angle or say that this is related to this 
part of the strategy […]. I’ll base it on the strategy […]. That you have a justifi-
cation for why you bring up some matter. That you can justify it and stand be-
hind it. Probably team members will get a feeling that this was an important 
thing now, when there was such justification. For me, it [strategy] is justifica-
tions and support for the things that I take further.” 
“If we think about practical examples, how we deal with something. If I need to 
tell a bigger crowd about some decision, for instance with e-mail, I say that this 
is the way we operate […] that why we operate like this now […] and those 
things involved in our strategy are also included.” 
The manager uses strategy as the instrument to justify and legitimize the message 
he/she delivers to his/her subordinates. When the subordinates “criticize” something 
that needs to be done in face-to face interaction, strategy provides a “justification” or 
“base” for him/her to deal with such resistance. On his/her words, he/she brings “the 
strategy angle” and relates the decision to Insurance’s strategy. Also, when the man-
ager needs to “tell a bigger crowd about some decision” with e-mail, he/she “in-
cludes things involved” in the strategy in his/her message.  
Here strategy also allows the manager to stand behind the decisions him/herself. 
He/she seem to use strategy as a “support” for him/her. Strategy is also regarded as 
something that is “important.” The manager brings out how his/her subordinates will 
regard something as an important issue when he/she justifies it with the strategy. It 
seems that the manager uses strategy like this more or less on a daily basis. With this 
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kind of a usage tactic, the strategy appears as an everyday justification for the deci-
sions and choices.  
7.3 USAGE: PLAYFUL TACTIC 
The playful strategy usage at Insurance is by nature very critical. The playful critique 
is used for three different purposes. Firstly, the abstract content of Insurance’s strat-
egy is joked about. Secondly, Insurance’s top management’s and headquarters’ roles 
and abilities are questioned with a satiric and ironic rhetoric. And thirdly, the methods 
used as the symbols and tools in Insurance’s strategy communication are criticized. 
7.3.1 “BIBLICAL COMMANDMENT AND THE CATECHISM” 
As mentioned, Insurance’s strategic intent is formulated on purpose in a rather ab-
stract and general way to encourage people to surpass themselves. Or, this is at least 
what the top management hopes for. However, the content of strategy and abstract-
ness of strategy arouses a lot of astonishment and criticism among the middle manag-
ers of Insurance. In the following extract from an interview, a manager of Insurance 
outlines how the company’s strategy is by nature abstract and complex: 
“In my opinion, the great process has been over-emphasized at Insurance. It 
produces good looking PowerPoints, but if you ask what this means in people’s 
everyday life, those strategy writers can’t give you an answer. This is said quite 
harshly, but I think there’s no use in giving you answers related to our religion 
[…]. If it’s so that there’s strategy, and then there’s strategy communication as a 
separate thing, it raises the question of whether the strategy is so difficult and 
complicated that you have to create a separate process for explaining it. […] It 
[communication] should be baked into the strategy so that we don’t have a cate-
chism, that here’s the biblical commandment and then what does it mean, a very 
long explanation. […] You somehow get the feeling that you say things elegantly 
so the managers understand it, and then you tell a different story so the common 
people will understand.” 
The previous comment obviously has a spiritual underpinning in it. The corporate cul-
ture of Insurance is called “our religion,” hinting that at Insurance people tend to give 
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certain answers that are in line with the company ethos or belief system. In this case, 
the manager clearly rebels against this code of conduct and reveals some “harsh” 
facts that he/she has to know. But what is included in Insurance’s religion? Maybe the 
“over-emphasized” strategy process that produces beautifully made PowerPoint slides 
that do not have much to do with the “everyday life” of Insurance’s people. The cen-
tral figures in this process are the “strategy writers,” who do not seem to know what 
they have written even themselves. The spiritual macro-discourse is also present when 
the manager compares Insurance’s strategy to a “biblical commandment” and the 
strategy communication to the “catechism” that explains the spirit and letter of the 
commands. However, the manager does not regard this as a good thing, since it sort of 
separates “the managers” capable of understanding the “elegant” strategy from the 
“common people,” who hear “a different story.”  
Here the same manager also outlines how the company values are by nature very am-
biguous: 
“For instance, these values that the company has, there’s a sort of amusement, 
that everyone interprets them as they want. Entrepreneurship, which is our 
value, if we try to tell the Insurance people what the entrepreneurship means for 
your and for your work […]. For some it’s some damned kind of trading, for 
some it’s risk taking, for some it means that you can try whatever you want. Very 
different things.” 
The manager finds Insurance’s values, which are considered to be at the core of its 
strategy by many, “amusing,” since they can be interpreted so differently by the peo-
ple. The humanistic macro-discourse is used here as a resource to illustrate that the 
meaning of values is constructed individually. The value of “entrepreneurship,” for 
instance, can be taken in many ways according to the manager. This kind of a strategy 
use suggests that Insurance’s strategy work is some sort of nonsense that does not 
have a close relation to the everyday activities of the organization. The company val-
ues are vague rhetoric, and the strategies wordmongering. The manager him/herself 
somehow zigzags in the midst of all this. It is almost as if he/she is throwing up 
his/her hands in the air and saying that there is nothing he/she can do anymore. And 
clearly, he/she does not feel much ownership for strategy of this kind.  
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7.3.2 “OH NO, DID I PUSH THE WRONG BUTTON?” 
Although the strategy work at Insurance seems to be rather open by nature, and the 
people who are willing may take part in it, it seems to be still personified in the top 
management of the company. Their role as strategist is, however, anything but un-
questioned. In the following, a manager gives a satirical example of how the top man-
agement of Insurance communicates strategy to others and what the manager himself 
thinks of it: 
”When the top management is presenting these [strategies], they are very bound 
to the [PowerPoint] slides. They don’t dare to take any of their own space there. 
[…] They proceed according to these slides and they are nervous whether ‘I 
pushed the right button so that the following sliding text would certainly come 
next’. Or ‘Did I push [it] too many times, since the sort of text appeared and the 
arrow points into that direction?’ Well, that shows that it’s not their own thing 
that they’re talking about there.” 
The previous comment does not give a particularly good picture of Insurance’s top 
management. On the contrary, it actually suggests that they are like marionettes per-
forming strategy rituals. In this example, the top managers seem to be more interested 
in knowing whether they are able to use PowerPoint in the right way, than the content 
of the strategy. The managers do not “dare to take any of their own space there,” 
concludes the manager. He also makes a guess that the strategy is not “their matter.” 
This is an interesting mention, since one would easily think that the strategy is in the 
top management’s possession. But in this case, it seems that it is neither the speaker 
himself nor the top management of Insurance who own it. Instead, it is some third 
source that has ownership, and the top management is just repeating it mechanically. 
In the following, the same manager sheds more light on this by drawing on the spiri-
tual macro-discourse:  
“But when you read bullet points from the paper, it says that you are witnessing 
some article of faith and you are afraid to use the wrong words.” 
The top managers of Insurance seem to be “witnessing some article of faith.” This is 
clearly spiritual rhetoric comparing strategy to religious belief. The manager con-
sumes the spiritual macro-discourse in an ironic manner to outline how corny and ri-
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diculous the top management appears to him/her with regard to the strategy. When the 
strategy is communicated in this way, it is something that is not worth taking seri-
ously. It is like a serious joke, a comic play presented by the top management that the 
employees are invited to watch from time to time. However, this play is not about im-
provisation. It seems that there is a certain script to follow, even the top managers are 
“afraid to use the wrong words” with regard to strategy.  
7.3.3 “COME ALONG, GHOST!” 
The playful strategy usage brings out the differences and contradictions that exist be-
tween different parts of Insurance. In the following comments, a contradiction is con-
structed between the headquarters and sales organization of Insurance:  
“When we sit at some meeting, where me and my colleagues are talking about 
these things [strategy], and when the company tells us that ‘This is the way we 
want to operate’ somebody asks ‘How do you intend to do it in our area?.’ 
‘Come along and show us the model there!’.” 
“When I compose different kinds of presentations, I generally even outline it on 
purpose. When I picture headquarters, I usually draw a ghost there. I really 
drive them [headquarters and sales organization] apart from each other, but its 
purpose is just to entertain.” 
This is interesting and playful talk from the manager of Insurance’s sales organiza-
tion. The talk is in contrast to the common view that Insurance is a consensus driven 
organization, first and foremost. The previous comments create a clear tension be-
tween the headquarters and a sales organization at Insurance. In the first quote, the 
manager illustrates how he/she and his/her colleagues tend to question the strategic 
direction received from the headquarters, referred as the “company.” It seems that the 
manager considers the ‘company people’ as sort of strategy theorists, who are eager to 
present their ideas and “models,” but who leave the practical realization to the sales 
people, which is the most difficult part of the plan. Thus, the sales managers say to the 
“company” managers: “Come along and show” how this works in our area! This is 
an indication of the pragmatic macro-discourse.  
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The second comment outlines how the sales manager maintains and creates the ten-
sion between the headquarters and sales organization on purpose. In his/her own pres-
entations, he/she pictures the headquarters as a “ghost.” In this way he/she “drives 
them apart from each other.” And he/she does it just for the purpose of “entertain-
ment.” This is playful strategy consumption, indeed, with the aim of picturing Insur-
ance’s strategy as headquarters’ “model” that does not have too much to do with the 
everyday work of the sales people. The only ones who take strategy seriously are the 
representatives from the headquarters. This could be read as a way of showing silent 
and cynical resistance towards the strategy and Insurance’s headquarters.  
7.3.4 “MAO’S LITTLE RED BOOK” 
As mentioned earlier, Insurance has put a lot of effort into producing the strategy 
communication material and tools for promoting strategy and to make it an everyday 
matter in the organization. There are managers who consider this “brainwashing ma-
terial” something useful when adopting the strategy, but to some it appears more like 
propaganda. Here, a manager plays with this issue interestingly: 
“When the new employees arrive and when the new strategy period begins, a 
sort of strategy booklet is delivered to every employee [of Insurance]. It was like 
Mao’s Red Book.”  
Here, the manager compares the strategy communication material that Insurance pro-
vides for its employees with Mao Zedong’s Little Red Book. The book published by 
the People’s Republic of China in the 1960s contained Chairman Mao’s quotations 
and ideas with the purpose of transforming Chinese society. Every Chinese was to 
own and carry this iconic book. During the Cultural Revolution it was standard prac-
tice to study and read the book at all work units in China during working hours. It was 
argued that Mao’s thesis would bring enlightenment to work.  
Comparing strategy to Mao’s book is a quite clever discursive move from the man-
ager. In a way, the red book was also a ’strategic’ tool to change the Chinese people 
and society just like Insurance’s strategy is an attempt to change Insurance’s people 
and working culture. By distributing “the strategy booklet” to every employee of In-
surance and requiring people to read it, the management of Insurance engages in the 
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same kind of a practice as the Chinese government. By comparing Insurance’s strat-
egy booklet to the Little Red Book of Mao, the manager also hints that Insurance’s 
strategy has an ideological slant like the Chinese Cultural Revolution did.  
The purpose of this kind of playful strategy use is obviously to ridicule and criticize 
Insurance’s top management and strategy. Here, the manager uses strategy to entertain 
him/herself although he/she is unable to escape or resist it totally. This kind of strat-
egy use does not produce any concrete outcomes for the manager, but establishes and 
maintains his/her identity as a sort of guerilla manager, who dares to resist the strat-
egy. 
7.4 USAGE: INTIMATE TACTIC 
The intimate strategy usage at Insurance has three elements. Firstly, managers use 
strategy to describe their commitment and devotion to Insurance’s strategy. Here 
managers’ existence is tied closely to the strategy, almost as if they would sacrifice 
themselves for it. Secondly, managers use strategy to outline their helplessness and 
incapability in front of it. This can be read as a sign of vulnerability and fragility in 
their existence with regard to strategy. And thirdly, managers use this tactic to dis-
indentify themselves from the strategy by revealing how they secretly silence it and 
ignore some institutionalized and compulsory practices of it. Here strategy is used as a 
counterpoint of their identity; strategy is anything but their thing. 
7.4.1  “WE BRAINWASH OURSELVES” 
Many managers of Insurance outline how they have to understand company’s strategy 
before they are able to communicate it further to their own subordinates and act as 
proper supervisors. Also, many managers genuinely believe in Insurance’s strategy 
since they think that it benefits their customers and helps their lives. Hence, they 
commit themselves to the strategy. Here a manager explains what this means in 
his/her case: 
“Well, I think that my role is, firstly, to buy the story [strategy] and perceive my 
own role as a realizer of the strategy. […] We got a strategy workbook and those 
INSURANCE COMPANY   
157 
playing cards and […] all these screensavers that some call brainwashing mate-
rial. […] But I consider these good for adopting the thing [strategy]. […] It 
[strategy] is sort of brainwashed to your subconscious. […] The whole system of 
ours has swallowed the hook [strategy] pretty well.” 
In the previous comment the manager uses strategy with the intimate manner by con-
cluding that he/she has to “buy” the strategy and perceive his/her “own role” in it. 
He/she consider his/her role to be that of “realizer,” which refers to the pragmatic 
macro-discourse. The manager also tells how some call the material created for ensur-
ing the strategy communication as a “brainwashing material” but how he/she consid-
ers it good and fitting for him/her to adopt the strategy. It is interesting how he/she 
also states that the strategy has been “brainwashed to your subconscious,” and how 
the organization has “swallowed the hook” of the strategy effectively. This sounds 
violent, almost like the managers have been somehow indoctrinated with the strategy.  
Here another manager continues how he/she takes Insurance’s strategy: 
“I feel that during the every three year time span [a strategy period at Insur-
ance] we brainwash ourselves to believe strongly that this is a good strategy. 
That it’s easy to speak of it from the bottom of your heart.” 
The manager uses the same term, “brainwashing,” to describe the process how strat-
egy is adopted him/her. Unlike in the case of the first manager, this manager brain-
washes him/herself to believe in the strategy and its goodness. This process appears to 
be collective since the manager says that “we” brainwash “ourselves” to believe in 
the strategy. Again, this sounds like the manager is not sure about the quality of the 
strategy, but that he/she would make him/herself to “believe” in it. If he/she would 
not believe in it, he/she could not speak of it wholeheartedly. Here the spiritual 
macro-discourse is used rather obviously. The strategy is clearly constructed as a 
spiritual phenomenon that requires faith and followers. The manager is in the position 
of spreading the strategy gospel further, which is why he/she needs to have a personal 
relationship with it.  
Here, the managers devote and commit themselves to the strategy. They take it to 
their “heart” and even to the “subconscious” to be able to act according to it. The 
strategy appears to be a sort of transcendental phenomenon, which makes them to 
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submit themselves to it. They voluntarily relinquish their own will to the strategy and 
let the strategy guide them. It seems that they either genuinely believe in the goodness 
of the strategy, or either fear not to act according to it.  
7.4.2 “FAITH IN STRATEGY” 
Here, a manager again devotes him/herself to strategy. The spiritual macro-discourse 
constructs strategy as a matter of faith, outlining the personal belief in it. The follow-
ing extract is an example of the intimate usage of strategy in this respect. In it, the 
manager constructs strategy almost as a spiritual experience for him/her while dis-
cussing his/her relationship to strategy:  
”Well, from my opinion it requires that you have faith in the strategy, then every-
thing else comes with it. […] But if you don’t believe in it, you won’t get people 
excited. The one who talks [about strategy] has to be an Insurance people. […] I 
got the faith, and I believe that the majority of our management team got it, 
we’ve come here straight from the school and we’ve been brainwashed with it. 
We’ve had a very good supervisor, who has brought us up to be the Insurance 
people. […] But not everyone has that faith.” 
The beginning of the quotation reveals the spiritual underpinning of this comment. 
The manager regards faith as a crucial antecedent of strategy communication. When 
you “believe” in strategy, “everything comes with it.” But if you do not believe in it, 
you do not “get people excited” about it. Also, in order to speak about the strategy, 
you need to be an “Insurance people.” But how has he/she got the faith in Insurance’s 
strategy? He/she has joined the company right after the school and been “brain-
washed” to believe in the strategy. A central actor in this brainwashing process has 
been his/her previous supervisor. The supervisor is produced as a charismatic and 
powerful, almost like a godly figure that has “brought up” the manager and his/her 
colleagues as true believers of Insurance and its strategy. Despite his/her own faith, 
the manager, however, doubts that not all “have faith” in Insurance. This hints that 
the true faith in Insurance’s strategy is only possessed by a few of the faithful such as 
him/herself.  
This is a lively example of the intimate usage tactic. Here, strategy is not an instru-
ment that is used as a managerial tool, but obviously a spiritual experience that is by 
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nature very personal. This is the kind of talk that reveals a manager’s own personal, 
intimate feelings towards strategy. Strategy gets under his/her skin. It may be no sur-
prise that this kind of the intimate tactic is used in Insurance, as the company is 
known for its long-term careers and loyal employees. As the managers put it, they 
have grown up to be “the Insurance people.” The manager constructs him/herself 
definitely as a part of a family or community, which he/she has been brought up to. 
He/she belongs to the company. 
7.4.3 “I HAVE NO IDEA” 
Previously, the intimate strategy usage treated the strategy as something that the man-
agers have to adopt themselves. It was referred as the “brainwashing” and “swallow-
ing the hook.” Now, the intimate strategy usage reveals that the content of Insurance’s 
strategy is so general, difficult and abstract that the managers find it hard to under-
stand and communicate further. Thus, they feel themselves helpless in front of it. In 
the following, a manager tells how he/she feels him/herself insecure and hesitant 
about the strategy in some occasions:  
”And when you communicate it [strategy], people wait for something concrete 
right at the beginning. […] That how it is realized and how it really differenti-
ates us from our competitors. […] Sometimes you’d want to say that actually I 
don’t know. That, this is a quite sticky position.” 
“When I’ve communicated [strategy] at our advisory board meetings […] There 
was a discussion that all the insurance companies are doing the exactly same, 
that what makes the difference. […] It made me feel uncertain that what do I an-
swer to that.” 
The manager has been in the situations where he/she has been asked to concretize and 
crystallize Insurance’s strategy. He/she had found it difficult, admitting that he/she did 
not know the answer. It made him/her feel “uncertain.” The manager understands 
that this is a “sticky position,” since the employees would like to know how the strat-
egy will be “realized” and how it “differentiates” Insurance from its competitors. 
According to the manager, Insurance’s strategy does not answer these questions, or at 
least he/she has not found the answer in it.  
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In the following, a manager describes how Insurance’s strategy is constructed through 
two languages in the organization: 
”We sort of speak at two levels. We have an official strategy language, which is 
difficult to understand, pretty PowerPoints. And then the […] everyday life […], 
where you try to cope with the strains, those objectives that are given, and that 
you try to fulfill. […] I think that quite many of us managers in the field build 
their own stories, which are hopefully based on the strategy. But maybe some-
times you feel a bit homespun, that how do I understand these strategies.” 
Here, the distinction is produced between the strategy and “the everyday life.” The 
“official strategy language,” as the manager described it, is documented in the form 
of the PowerPoint slides and is “difficult to understand.” On the contrary, everyday 
life is full of strains and challenges that you cope with. The manager positions 
him/herself as one of the “field managers,” who tell their “own stories” based “hope-
fully” on Insurance’s strategy. The manager feels him/herself “homespun,” somehow 
as an outsider compared with the world of strategy that he/she is obligated to commu-
nicate. He/she follows his/her own paths and hopes that the story he/she has “built” is 
legitimized in the wider organizational context. The pragmatic macro-discourse can 
be sensed here. The manager is clearly more sympathetic to the everyday life of peo-
ple than the difficult PowerPoint presentations discussing Insurance’s strategy. He/she 
is saying that Insurance’s strategy does not reach the employee level of the company. 
He/she also admits that the strategy is unclear to him/her as well, which makes 
him/her feel insecure and helpless.  
7.4.4 “I’M NOT MOTIVATED BY IT” 
While in the previous streams the intimate strategy usage had a seemingly positive 
attitude towards Insurance’s strategy, in the following the strategy is resisted. Here, a 
manager talks about how he/she takes strategy and his/her own role in it: 
“I have this professional job here at the background, so I haven’t had any meet-
ings where I would have talked about the strategy to my subordinates, and I 
won’t be very happy to do it. […] I don’t consider it an appropriate task for me. 
I rather talk about math, not about the strategy.” 
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“I haven’t gone through it [strategy]. And I’m not that deeply motivated about it 
that I would go through it. These professional tasks appeal me more. That I want 
to go through them, not the strategy, necessarily.” 
“I’d probably go against it and I’d think that I’m not a right person […] And I 
do think that it’s perhaps a quite prevailing phenomenon here at Insurance, and 
probably elsewhere as well, that there aren’t many eager Messiahs here, who 
want and [who] are eager to talk about the strategy.” 
The manager clearly dis-identifies him/herself from the strategy of Insurance. Al-
though the top management of Insurance, at least implicitly, expects that the other 
managers will communicate the strategy to their own subordinates, here the manager 
rejects doing it on purpose. The manager regards the role of strategy communicator as 
“messianic,” referring to the spiritual macro-discourse. The manager says that he 
rather talks “about math” than the strategy, since he/she does not concern the strategy 
communication as “an appropriate task” for him/her. The manager also says that 
he/she has not gone “through” the strategy and neither will he/she do it, since the 
strategy does not motivate him/her. It is the “professional tasks” that appear as more 
appealing to him/her. So, in other words he/she indentifies him/herself more with 
his/her profession than the strategy as a managerial device. 
In the following, another manager discusses about how he/she considers a practice 
related to the strategy implementation at Insurance:  
“Well, I take the score card […] That’s one thing that I should have done. I think 
that I haven’t done it even once during this three year time period although it 
should have been done always. […] But it is not something that would influence 
my working anyway. […] I’d probably get fired if someone heard about this 
[laughs].” 
The manager reveals how he/she has not filled “the score card” (referring to the Bal-
anced Score Card of Insurance) even once during the last three years, although he/she 
should have done it. The manager considers the score card as something that does not 
influence his/her working a lot. However, he/she is aware that ignoring this practice 
so intentionally may cause him/her some harm. “I’d probably get fired if someone 
heard about this,” he/she says and laughs.  
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Here the managers dis-identify themselves from the strategy by silencing it and ignor-
ing some practices related to it. They do not consider strategy meaningful or impor-
tant for themselves in any way. They position themselves in opposite to the strategy. 
This kind of intimate strategy usage reveals how strategy is resisted and silenced qui-
etly and tacitly in the organizational life. It questions and challenges the ideals 
(re)produced previously that emphasized how strategy should belong to everyone in 
the organization by ignoring strategy on purpose.  
This chapter has discussed how the managers of Insurance have (re)produced and 
used strategy. The strategy (re)production and usage and the macro-discourses related 
to them are summarized in Table 11.  
TABLE 11 STRATEGY CONSUMPTION AT INSURANCE 
I N S U R A N C E 
(RE)PRODUCTION USAGE 
Strategy describes the vi-
sion or intent Insurance 
aims at. (Spir) 
Strategy sets conditions on 
how the company proceeds 
to the vision. (Mec & Spir) 
Strategy should be a coher-
ent part of everyday life at 
Insurance. (Prag) 
Instrumental: 
Managers use Insurance’s strategy as an intent that they concretize and execute as 
a part of their job as managers. (Prag & Mec) 
Managers use Insurance’s strategy as a tool to motivate and inspire their subordi-
nates. (Hum & Spir) 
Managers use Insurance’s strategy as a means to justify and legitimize choices and 
decisions. (Prag) 
Playful: 
Managers amuse themselves by joking about the abstract content of Insurance’s 
strategy. (Spir) 
Managers ridicule the role of Insurance’s top management and headquarters in 
strategy. (Prag & Spir) 
Managers parody the methods used as symbols and tools in Insurance’s strategy 
communication. (Spir) 
Intimate: 
Managers devote and submit themselves to Insurance’s strategy. (Spir & Mil) 
Managers feel themselves helpless and incapable in front of Insurance’s strategy. 
(Prag) 
Managers dis-identify themselves from Insurance’s strategy by silencing it and 
ignoring some of its practices. (Prag) 
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8 DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the key findings of this work and evaluates their theoretical 
relevance. I seek to make a twofold contribution to the existing literature. Firstly, I 
will discuss the results from the perspective of the practice approach to strategy by 
showing how strategy consumption integrates the macro and micro-levels of strategy 
practice. Secondly, I will reflect on the results from the perspective of the discursive 
strategy view by discussing and illustrating the discursive nature of strategy consump-
tion.  
8.1 STRATEGY CONSUMPTION: CONNECTING MICRO TO 
MACRO 
The practice approach to strategy seeks to understand how strategy is practiced in or-
ganizations. More precisely, it has urged us to study the practice of strategy both at 
intra and extra-organizational levels (Whittington 2006). In other words, it has called 
for research that would uncover the relation between the institutionalized, socially de-
fined modes of doing strategy, and the actions of strategy practitioners in organiza-
tions that are influenced by these socially accepted codes (Jarzabkowski et al. 2007).  
In this work, my intent has been to bridge this gap by studying the use of strategy. I 
have applied the thinking of de Certeau (1988) to show how strategy, as an institu-
tionalized management discipline, is practiced, that is consumed, by the managers in 
three case organizations. As a result, I have shown how the two context-specific and 
embedded discursive practices of strategy consumption, the (re)production and usage, 
are closely connected to the macro-level strategy discourses present in the wider strat-
egy and management literature (for a summary, see Tables 12 and 13). By showing 
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this interconnection, I have demonstrated how managers, as strategy practitioners, 
consume and use different macro discourses of strategy. I have also shown what ele-
ments ((re)production and usage) and styles (instrumental, playful and intimate tac-
tics) compose a strategy consumption trajectory. 
Although de Certeau’s ideas are familiar within the practice-oriented research com-
munity, there are not too many empirical works that would have applied his ideas to 
explain how strategy is practiced (cf. De La Ville & Mounoud 2003). The findings of 
this work contribute to the practice approach to strategy not only by integrating the 
gap between the extra and intra-organizational approaches to strategy practice, but 
also by deepening our understanding of how strategy is practiced in organizations. 
They show that strategy may be consumed and used by managers in more creative and 
improvisatory ways than the previous, namely rational-oriented, strategy research has 
shown.  
TABLE 12 STRATEGY (RE)PRODUCTION AT CASE ORGANIZATIONS 
DISCURSIVE 
PRACTICE 
INDUSTRIAL POLYTECHNIC INSURANCE 
(RE)PRODUCTION Strategy is a way or means 
to reach the vision or to win 
the war. (Spir & Mil) 
Strategy is created and exe-
cuted through the systematic 
strategy process (Mec) 
Strategy concerns the entire 
personnel. (Hum & Prag) 
Strategy means realizing the 
inspired vision. Strategy is 
ladders or road signs that 
lead to the vision. (Spir & 
Mec) 
Strategy, as an agreed con-
tract, requires participation 
and involvement of the en-
tire personnel. (Hum) 
Strategy is pragmatic and 
that should be taken to the 
grass roots, where everyday 
decisions are being made. 
(Prag) 
Strategy describes the vision 
or intent Insurance aims at. 
(Spir) 
Strategy sets conditions on 
how the company proceeds 
to the vision. (Mec & Spir) 
Strategy should be a coher-
ent part of everyday life at 
Insurance. (Prag) 
 
Jarzabkowski (2004) introduced the concept of “management practices-in-use” to 
explain and describe how institutionalized practices, such as strategy, can be used in 
ways that may not comply with the original purpose of practice. The strategy usage 
illustrated in this work sheds light on the use of strategy practices by pointing out how 
strategy is practiced by managers with improvisatory and adaptive manners for their 
contextual and situational needs. For instance, when using strategy instrumentally, 
managers analyze their business environment, set targets and objectives (Industrial), 
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and try to position their organization into the market (Polytechnic). Here their strategy 
usage reminds the rational strategy approach in various ways (cf. Chandler 1962). 
However, in other parts, mangers seem to use strategy instrumentally for totally dif-
ferent purposes than the rational ethos would have suggested. For instance, the legiti-
mization aspect (Knights & Morgan 1991) seems to be acute in every case organiza-
tion, as strategy provides the managers with the means to secure their back and le-
gitimize their work. At Polytechnic and Insurance, managers apply strategy instru-
mentally to motivate their subordinates. Strategy seems to offer them a device that 
connects their work with that of their subordinates to the objectives and higher level 
purposes of their organization.  
Although strategy is acknowledged ((re)produced) as a management discipline rather 
unanimously in different case organizations, the way it is used by the managers in 
their everyday life is very context-specific and largely based on their individual needs. 
This finding shows that strategy is an indefinite and versatile (and maybe even pre-
carious) practice for managers, and that they use and “poach” this practice in multiple 
ways and with multiple means that may even depart from the ideals that they them-
selves attach to it. (Whittington 2003.) Different kinds of ideals and models (macro-
discourses) can be used creatively by managers, depending on their prevailing situa-
tion and needs. For instance, at Industrial strategy is treated as a loose framework that 
allows managers to maneuver with their own sub strategies (cf. Laine & Vaara 2007). 
At Polytechnic, managers perform some semi-illegal actions and tricks in order to 
cope with strategy in their everyday work. They also use strategy to solve major prob-
lems in their units by labeling them strategic. These findings show how strategic ac-
tions of managers may not arise from the intended and intentional strategies, as the 
purely rational thought would suggest, but on the contrary, they emerge through the 
everyday “practical coping” and “dwelling” of the managers when things are labeled 
and regarded as strategic (Chia & Holt 2006, 2009). This is also in line with the ideas 
of the processual strategy approach (cf. Mintzberg & Waters 1985).  
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TABLE 13 STRATEGY USAGE IN CASE ORGANIZATIONS 
DISCURSIVE 
PRACTICE 
INDUSTRIAL POLYTECHNIC INSURANCE 
USAGE:  
INSTRUMENTAL 
TACTIC 
Managers use strategy to 
analyze and understand their 
business. (Hum & Mec) 
Managers use strategy to set 
targets and objectives. (Mec) 
Managers create sub-
strategies to secure and en-
sure that their unit is in line 
with Industrial’s strategy and 
appears legitimized. (Hum & 
Mec) 
Managers use Industrial’s 
strategy as a loose frame-
work, guideline, which 
leaves them room to maneu-
ver with their own sub-
strategies. (Prag) 
Managers produce elegant 
strategy papers for the City 
Council to legitimize and 
report organization’s activi-
ties as an administrative task. 
(Mec, Spir & Prag) 
Managers use strategy to 
differentiate Polytechnic 
from its competitors and 
improve its brand. (Prag) 
Managers use strategy to 
build commitment and in-
volvement in their own units. 
(Prag, Hum & Spir) 
Managers use strategy to 
solve problems in their own 
units. (Mec & Prag) 
Managers use Insurance’s 
strategy as an intent that they 
concretize and execute as a 
part of their job as managers. 
(Prag & Mec) 
Managers use Insurance’s 
strategy as a tool to motivate 
and inspire their subordi-
nates. (Hum & Spir) 
Managers use Insurance’s 
strategy as a means to justify 
and legitimize choices and 
decisions. (Prag) 
USAGE:  
PLAYFUL TACTIC 
Managers question and joke 
about the role of Industrial’s 
headquarters and top man-
agement as central strate-
gists. (Mec & Spir) 
Managers play with the cul-
tural differences between 
different parts of Industrial, 
preventing it from operating 
coherently and realizing its 
strategy in a desired way. 
(Prag) 
Managers regard Polytech-
nic’s strategy as poor in 
quality. (Spir) 
Managers construct admini-
stration-driven strategy work 
and its mechanisms as un-
suitable and ridiculous for 
Polytechnic. (Mec) 
Managers amuse themselves 
by joking about the abstract 
content of Insurance’s strat-
egy. (Spir) 
Managers ridicule the role of 
Insurance’s top management 
and headquarters in strategy. 
(Prag & Spir) 
Managers parody the meth-
ods used as symbols and 
tools in Insurance’s strategy 
communication. (Spir) 
USAGE:  
INTIMATE TACTIC 
Managers use strategy to 
glorify themselves as strate-
gic leaders. (Mil) 
Managers outline how they 
lack support in Industrial’s 
strategy process. (Hum & 
Prag) 
Managers dis-identify them-
selves from Industrial’s strat-
egy that does not concern 
them. (Prag) 
Managers take risks and use 
some half illegal tricks in 
order to cope and maneuver 
with Polytechnic‘s strategy. 
(Prag & Mec) 
Managers feel themselves 
intimidated, sidelined and 
dominated in Polytechnic’s 
strategy work. (Hum) 
Managers pass and ignore 
Polytechnic’s strategy 
swiftly when considering it 
unsuitable for themselves. 
(Mec) 
Managers devote and submit 
themselves to Insurance’s 
strategy. (Spir & Mil) 
Managers feel themselves 
helpless and incapable in 
front of Insurance’s strategy. 
(Prag) 
Managers dis-identify them-
selves from Insurance’s 
strategy by silencing it and 
ignoring some of its prac-
tices. (Prag) 
 
To some extent, the whole idea of studying strategy usage like this contains and ex-
presses a flavor of irony (Whittington 2007) by focusing on the neglected side of 
strategy practice. The rational, and to some extent, also the processual strategy ap-
proach have not paid enough concern to this kind of individuality in strategizing. This 
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kind of individual activity may often be by-passed or ignored as trivial or nonsense or 
it may remain totally unseen, since it is often hidden and scattered within the existing 
structures and routines. The irony lies in the fact that strategy is (re)produced and ac-
knowledged in one way and later used differently, as the results of this work showed. 
Again, macro-discourses of strategy can be used very ambiguously. They may say one 
thing, and mean something totally different. For instance, the mechanistic macro-
discourse can be used to either describe efficient mechanisms of strategy or to ridicule 
those very same systems harshly.  
Table 14 summarizes the contribution of this work to the practice approach to strat-
egy. The column on the left indicates the findings of prior research, and the column on 
the right defines how the results of this work seek to contribute to those findings.  
TABLE 14 SUMMARY OF THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE PRACTICE-ORIENTED STRATEGY RESEARCH 
PRACTICE APPROACH CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
Strategy work that is 
done in organizations is 
influenced and guided by 
socially defined modes, 
established by the strat-
egy industry. A research 
approach that integrates 
these micro and macro-
levels of strategy practice 
is thus needed. (Jarzab-
kowski et al. 2007; Whit-
tington 2003, 2006, 
2007). 
Strategy, as an institutionalized management discipline, is practiced, consumed (de 
Certeau 1988), by the managers in three case organizations. The two context-specific 
and embedded micro-level discursive practices of strategy consumption, 
(re)production and usage, are closely connected to the macro-level strategy dis-
courses present in the wider strategy and management literature.  
The integrative strategy consumption process deepens our understanding of how 
strategy is practiced in organizations. The finding contributes to the practice ap-
proach to strategy by connecting the gap between the extra and intra-organizational 
approaches to strategy practice and by showing what strategy consumption is in prac-
tice (Whittington 2003, 2006). The results show that strategy may be consumed and 
used in more creative, improvisatory and contextual ways than the previous, namely 
rational-oriented, strategy research has shown. 
Strategic practices are 
used in creative ways by 
practitioners (Whittington 
2003; Jarzabkowski 
2004). 
The strategy use of managers is context-specific and largely based on their individual 
and situational needs. The instrumental usage tactic uses strategy as an instrument to 
perform different managerial duties. The playful usage tactic does not do anything 
concrete with strategy, but plays and amuses the user with it. The intimate usage 
tactic attaches strategy to a manager by constructing one’s personal relationship to it.  
Strategic actions of managers may not arise from the intended and intentional strate-
gies, as the purely rational though would suggest, but emerge through the everyday 
“practical coping” and “dwelling” of managers when things are labeled and re-
garded as strategic (cf. Chia & Holt 2006). Strategy is an indefinite and versatile (and 
maybe even precarious) practice for managers, and they use and consume this prac-
tice in multiple ways and with means that may depart from the ideals that they them-
selves attach to it. (Cf. Whittington 2003.)  Different kinds of ideals and models 
(macro-discourses) can be attached to it depending on the prevailing situation and 
needs. 
Strategy practice includes 
ironies that should be 
covered by practice-
oriented research (Whit-
tington 2006).  
The idea of studying strategy usage contains a flavor of irony (Whittington 2007) by 
focusing on the neglected side of strategy practice. The irony lies in the fact that 
strategy can be (re)produced as one way and later used differently. Again, macro-
discourses of strategy can be used very ambiguously. They may say one thing, and 
mean something totally different. This kind of irony stems from the individuality of 
strategy practice.  
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8.2 STRATEGY CONSUMPTION AS DISCURSIVE ACTIVITY 
Besides making remarks to the practice approach to strategy, this work seeks to con-
tribute to the discursive strategy research by showing how strategy consumption is a 
creative and artful discursive activity. The previous work on strategy discourse has 
already shown that strategy is not a unanimous discourse, but more likely consists of 
different kinds of (even contradictory) ideas and types of discourse (Laine & Vaara 
2007; Mantere & Vaara 2008; Phillips et al. 2008). The results of this work show how 
different macro-discourses of strategy can co-exist within the same organization and 
be used tactically for different purposes by its managers. For instance, the spiritual 
macro-discourse is used widely as a resource to (re)produce strategy as a sacred jour-
ney into the intended vision of the organization. The same macro-discourse is, how-
ever, also used as a means to ridicule and joke about the role of the top management 
in strategy work, as is the case at Industrial and Insurance. This example shows how 
strategy discourses can be polysemic resources, having a number of meanings and 
ways of using them (Hardy et al. 2000), and that strategy consumption is a discursive 
accomplishment that capitalizes and appropriates the discursive space between the 
discursive structures (macro-discourses of strategy) and the user (manager).  
In this work, managers seem to (re)produce strategy in rather similar ways in different 
case organizations (see Table 12 above), which recalls the ideas of the rational strat-
egy approach. Here, strategy appears to managers mostly as a way or journey into the 
defined vision of the organization, which can be interpreted as a strong reference to 
the spiritual macro-discourse. Again, at every organization managers outline how 
strategy should concern the whole personnel and how it should get realized in the eve-
ryday actions of the organization, which refer to the humanistic and pragmatic macro-
discourses. To some extent, the mechanistic macro-discourse is also present in every 
case organization, as managers emphasize mechanisms and processes that relate to 
strategy. This finding confirms the Foucauldian (1972, 55) idea that discourses, as 
manifestations of power structures, dominate individuals. In practice, many managers 
do not have a choice whether or not to apply strategic practices in their work. Strategy 
is imposed on them by the zeitgeist that treats strategy as a superior management dis-
cipline (cf. Knights & Morgan 1991; Ezzamel & Willmott 2008), and the similarity 
found in the accounts of the strategy (re)production seems to indicate this. It may also 
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reveal that certain root metaphors, such as the metaphor of the journey (Inns 1996), 
have been deeply embedded and institutionalized in the strategy discourse and became 
a socially accepted way to describe strategy. The journey metaphor seems to provide 
us with a means to describe the progress, direction and purpose of an organization 
(and its strategy) in a manner that makes sense to us.  
However, the (re)production of strategy is only the other side of the strategy con-
sumption process, since managers are also able to use and subvert strategy in creative 
ways, as the other discursive practice, strategy usage, shows (see Table 13 above). 
Strategy use is an area that has been somewhat neglected in the previous research on 
strategy discourse. Through these accounts of strategy usage we cannot only learn 
what is being done with strategy, but also how strategy is consumed stylistically by 
managers (de Certeau 1988). We learn that strategy usage is a discursive activity that 
poaches, combines, and utilizes different strategy discourses artfully. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the instrumental strategy usage stems largely 
from the contextual and situational needs of managers’, departing from the rational 
ethos of strategy at some cases. The previous research on strategy discourse has iden-
tified several power effects of strategy (Knights & Morgan 1991). The results of this 
work show how managers can subtly use and apply these power effects in practice. 
For instance, managers make strategies to appear important and legitimized to others 
(Industrial & Polytechnic) and in this way use strategy to demonstrate their manage-
rial rationality and ability. They also legitimize their exercise of power to their subor-
dinates by using strategy to justify the choices and decisions that have been made (In-
surance). These examples show how strategy discourse can be used to justify and le-
gitimize many different things in organizational life (cf. Vaara & Tienari 2002; Vaara 
et al. 2004). 
Again, the playful and intimate strategy usage tactics depart even more clearly from 
the ideas of the strategy (re)production. These strategy usage tactics show how man-
agers shape and consume strategy and strategic issues actively and individually. For 
instance, the playful usage tactic seems to be highly critical towards the top manage-
ment in every case organization. At Polytechnic and Insurance, the content of the 
strategy and the methods and tools that are used in the strategy work are criticized 
harshly. It is also interesting to note how dis-identification becomes a central feature 
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of the intimate strategy use in every organization, as managers seem to produce and 
construct their role as bystanders in strategy. Strategy usage like this does not produce 
any tangible or concrete results, and can thus often be regarded as unproductive. Nev-
ertheless, as we have seen, they are anything but innocent or empty accounts, but col-
orful and interesting notions about cynicism and humor that are related to the strategy 
work and that may distance the practitioners from strategy or make them to dis-
identify from it (Fleming & Spicer 2003; Mantere 2003). They certainly influence the 
way that managers act and master strategy in their work. Accounts of the playful and 
intimate strategy usage represent also very artful and skilful styles of using strategy 
discourses.  
The discursive research on organizational discourse has been criticized of being too 
deterministic in its relation to agency. To some extent, it may have downplayed the 
role of agency in the construction, reproduction and transformation of discourse, by 
ignoring the fact that the individuals are not that passive and powerless as the Fou-
cauldian tradition of the discourse analyses might have suggested. (Reed 2000.) This 
work outlines the agency of individual managers who use and appropriate strategy 
discourse in their everyday life actively and artfully. Although strategy discourse de-
finitely “transforms managers […] into subjects” and makes them follow principles 
of it (Knights & Morgan 1991, 252), managers are also able to transform and subvert 
the strategy discourse to fit their own preferences and desires. By showing this kind of 
strategy consumption, this work stresses the dynamic relationship between discourse 
and power (Hardy & Phillips 2004), and the dynamics between agency and structure, 
by showing that although macro-discourses have power over us we can use and 
(re)produce them in novel ways.  
The intimate and playful strategy usage tactics tell us how the managers engage them-
selves in strategy personally, either struggling with its meaning to their subjectivity 
(Laine & Vaara 2007) or using it to construct their identity. The struggles become 
most obvious in the case of the playful and intimate strategy usage. Especially playful 
strategy usage is in most parts rather cynical and critical towards strategy and its 
manifestations. By showing detailed descriptions of this kind of strategy usage, this 
work shows how managers resist strategy artfully. They use and appropriate the strat-
egy discourse skillfully for their own purposes to resist and alternate it, while at the 
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same time articulate and talk in ways that do not directly confront the dominant dis-
cursive regime (Mumby 2005). By doing this, they fix the meaning of strategy dis-
course and consume it in its own terms. This finding shows that resistance towards 
strategy is seldom evident and direct, but more likely implicit, hidden and playful by 
nature.  
The previous work on strategy discourse has showed how different strategy discourses 
can either promote or prevent participation and engagement in strategy process 
(Mantere & Vaara 2008). In the case of the intimate strategy usage, this work shows 
how the lack of chances for participation, and the lack of applicability of the strategy 
can make managers dis-identify themselves from it. On the other hand, the intimate 
strategy usage also shows how managers can engage themselves strongly in strategy 
with different discursive resources. For instance, the militaristic macro-discourse can 
be used to glorify managers as strategic leaders, and the combination of militaristic 
and spiritual macro-discourse can be used to construct managers as obedient and 
submissive foot soldiers or followers of strategy (cf. Knights & Morgan 1991). These 
results support the finding that strategy discourse does not produce different subject 
positions to the individuals alone, but that also individuals can use strategy discourse 
to construct and consume their subjectivity (Laine & Vaara 2007).  
Table 15 summarizes the contribution of this work to the discursive strategy view. 
The left column indicates again the previous research findings, and the right column 
discusses how the results of this work contribute to them.  
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TABLE 15 SUMMARY OF THE CONTRIBUTION TO DISCURSIVE STRATEGY RESERACH 
DISCURSIVE VIEW 
ON STRATEGY  
CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
Strategy discourse creates 
organizational reality 
determines and justifies 
actions. Strategy dis-
course is not a unanimous 
project, but instead con-
sists of different kinds of 
ideas and types of dis-
course (Mantere & Vaara 
2008; Phillips et al. 
2008).  
Different macro-discourses of strategy co-exist within same organizations and are 
used tactically for different purposes by their managers. Strategy discourse is a 
polysemic resource having a number of meanings and ways of using it (cf. Hardy et 
al. 2000). Strategy consumption is a discursive accomplishment that capitalizes and 
appropriates the discursive space between the discursive structures (macro-
discourses of strategy) and the user (manager).  
Through different strategy usage tactics (instrumental, playful, intimate) we cannot 
only learn what is being done with strategy, but also how strategy is consumed stylis-
tically by managers (de Certeau 1988).  
Strategy discourse has 
several different power 
effects (Knights & Mor-
gan 1991).  
Managers can subtly use and apply these power effects in practice. For instance, they 
create strategies to appear important and legitimized to others (Industrial & Poly-
technic) and by this way use strategy to demonstrate their managerial rationality. 
They also legitimize their exercise of power to their subordinates by using strategy to 
justify the choices and decisions that have been made (Insurance). Hence, strategy 
discourse can be used to justify and legitimize many things in organizational life (cf. 
Vaara & Tienari 2002; Vaara et al. 2004). 
Individual agency has 
been somewhat neglected 
by Foucauldian discur-
sive strategy research 
(Reed 2000). 
Managers (re)produce strategy rather unanimously, drawing on the ideas of the ra-
tional strategy approach. This confirms the Foucauldian idea that discourses, as 
manifestations of power structures, dominate individuals. However, the strategy 
usage shows how managers are also able to use and subvert strategy discourses with 
creative ways.  
Although strategy discourse “transforms managers […] into subjects” and makes 
them to follow principles of it (Knights & Morgan 1991, 252), managers are also 
able to transform and appropriate the discourse to fit their own preferences and de-
sires. This consumption of strategy stresses the dynamic relationship between dis-
course and power (cf. Hardy & Phillips 2004) and the dynamics between agency and 
structure. By this way strategy discourse does not produce different subject positions 
to individuals alone, but also individuals can use strategy discourse to construct and 
consume their subjectivity (Laine & Vaara 2007). 
Strategy discourse can 
either promote or prevent 
participation in strategy 
work (Mantere & Vaara 
2008).  
The lack of chances to participation and of applicability of the strategy can make 
managers to dis-identify themselves from strategy. On the other hand, intimate strat-
egy usage shows how managers can also engage themselves strongly in strategy. For 
instance, the militaristic macro-discourse can be used to glorify the managers as stra-
tegic leaders and the combination of militaristic and spiritual macro-discourse can be 
used as a resource to construct managers as an obedient and submissive foot soldiers 
or followers of strategy (cf. Knights & Morgan 1991).  
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
At the beginning of the introduction chapter, there was a quotation from the manager 
of Polytechnic, who said that he/she has been “fussing with the strategy” for 20 years. 
The aim of this work has been to cover and illustrate what this fussing is all about, 
that is, to study the consumption of strategy. The primary research question of the 
study was as follows: 
- How do managers consume strategy in their talk? 
And the secondary research questions were: 
- What kinds of discursive recourses do managers use in strategy consumption? 
- What kinds of discursive practices do managers use in the strategy consump-
tion?  
- How do managers consume strategy in the different case organizations? 
The work begun with a classification of three theoretical approaches to strategy: ra-
tional, processual and practice. Each of them provided their own conception of strat-
egy and the role of the managers’ (Chapter 2). By drawing on the discursive view, the 
discursive perspective on strategy was also introduced, in order to understand how 
strategy is practiced discursively. The term consumption adopted from de Certeau 
(1988) was used as the theoretical framework to analyze the research data produced in 
three case organizations (Industrial, Polytechnic and Insurance), to understand and 
explain how managers use and apply macro-level strategy discourses in their everyday 
talk.  
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During the research process (Chapter 3), I found that the managers consume strategy 
at two levels. (Re)production is a discursive practice that brings strategy into being by 
defining and describing it at the societal and organizational level with the use of the 
macro-discourses. Here managers define what strategy is to them. Strategy usage, on 
the other hand, is the discursive practice that applies and uses strategy for the manag-
ers’ purposes and ends. It turns the Foucauldian idea of discourses as totalities more 
or less up-side-down by explaining how managers use strategy. Instrumental talk con-
structs strategy as a device, as an instrument that managers use as a means in their 
work. Playfulness represents rhetoric that distance managers from strategy and chan-
nels criticisms, disagreement, and/or frustration towards it. Intimate rhetoric describes 
managers’ own personal feelings, such as fear, insecurity or faith, towards strategy. 
Besides these two discursive practices, I also found that certain macro-discourses of 
strategy are used as resources in strategy consumption. The macro-discourses of strat-
egy represent the structure that the managers use and consume. These five discourse 
types discuss the nature, conditions, and actors of strategy work in different ways. All 
of these discourses are imported discourses (cf. Phillips et al. 2008) in the sense that 
they are not only consumed in the case organizations but can also be indentified from 
the broader strategy discourse and most likely from other organizations as well.  
By constructing a general strategy consumption framework (see Figure 6) along with 
illustrating how the elements of the framework are manifested in different case or-
ganizations (Chapters 4-7), I hope to have answered the research questions. As a con-
clusion, we could argue that managers consume strategy with more creative, context-
specific and original ways than has been previously acknowledged. The obvious dif-
ferences between managers’ accounts of the strategy (re)production and usage shows 
that while managers acknowledge strategy in a certain conventional way, they use it 
in ways that depart from this conventionalism. This is the art of practicing and using 
strategy.  
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FIGURE 6 STRATEGY CONSUMPTION FRAMEWORK 
The previous chapter discussed the theoretical relevance of the results. In the follow-
ing, some practical recommendations are given based on the results. In terms of the 
practical relevance, two kinds of implications can be formulated from the results. 
Firstly, the results have something to say to the individual manager who is trying to 
cope with strategy in his/her everyday work. Secondly, some recommendations can 
also be made to organizations that are trying to manage and organize individuals, that 
is, strategy consumers. Finally, at the end of the chapter, the credibility of the findings 
is discussed and some further research questions are proposed.  
9.1 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
As the results show, an individual manager can consume strategy with multiple ways 
for his/her own benefit. For instance, the instrumental usage tactic has proven that 
strategy can be a versatile tool that can be used by managers for different functions 
and ends. For a new manager, strategy provides an opportunity to get to know his/her 
organization and its business conditions, as was the case at Industrial, where managers 
used strategy to analyze and learn about their business environment. It seems that 
while formulating strategy, managers are allowed to ask simple questions (“Who are 
our customers?”) and to take some distance from their everyday work. At Industrial, 
managers also used strategy to set targets and objectives, both for themselves and 
their subordinates. At Insurance, managers used strategy as intent, which they concre-
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tized and executed as part of their jobs as managers. In these cases, strategy seemed to 
provide managers with the means to lead their people in a target-oriented way in an 
executive mode.  
Strategy may also provide managers with a means to legitimize their own work, as 
was the case at Industrial and Polytechnic, where managers used strategy to ensure the 
meaningfulness and importance of their work, both for the internal and external stake-
holders. At some points, it seemed that by not formulating their own strategy, manag-
ers risked losing their importance in and connectedness to the rest of the organization. 
At Insurance, strategy provided managers with a means to justify and explain different 
decisions and choices for their subordinates, who might from time to time question 
their relevance. In tough situations like this, strategy may provide managers with 
valuable support.  
Strategy can also equip managers to influence the sense of meaningfulness felt by 
their subordinates. Both at Polytechnic and Insurance, managers sought to motivate 
their subordinates with strategy. It seems that strategy may provide a means to create 
a sense of meaningfulness and importance among subordinates, and in this way help 
managers to “win their hearts.“ At Polytechnic, strategy was also used for solving 
some central problems that managers faced in their units. When labeling a problem 
”strategic,“ managers may have used strategy to outline and highlight the importance 
of the problem and to create a sense of urgency for solving it.  
In practice, managers spend plenty of their time communicating and interacting strat-
egy with others. Strategy language is their resource for shaping issues and changes 
and for gaining influence over people. The way strategy is consumed and used by 
them influences and shapes the way others perceive strategy and their role in it. (John-
son et al. 2008, 17-22.) In this work, five different resource bases (macro-discourses 
of strategy) were identified and explained. This work may help managers to reflect on 
their own consumption styles of strategy and even equip them with some new ideas 
on how to use strategy in their talk. This can further improve their leadership skills 
and abilities.  
However, my intention is not to say that managers should use strategy purely for their 
own interest and ends opportunistically, individualistically and unethically without 
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paying attention to the benefits of others. From my viewpoint, strategy is often a team 
effort that requires cooperation, engagement and participation throughout the organi-
zation. An organization full of individual managers performing and consuming their 
own strategies driven mostly by their self-interests might be a dangerous and disas-
trous experiment, as the recent global credit crunch has shown.  
This work has shown that strategy is consumed and used in ways that are more crea-
tive and original than is usually thought and considered. It is obvious that strategy 
consumption cannot be “managed,” since it is part of our very human nature. How-
ever, too many variations in strategic management or in a corporate strategy within 
the same organization can cause chaos and disorder. This is why it might be useful to 
try to create coherence regarding how to lead and manage “strategically” within an 
organization. Strategy instructions or a user’s manual might provide the needed co-
herence and coordination to organization’s strategy praxis, in terms of the instrumen-
tal strategy use. Again, the coherence in the strategy rhetoric and usage of managers’ 
increases the likelihood of creating commitment towards strategic targets (cf. Jarzab-
kowski & Sillince 2007).  
Here we cannot ignore the pessimism and criticism with which the playful tactic tar-
gets strategy. It seems that to a great deal this criticism stemmed from the fact that the 
managers felt themselves outsiders and disrespected (Mantere 2008) in their organiza-
tions’ strategy work. Strategy may have appeared to them as ironic and odd, which 
made them distance themselves from it and to play with it. All criticism cannot be si-
lenced, and neither should it be, since critical and playful strategy thinking, mani-
fested in the playful tactic, may encourage and fuel innovative “out of the box” think-
ing, which may improve strategic renewal (cf. Burgelman 1983) in an organization. 
However, cynicism about strategy, which can be harmful for the organization, might 
be reduced by providing people with opportunities to influence and shape the struc-
tures they are using, as cynicism may originate from lacking or non-existing participa-
tion chances (cf. Mantere & Vaara 2008). This is something that should be taken into 
account when planning strategy processes, since the way managers communicate 
strategy influences how their own subordinates understand and adopt it (Suominen, 
Karkulehto, Sipponen & Hämäläinen 2009).  
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With the case of the intimate tactic, the managers construct their subjectivity and 
identity in relation and with regard to strategy. This means that strategy is taken very 
seriously by many managers. In every case organization, there were managers who 
wanted to dis-identify themselves from strategy. At Polytechnic, some managers felt 
intimidated and humiliated by the strategy work. Previous research has shown (Guth 
& MacMillan 1986) how the self-interest of middle managers’ motivates their degree 
of commitment to strategy implementation. The evidence shows that middle manag-
ers, who believe that their self-interests are compromised, cannot only redirect strat-
egy, delay its implementation or reduce the quality of its implementation, but also 
sabotage the entire strategy. (Ibid.) Based on this, it is easy to suggest that no-one 
should feel outsider or unimportant in strategy work.  
9.2 CREDIBILITY OF THE FINDINGS 
In this work, I have applied a discursive approach to strategy. Since discourse analysis 
is not a clear-cut research method as such, but more likely a field that allows different 
styles and approaches, a researcher needs to develop his/her own way of conducting a 
discourse analytic study. I chose to follow Fairclough’s (1992) ideas when construct-
ing a research and analysis design for this work, although I was not as critical towards 
the discursive structures as he might have been. Fairclough’s approach merges differ-
ent traditions of discourse analysis together, which suits my work fairly well. How-
ever, de Certeau’s (1988) thinking and ideas about consumption have also influenced 
this work a great deal. The research data were produced in three case organizations 
during 2003-2008. In this work, I have tried to ensure the anonymity of both the case 
organizations and interviewed managers by writing the case descriptions in a way that 
makes them un-recognizable. By doing this, I hope to have ensured the ethicality of 
this work.  
The credibility of the discourse analytic work like this, which draws on constructivism 
and post-structuralism (see Chapter 3), and seeks to follow the contextual reasoning 
strategy (cf. Ketokivi & Mantere 2010), calls for increased reflexivity from the re-
searcher conducting the research. Reflexivity means paying close concern to the ways 
in which the research is carried out. It requires understanding and reflecting on how 
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the research process was carried out and how it has influenced and shaped its out-
comes. In discursive research, both the results and the work itself are results of an in-
terpretation. The research process of this work was described in Chapter 3.  
Phillips and Hardy (2002, 83-85) have identified eight dimensions of reflexivity that 
should be acknowledged and reviewed when conducting a discourse analytic research. 
In the following, I will reflect and discuss those dimensions in terms of my own work. 
The first dimension, according to Phillips and Hardy, is to acknowledge that language 
constructs rather than reveals our social reality. This applies not only to the language 
used by the managers in this study, but also to the language that I have used when 
writing up this dissertation. (Ibid.) For instance, the case descriptions provided in 
Chapters 5-7, which described the contexts of consumption at the case organizations, 
are my personal constructions and interpretations of them, not objective accounts or 
reports on what they are “in reality.” Some other person might have interpreted them 
differently and produced different kinds of descriptions. However, in this work I have 
tried to “validate” my descriptions and interpretations by asking my colleagues, who 
were present in the same organizations, to read and evaluate my case descriptions in 
order to reflect and compare whether they have interpreted the “facts” related to them 
in the same way. The feedback I received from them seems to confirm my findings. I 
also decided to use de Certeau’s idea of consumption as the theoretical lens in this 
work, which means that it has influenced the work and its results. The results of this 
work, although produced empirically, stem from this paradigm and thinking, which 
means that the empirical evidence of strategy consumption has been constructed 
within this particular paradigm and line of thinking (Alvesson & Kärreman 2007). 
The second dimension of the reflexivity is to study and identify the historical proc-
esses that underline and interact with particular texts. This means that the researcher 
should recognize the broader historical discourses that influence the particular lan-
guage use. (Phillips & Hardy ibid.) In this research, I have showed how the discursive 
activity of the managers takes place in at least two kinds of contexts. Firstly, I have 
shown how the local contexts, here the atmosphere and situation of the case organiza-
tions, affect and influence the discursive activity of managers. Secondly, I have illus-
trated how the managers use different kinds of macro-discourses of strategy when 
(re)producing and using strategy in their talk. By showing this type of intertextuality 
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(cf. Fairclough 1992, 124-136), I hope to have described how the construction of our 
social reality is a multilayer process including many levels and types of discourse that 
are highly interrelated to each other.  
Thirdly, in order to be reflexive, the researcher should allow different voices to per-
vade the text (Phillips & Hardy ibid.). Here, I have tried to locate different kinds of 
voices and even struggles that have been present in the data. Actually, the main idea 
of this work has been to cover those clandestine and often hidden tactics of consump-
tion that may not comply with the spirit of the dominant strategy discourse and that 
are normally missed and by-passed in strategy research. For instance, the playful tac-
tic presented in this work consists of talk that might often be silenced in many organ-
izational contexts.  
The fourth dimension outlines that not all possible voices appear in text that is being 
analyzed. Some actors and subject positions will remain necessarily invisible, while 
some others will be privileged. Phillips and Hardy (ibid.) outline how discourse can-
not be studied in its entirety; only clues and small subsets of it can be found in texts. 
This also applies to this work, and might also be considered as its weakness. The dis-
cursive construction and consumption of strategy is studied in only three case organi-
zations, and only some of their managers were interviewed for this work. Had there 
been more case organizations, more managers, and maybe even in different countries, 
the results might have been different. I also left some voices and comments out of the 
analyses by focusing clearly on the talk that was related to strategy and strategy work. 
To some extent, a discursive work like this is always an incomplete project in this 
sense.  
The fifth dimension calls for multiple meanings and alternate representations that 
should be covered in the discourse analytic work (ibid.). In this work, I have distanced 
myself from the idea that the strategy consumption should be presented in plain terms. 
Instead, I have aimed at showing how the strategy consumption process is a diverse 
enterprise that embodies a number of different representations and rhetorical tactics. 
Even the usage tactics presented in this work are not totally equal and commensurable 
in terms of their content and form. The instrumental strategy usage is very different 
from the playful and intimate usages, and vice versa. Also, within the usage tactics 
there are different kinds of streams of usage that make them polyphonic.  
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Sixthly, a discourse analytic work should engage in a debate among and between dif-
ferent theoretical communities and discussions (ibid.). In this work I have tried to fol-
low this advice by reflecting the results and findings to different bodies of knowledge, 
such as to the practice approach to strategy and to the discursive strategy view previ-
ously in this work. I have also tried to stimulate practical strategy discussion by pro-
viding advice to individual managers and organizations in terms of the research find-
ings in this work. Potter and Wetherell (1984, 171-172) call this the “fruitfulness” of 
research, which means the scope of an analytic scheme to make sense of new kinds of 
discourses and to create novel solutions. Again, Giddens (2006, 103-104) outlines 
how research should assign counter-intuitiveness, by which he means the ability and 
power of theory to break out of what common sense would suggest and provide a 
fresh and new perspective on a phenomenon that puzzles us. Here, I have tried to re-
fresh strategy research by illustrating how managers use strategy discourse in novel 
and creative ways by using de Certeau’s (1988) idea of consumption as a theoretical 
lens. As mentioned before, there are not many works that have applied this approach 
previously (cf. Jarzabkowski 2004; De la Ville & Mounoud 2003), which already 
makes it an exciting and fresh perspective within strategy research.  
Seventhly, Phillips and Hardy (ibid.) outline how a researcher applying the discursive 
approach should not hide behind dominant conventions or rhetoric, but instead take 
responsibility for his/her text as its author. I have sought to do this by writing this dis-
sertation largely in the active voice, to outline the choices that I have made during the 
research process, and to make it as transparent for the reader as possible. Since there 
are no ”ready-made analysis solutions” available for the researcher in the field of dis-
course analysis, the analysis has to be customized to fit the work in question and this 
framework needs to be explained in detail for the reader. In the fourth chapter of this 
work, I attempted to reveal the logic and progress of this research process.  
Finally, Phillips and Hardy (ibid.) advise the researcher to be aware of the political 
aspects of the research process. That is, the researcher reporting his/her results is not 
only uncovering our social reality, but constructing it, which means using power. 
Here, I should be aware of my ideological and theoretical underpinnings that effect 
my interpretations and might renew some power effects. It should be remembered that 
I was involved rather heavily in the strategy work of the case organizations of this 
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study, especially at Industrial and Insurance, where I worked as a consultant for al-
most two years. On the one hand, this may have provided me with some information 
and data that I would not have had produced otherwise. On the other hand, I was in-
volved in their culture and discourse rather thoroughly, which may have influenced 
my interpretations and thinking. In any case, I have tried to describe my role in each 
case organization, which I hope will increase the credibility and reflectivity of this 
work.  
9.3 FURTHER RESEARCH 
As was mentioned, the fruitfulness of a research depends upon its ability to generate 
new ideas and stimulate further research (cf. Giddens 2006, 103-104). Based on the 
results of this work, at least four different paths for further research could be identi-
fied.  
Firstly, in this work, strategy consumption has been studied at the level of top and 
middle managers. In order to broaden the scope, further research attempts should con-
centrate on the employee level. I am confident that strategy is consumed differently at 
the employee level, especially in the current times of economic recession, when strat-
egy is used to justify difficult decisions. Thus, it would be interesting to compare how 
different groups within an organization consume strategy and strategic issues. There 
would certainly be some similarities and differences in the (re)production and usage 
of strategy, and it would be interesting to study how they affect organizations’ suc-
cess.  
Secondly, it would be interesting to take a more ethnographical and longitudinal ap-
proach to strategy consumption, and to study how a group of managers (and employ-
ees) would consume strategy in their talk during a longer period of time. This kind of 
approach would increase our understanding on how usage tactics evolve and change 
over time. It would be also interesting to study how individuals use different kinds of 
consumption tactics in different forums and platforms when addressing strategy to 
different audiences.  
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Thirdly, it would be interesting to concentrate on a single strategy usage tactic pre-
sented in this work, for instance the playful strategy use, and study how it is mani-
fested in different organizations and contexts. The playful strategy usage embodies an 
interesting form of resistance towards strategy and thus it would be interesting to 
study what provokes and fuels this kind of consumption. The more I think about play-
fulness in the strategy consumption, the more aware I become of the fact that I am 
also a rather playful strategy consumer myself. To me, playfulness seems to provide a 
break from everyday routines and a way to approach possible problems and deadlocks 
by means of humor.  
One of the limitations of this work is the fact that strategy consumption has been stud-
ied at the level of the strategic management practice. We still know rather little about 
how certain individual strategic practices, such as the Balanced Score Card or Porter’s 
Five Forces, are used in different contexts and situations. Further research should thus 
narrow its scope and focus on a single practice or practices and study how they are 
used as strategy practices.  
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11 APPENDICES 
11.1 APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW OUTLINE OF INDUSTRIAL 
The interviewee: title, job description and group/department 
Have there been significant changes in your work lately? What kinds of changes? 
1 How do you perceive Industrial’s future? 
2 What do you understand by the term strategy? (What is associated with strategy?) 
3 What do you understand by the term strategy implementation? (What is associ-
ated with strategy implementation?) 
4 What do you understand by the term strategy process? (What is associated with 
strategy implementation?) 
5 Who creates Industrial’s strategy? (How do they create it?)  
6 Who realizes Industrial’s strategy? (How do they realize it?) 
6.1 What kinds of participation opportunities do they have in Industrial’s strat-
egy process? 
6.2 What is your / your unit’s role in the Industrial’s strategy process? 
7 Which events are most important at Industrial’s strategy process?  
8 How familiar you are with this figure? (The interviewer shows a picture of Indus-
trial’s strategy process.) 
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9 Could you explain briefly how the strategy process operates? 
10 How is Industrial’s strategy shared into business plans? 
11 What is done in your site / BU / area of responsibility  
11.1 How well does this part of the strategy process work?  
12 How are the business plans linked to sites’ priorities? 
12.1 What is done in your site / BU / area of responsibility  
12.2  How well does this part of the strategy process work?  
13 How are the team and personal plans linked to sites’ priorities? 
13.1 What is done in your site / BU / area of responsibility  
13.2 How well does this part of the strategy process work?  
14 What kind of feedback channels can be found between the company center, BUs 
and sites? 
15 How well does Industrial’s current strategy process work? 
16 What are the weaknesses of the Industrial’s strategy process? Explain! 
17 What are the strengths of the Industrial’s strategy process? Explain! 
18 Does Industrial offer enough resources in order to realize its strategy?  
19 Is Industrial’s strategy realize in a desired way? 
20 Does Industrial’s organization structure promote strategy realization?  
Any questions or comments? Thank you! 
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11.2 APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW OUTLINES OF POLYTECHNIC 
INTERVIEW OUTLINE FOR THE TOP MANAGERS 
1 How do you perceive the future of Polytechnic? 
2 What do you understand by the term strategy? (What is associated with strategy?)  
3 What do you understand by the term strategy implementation? (What is associ-
ated with it?)  
4 How do you participate in Polytechnic’s strategy process? (Strategy work) 
5 How would you define your role in strategy implementation? 
6 How do you communicate strategies? What practices are related to the strategy 
communication?  
7 How well do you know Polytechnic’s strategy? (What is associated with it?)  
8 Are there problems with strategy implementation? (Questionnaire 3) 
9 How do you perceive the ability of Polytechnic personnel’s to participate in the 
strategy process?  
10 How and what kind of feedback do you get from your subordinates related to 
strategy? (Tell a concrete example.) 
11 What kinds of discoveries and findings have you made in your work that relate to 
the strategy? (How did it happen and why? Where did it lead on to?) 
12 What is meant by R&D operations in your opinion (at Polytechnic)?  
13 What is the role of the R&D operations in Polytechnic’s strategy? 
14 Why are R&D operations important for Polytechnic? 
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15 What have you done to promote R&D operations in the education processes at 
your faculty? (Questionnaire 1. Pick the methods that you have used and choose 
the five best.) 
About these five methods:  
16 Why do they work well? 
17 Who has participated in these methods? (In what way?) 
18 In which other situations and with who have you discussed R&D operations at 
Polytechnic?  
19 What have you done to promote the R&D operations in education?  
20 How do you know that Polytechnic’s personnel have adopted the idea of R&D 
operations? 
21 Which matters associated with R&D operations have been the most difficult to 
explain to the personnel?  
22 What kinds of discoveries and findings have your subordinates made that relate to 
the R&D operations? (Tell a concrete example.) 
23 What have you done to ensure that the members of the personnel have interpreted 
the idea of the R&D operations in a parallel manner? 
24 What kinds of abilities (competence) are required from Polytechnic’s with regard 
to the R&D operations? 
25 On what level would you say that these abilities are at present? 
26 How are R&D operations present in Polytechnic’s objectives? 
27 In what way are R&D operations present in Polytechnic’s work practices right 
now? 
28 In what way should R&D operations be present in Polytechnic’s work practices 
right now? 
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29 What is the most central content that you have communicated to Polytechnic’s 
personnel concerning R&D operations? 
30 What sorts of goals have been set for your work? Who has set them? How are 
R&D operations present in these goals? 
31 How are the R&D operations present in your work? (Please provide an example.) 
32 Do you feel that you have been given a sufficient opportunity for influencing the 
goals related to R&D operations?  
(If not: how would you have wanted to influence them?) 
33 In your opinion, what is the single most important thing that should be done to 
promote R&D operations at Polytechnic? 
34 Does Polytechnic’s strategy realize in a desired way?  
Questions? Comments? Were the questions difficult? Thank you!  
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INTERVIEW OUTLINE FOR THE MIDDLE MANAGERS 
1 How do you perceive the future of Polytechnic? 
2 What do you understand by the term strategy? (What is associated with strategy?)  
3 What do you understand by the term strategy implementation? (What is associ-
ated with it?)  
4 How do you participate in Polytechnic’s strategy process? (Strategy work) 
5 How would you define your role in strategy implementation? 
6 How do you communicate strategies to your subordinates? What practices are 
related to the strategy communication?  
7 Are there problems with strategy implementation? (Questionnaire 3) 
8 How do you perceive the Polytechnic personnel’s ability to participate in the 
strategy process?  
9 How and what kind of feedback do you give to your supervisor related to strat-
egy? (Please give a concrete example.) 
10 How and what kind of feedback do you get from your subordinates related to 
strategy? (Tell a concrete example.) 
11 What is meant by R&D operations in your opinion (at Polytechnic)?  
12 What is the role of R&D operations in Polytechnic’s strategy? 
13 Why R&D operations are important for Polytechnic? 
14 In what occasion did you get to know about the role R&D operations in educa-
tion?  
15 Are there things related to R&D operations that are unclear? What are those 
things? 
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16 What kinds of discoveries and findings have you made in your work that relate to 
the strategy? (How did it happen and why? Where did it lead on to?) 
17 In which other situations and with who have you discussed R&D operations at 
Polytechnic?  
18 How the understanding of the role of R&D operations has been supported? 
19 How do you know that Polytechnic’s personnel have adopted the idea of R&D 
operations? 
20 Which matters associated with R&D operations have been the most difficult to 
explain to the personnel?  
21 What have you done to ensure that the members of the personnel have interpreted 
the idea of R&D operations in a parallel manner? 
22 What kinds of discoveries and findings have your subordinates made that relate to 
R&D operations? (Please, tell a concrete example.) 
23 What kinds of abilities (competence) are required from Polytechnic’s personnel 
with regard to R&D operations? 
24 How are R&D operations present in Polytechnic’s objectives? 
25 In what way are R&D operations present in Polytechnic’s work practices right 
now? 
26 In what way should R&D operations be present in Polytechnic’s work practices 
right now? 
27 What have you done to promote R&D operations in the education processes at 
your faculty? (Questionnaire 1. Pick the methods that you have used and choose 
the five best.) 
About these five methods:  
28 Why do they work well? 
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29 Who has participated in these methods? (In what way?) 
30 What is the most central content that you have communicated to Polytechnic’s 
personnel concerning R&D operations? 
31 What sorts of goals have been set for your work? Who has set them? How are 
R&D operations present in these goals? 
32 In what ways do you realize R&D operations in education?  
33 What motivates you to realize R&D operations in education? 
34 Do you feel that you have been given a sufficient opportunity for influencing the 
goals related to R&D operations?  
(If not: how would you have wanted to influence them?) 
35 Do you believe in the realization of R&D operations in education?  
36 In your opinion, what is the single most important thing that should be done to 
promote R&D operations at Polytechnic? 
37 Does Polytechnic’s strategy realize in a desired way?  
Questions? Comments? Were the questions difficult? Thank you!  
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QUESTIONNAIRE 1: IN WHAT WAY HAVE YOU CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROMO-
TION OF THE R&D OPERATIONS AT POLYTECHNIC? 
 
  I have 
used this 
 Communication  
 Meetings  
 Briefings  
 Letters and communications  
 Notice boards  
 Internal magazines  
 Intranet  
 Mailing lists (e-mail)  
 Unofficial discussions  
 With superiors  
 With subordinates  
 With co-workers (associates)  
 Cultural phenomena  
 Stories  
 Symbols  
 Slogans  
 Personnel development  
 Training  
 Goal-setting discussions  
 Socialization / breaking in  
 Personnel choices  
 Rewarding  
 Planning  
 Budget monitoring and control  
 Business plans  
 Operational and performance objectives  
 Operations/processes  
 Project management systems  
 Quality systems  
 Changes in organizational structure  
 Networks and partnerships  
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 Something else (what)?  
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QUESTIONNAIRE 3: PROBLEMS IN STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 
The problems presented in the list below are typical to many organizations. Please 
assess the weight of these problems in strategy implementation at Polytechnic. 
 
I don’t 
know 
Not a 
problem 
A small 
problem 
A rela-
tively big 
problem 
A big 
problem 
Feasibility of the strategy      
The strategy is not applicable in every part of the 
organization 
0 1 2 3 4 
Different areas/issues in the strategy are in con-
flict with each other 
0 1 2 3 4 
The organization’s environment hinders strategy 
implementation 
0 1 2 3 4 
Awareness of the strategy      
The strategy is being deliberately kept a secret 0 1 2 3 4 
It is assumed that the strategy is already known 0 1 2 3 4 
The communication of the strategy has been 
insufficient 
0 1 2 3 4 
The communication of strategy to different or-
ganizational levels is not perceived as necessary 
0 1 2 3 4 
The flow of information is disrupted at some 
point 
0 1 2 3 4 
The strategy is not correctly understood  0 1 2 3 4 
Organizational systems      
There are not enough resources for strategy im-
plementation 
0 1 2 3 4 
Working procedures conflict with strategy 0 1 2 3 4 
The organizational structure conflicts with strat-
egy 
0 1 2 3 4 
The connection between strategy and rewarding 
system(s) is insufficient 
0 1 2 3 4 
Different personal roles have not been ade-
quately defined 
0 1 2 3 4 
The concretization of strategy does not succeed 0 1 2 3 4 
Commitment to strategy      
The management does not sufficiently commit 
itself to implementation 
0 1 2 3 4 
The middle-management does not sufficiently 
commit itself to implementation 
0 1 2 3 4 
The operational personnel does not sufficiently 
commit itself to implementation 
0 1 2 3 4 
There is not enough faith for the realization of 
strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 
Strategy implementation conflicts with organiza-
tional culture 
0 1 2 3 4 
APPENDICES   
205 
Strategy implementation conflicts with certain 
personal goals or interests 
0 1 2 3 4 
Other activities and events divert attention from 
strategy implementation 
0 1 2 3 4 
Monitoring and development of implementation       
The implementation is not evaluated 0 1 2 3 4 
After any change the old direction of activities is 
soon regained 
0 1 2 3 4 
There is no reaction to perceived problems in 
implementation 
0 1 2 3 4 
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11.3 APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW OUTLINE OF INSURANCE 
1 First, would you tell a little about your job? What do you do? 
2 What do you understand by the concept of strategy? 
3 How would you define communication? 
4 In your opinion, what is strategy communication? What does the word strategy 
communication bring to mind? 
5 How is strategy communicated at Insurance? 
6 Are you satisfied with Insurance’s strategy communication? If not, why? 
7 Who communicates strategy at Insurance? 
8 Describe your own role in strategy communication / strategy communication pro-
cess 
8.1 How would you develop your role in strategy communication? 
8.2 What kind of duties and tasks do you have relating to strategy communica-
tion? 
8.3 How do you experience / feel about your role (pleasant, unpleasant, impor-
tant, something you must do but don’t like)? 
8.4 How would you develop your role in strategy communication?  
9 How is strategy communicated at Insurance? In your opinion, what are the central 
events and occasions in strategy communication? (NOTE: also “informal” events 
and occasions) 
10 What kinds of strategy communication events have you participated during the 
last year? 
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11 In what kinds of situations and events have you communicated strategy? Give 
examples. 
12 How would you develop the way strategy is communicated at Insurance? 
13 In your opinion, what kind of knowledge, skills and competencies does strategy 
communication require from you? 
14 In your opinion, what kinds of things related to strategy are the most difficult to 
communicate in an understandable fashion? Give an example. 
15 What kinds of things related to strategy are easiest to communicate? Give an ex-
ample.  
16 What kind of routines / practices / tools / methods you use in strategy communi-
cation? (Symbols, stories, slogans, BSC, discussions, meetings, etc.) 
16.1 What kind of things you consider to be most effective in strategy communi-
cation? 
16.2 Do you think you have enough tools and methods that support strategy 
communication at your disposal? 
16.3 How would you further develop the tools and methods used in strategy 
communication? 
17 How have you experienced the (human) interaction regarding strategy communi-
cation between you and your 
17.1 Subordinates? 
17.2 Superiors? 
17.3 Peers? 
18 What kind of things  
18.1 Make interaction more difficult? 
18.2 Make interaction easier? 
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19 During the last year, what kinds of strategy communication events have you par-
ticipated in? 
19.1 How would you describe these events: What they were like, what kinds of 
feelings did they evoke in you, why? 
19.2 What kind of (human) interaction took place in these events? 
20 How would you describe the last strategy communication event you consider 
successful where you yourself actively interacted and communicated (strategy)?  
21 How would you describe the last strategy communication event you consider un-
successful where you yourself actively interacted and communicated (strategy)? 
22 Is there something you think we failed to account for? Would you like to add 
something? 
 
